This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 005266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2029 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PARM PTER OVIP MOPS MASS CY IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DASD BRZEZINSKI'S SEPTEMBER 21 
VISIT TO TURKEY 
 
REF: A. A) ANKARA 5140 
     ¶B. B) ANKARA 5115 
     ¶C. C) ANKARA 5100 
     ¶D. D) ANKARA 5118 
     ¶E. E) ANKARA 4915 
 
Classified By: Classified by: Acting DCM Jim Moore.  Reasons 1.4 (b) an 
d (d). 
 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: Your visit comes at a challenging time in our 
bilateral relations.  Our painstaking efforts to rebuild 
relations over the last year, capped by a successful Istanbul 
NATO Summit in June, have resulted in the restoration of 
productive relations at the top military and civilian levels 
and important Turkish contributions to the Global War on 
Terrorism.  Last year Turkey offered troops for Iraq and is 
scheduled to take over ISAF beginning in February 2005.  We 
cooperated closely on Cyprus, and at Sea Island PM Erdogan 
agreed to a role for Turkey in the Broader Middle East 
Initiative.  Turkey granted the use of Incirlik Air Base to 
support refueling missions for OIF and OEF and as an OEF 
transit hub.  However, perceived lack of U.S. action to 
terminate the PKK/Kongra-Gel presence in Iraq -- especially 
in light of stepped-up PKK/Kongra-Gel attacks in southeastern 
Turkey -- or to address a series of Turkish truck driver 
kidnappings in Iraq has convinced many that the U.S. remains 
indifferent to the needs of a loyal ally.  Turkish public 
opinion has soured significantly on the U.S., complicating 
our efforts to expand relations with the civilian leadership 
and to engage the Government of Turkey (GoT) on Global 
Defense Posture planning and other efforts in the region. 
Events in Iraq, such as the recent U.S. action against 
insurgents in the predominantly Turkmen northern Iraqi city 
of Talafar create tensions.  U.S. military sales have 
suffered with the cancellation of several tenders and 
continued demands for terms exceeding the limits of U.S. law, 
perhaps in part to send business to the EU in hopes of a 
December vote in favor of beginning the EU harmonization 
process toward membership.  While the Turkish General Staff 
(TGS) is interested in broadening the scope of our 
political-military discussion, you should expect to be asked 
about outstanding DECA issues, Turkey's inclusion in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Core Group and a U.S. 
contribution to Turkey's Counter-Terrorism Center of 
Excellence.  End Summary. 
 
------- 
SETTING 
------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Political: With a two-thirds majority in parliament, 
control of a majority of municipalities, and no viable 
political opposition, PM Erdogan and his AKP government 
appear firmly in control.  AKP's passage of major legal 
reform packages and constitutional amendments appears to have 
put Turkey more firmly on track to get an accession process 
start date from the EU in December, although chronic problems 
with implementation continue to plague the government.  In 
his meetings with foreign leaders, Erdogan projects 
confidence, power, and a pragmatism that has seemed to belie 
his Islamist firebrand past. 
 
¶3. (C) Yet, while seemingly at the peak of their power, 
Erdogan, his party, and his government face fundamental 
political challenges.  AKP has not consolidated itself as a 
party and Erdogan increasingly struggles to impose discipline 
and direction on the cabinet and parliamentary group. 
Erdogan's frequent travel interferes with his control of 
party policy-making and the Cabinet, and he stretches himself 
thin trying also to oversee Istanbul (he retains an intense 
interest in the management of the city he dominated as mayor 
from 1994-98).  AKP has not come to grips with the deeply 
entrenched State bureaucracy or established a solid modus 
vivendi with the judiciary, armed forces, and presidency. 
Corruption in the cabinet and AKP's provincial organizations 
has also become a serious problem.  Elements within the 
Turkish military and other elements of the "secular" 
establishment continue to assert that AKP intends to 
undermine Turkey's "secular" structure.  These assertions are 
harder for AKP to refute when various elements in the party 
try to push neuralgic issues -- the latest being an abortive 
attempt to re-criminalize adultery and fornication. 
 
¶4. (U) Economy: The Turkish economy has recovered from the 
financial and economic crisis of 2000-2001.  However, 
Turkey's huge debt and structural weaknesses leave it 
vulnerable to external shocks and necessitate continuation of 
the IMF program and its accompanying fiscal restraint and 
structural reform.  Large IMF loans -- tied to implementation 
of ambitious economic reforms -- have enabled Turkey to 
stabilize interest rates and the currency and to meet its 
debt obligations.  In 2002-2003, the reforms began to show 
results.  With the exception of a period of market jitters in 
the run-up to the Iraq war, inflation and interest rates have 
fallen significantly, the currency has stabilized, and 
confidence has begun to return.  Nonetheless, the economy 
still remains fragile, and continued implementation of 
reforms is essential to sustain growth and stability. 
 
-- 
EU 
-- 
 
¶5. (S) The drive to get Turkey into the EU has widespread 
support that cuts across political and religious lines, and 
PM Erdogan remains focused on getting a date at the December 
EU Summit to start accession negotiation talks.  EU 
Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen toured the country 
September 4-9 in advance of the European Commission's October 