This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005550 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2029 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR MOPS PINR IZ CY AF TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON NEW TLFC COMMANDER 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The Ambassador encouraged General Buyukanit 
to discuss ways to improve our Army-to-Army relationship when 
the latter sees USAREUR CG General Bell in October. 
Buyukanit suggested that both sides made mistakes in the 
attack helicopter tender and expected the next time the GOT 
would utilize a "simpler model."  For Turkey's assumption of 
command of ISAF next year, TLFC is planning to send a large 
corps headquarters and up to two reinforced battalions plus 
perhaps a brigade headquarters.  Buyukanit hinted that 
canceling future years' Toros exercise on Cyprus might be 
difficult, and suggested that support for a settlement may be 
waning in northern Cyprus due to the international 
community's disappointing response to the Turkish Cypriots 
positive vote on the Annan Plan.  The general thought Iran 
was a "crazy country," and expressed concern over 
developments in Kirkuk.  Buyukanit appeared to be already 
thinking about issues he will face if he assumes command of 
TGS in 2006 as most observers expect.  Engagement with him 
will be important for the future of our security 
relationship.  End summary. 
 
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Improving Relations 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador congratulated General Mehmet Yasar 
Buyukanit on assuming command of the Turkish Land Forces 
Command (TLFC) when he called on the general September 24. 
Army CSA GEN Schoomaker was looking to identify a time when 
he might invite Buyukanit to visit the US, he added.  The 
Ambassador said he understood Buyukanit would be attending 
the October 5-7 Conference of European Armies where he would 
see USAREUR CG GEN Bell who would welcome thoughts on how to 
improve our bilateral Army-to-Army relationship. 
 
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Transformation and Modernization 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador raised military transformation and 
asked Buyukanit for his thoughts, particularly in light of 
the cancellation of the tenders for attack helicopters and 
other systems.  Regarding the attack helicopter competition, 
Buyukanit noted that he had worked on that project for five 
of its six years during assignments in Ankara.  In July, 
2003, as he was leaving the Turkish General Staff (TGS), 
there had been an agreement on a new model for the project 
and he had hoped that Congressional notification would occur 
in September.  He suggested both sides had made errors that 
derailed the project, although he complained of hearing that 
with every proposal from Bell, the price went up.  He and the 
Ambassador agreed that the failure of that procurement effort 
was a pity for both sides.  Buyukanit said the new request 
for proposals (RFP) would utilize a "simpler model."  TLFC 
had finished working on the RFP and had sent it to the 
Turkish General Staff (TGS) for final review.  In response to 
a question, the Ambassador confirmed that the USMC's AH-1Z 
program was still on track, despite rumors to the contrary. 
ODC Chief Maj.Gen. Sutton urged that Turkey consider the pros 
and cons of the Foreign Military Sale system and direct 
commercial sale.  In one recent case, a country discovered 
FMS to be considerably cheaper than DCS. 
 
¶4. (C) On TLFC's hope for a new main battle tank, Buyukanit 
cited two reasons for this program's initial failure, price 
and the co-development requirement which only the Ukraine was 
prepared to meet.  Now, Turkey plans on applying the 
technology and know-how it is acquiring through its M-60 
upgrade program with Israel to the development of a new tank. 
 A foreign partner would still be needed, he said, to provide 
whatever portion of the tank that Turkey still was not able 
to do itself. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador noted that American defense equipment 
was the best in the world and his job included encouraging 
Turkey to buy American products.  Beyond the quality and 
commercial considerations, however, was the strategic 
interest of both countries in having their militaries 
transform in ways that preserve interoperability.  In an 
earlier meeting with the Undersecretary of Defense 
Industries, the Ambassador recalled making the point that 
excessive source code demands threatened to exclude American 
firms from competing.  Buyukanit understood, noting that even 
Israel had refused to release the technology for a few key 
components of the M-60 fire control system.  Buyukanit and 
the Ambassador agreed on the need for transparency, goodwill 
and open communication to resolve problems related to these 
types of programs. 
 
------------ 
ISAF Command 
------------ 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador expressed appreciation for Turkey's 
offer to lead ISAF again beginning in February 2005. 
Buyukanit said that TLFC was planning on deploying a 
reinforced headquarters element that is "much larger" than 
the typical corps headquarters.  While no decisions had yet 
been made on what other forces Turkey would send, TLFC was 
planning on either one or two reinforced battalions plus 
"maybe" a brigade headquarters that could command the Turkish 
battalion(s) plus other countries' forces.  He worried that 
NATO was not planning to hold a force generation conference 
until November, which he thought would be late for forces to 
arrive by February.  On funding, Buyukanit said that the GOT 
was working on what support might be received from NATO and 
what would be covered by national contributions.  Regardless, 
"there will be no problem," he said. 
 
------ 
Cyprus 
------ 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador said the USG was grateful that Turkey 
and Greece had agreed to cancel their fall exercises on 
Cyprus this year.  Buyukanit responded that, "as a soldier, 
exercises are necessary."  Ankara recognized that now was a 
sensitive time, but soldiers must exercise.  Regarding 
measures to reduce northern Cypriots' isolation, Buyukanit 
thought the measures to date were disappointing and impacting 
on Turkish Cypriot public opinion.  The pro-solution camp was 
losing support, he said, because they have received nothing 
for the positive vote on the Annan Plan.  The Ambassador 
noted that the US was providing $30 million in aid directly 
to northern Cyprus and taking other measures to ease the 
north's isolation.  He offered to provide a list of these 
measures.  Buyukanit lamented the continued lack of direct 
flights.  The Ambassador explained that there were many legal 
issues involved in direct flights, including some with ICAO. 
While direct flights to/from the United States would not be 
commercially viable, some code sharing arrangements might be 
possible. 
 
¶8. (C) Buyukanit thought the UNSYG report on Cyprus was "not 
perfect, but not too bad."  The Ambassador noted that the 
lack of Security Council action on the report would likely be 
discussed by the Secretary and FonMin Gul in New York.  On 
that and the UNFICYP renewal, the Embassy would remain in 
close contact with MFA, he told the general. 
 
------------------------- 
Iranian Nuclear Ambitions 
------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Turning to Iran, the Ambassador asked Buyukanit why a 
country rich in oil and gas needed to develop nuclear power, 
let alone the entire fuel cycle, and whether a nuclear-armed 
Iran was a concern for Turkey.  Buyukanit responded that 
Iran's nuclear program was a concern for the entire region. 
The Ambassador asked whether Iran was continuing to take 
action against the PKK/Kongra Gel as it had on the eve of PM 
Erdogan's recent visit to Tehran.  Buyukanit said that when 
it came to fighting the PKK/Kongra Gel, one must talk not 
only of Iran but also Syria and Iraq.  "Iran is a crazy 
country.  It poses a big threat for the region."  Tehran has 
supported the PKK/Kongra Gel for many years, he continued, 
with terrorists staying in Iranian barracks near the Turkish 
border.  Many people say Turkey has an important geostrategic 
position, he observed; "I hate it."  It would be better if 
Turkey were farther north, he mused, rather than surrounded 
by the Caucasus, Iran, Syria and Iraq.  The Ambassador noted 
that the Iranian threat was not only from potential nuclear 
weapons, but also from increasingly longer ranged missiles. 
Buyukanit responded that the "ideological threat" was greater 
than the proliferation threat.  Al Qaida and others "are 
mad," he said.  "If they had WMD, they would use it."  He 
thought Iran would be a good place to "impose moderate Islam." 
 
-------------------------- 
Iraq: PKK, LNOs and Kirkuk 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The Ambassador informed Buyukanit of the recent 
demarche by Embassy Baghdad to the IIG on taking action 
against the PKK/Kongra Gel.  In addition, the Embassy was 
encouraging MFA to be more active in engaging the IIG.  Our 
Embassy in Baghdad was prepared to help.  But getting 
accurate information on developments in Iraq can be a 
struggle.  The recent operation in Talafar demonstrated the 
value of getting real-time information to prevent problems. 
In that case, reports from the TFO's liaison officer (LNO) to 
the Turkish Special Forces, COL Rollinson, were invaluable. 
He understood that the Turkish LNOs on the ground were a bit 
frustrated at the time it took to get into Talafar to see the 
situation for themselves.  Having LNOs actively engaged 
improves transparency and reduces misunderstandings. 
Buyukanit agreed. 
 
¶11. (C) Buyukanit asked about developments in Kirkuk.  The 
Ambassador stated that no forceful change in the ethnic 
balance in the city should occur.  There was a property 
restitution process that, although slow in getting 
established, should work transparently and on a sound legal 
basis.  The US understands Turkey's concerns about how 
potentially dangerous the situation in Kirkuk could be for 
Iraq's future, he added. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Comment: In Command and Preparing for Command 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Comment: Buyukanit was extremely pleasant and 
engaging during this one-hour meeting, as he had been during 
the Ambassador's call on him last May at First Army 
headquarters in Istanbul.  He has been commander of TLFC for 
only four weeks but already appears in command of not only 
the Land Forces but also Turkey's national security issues; 
this is not surprising for a former Deputy Chief of TGS and 
the heir apparent to succeed GEN Ozkok as TGS Chief in 2006. 
His comments indicate he is already thinking ahead on the 
issues he will face then: 
 
--On Cyprus, suggesting future difficulty in canceling 
exercises on the island as disillusionment with the 
international response to the positive referendum vote grows. 
 
--On Iraq, Kirkuk (the only Iraq issue he raised) is clearly 
his barometer for Iraq's future. 
 
--On Iran, a realistic view of the regime, its intentions and 
the dangers it could pose with nuclear weapons, both 
conventionally and unconventionally, unusual in Ankara. 
 
High-level engagement with Buyukanit could permit us to help 
him refine his thinking on these issues and others of 
importance to us and shape how our relationship develops in 
the future.  End comment. 
EDELMAN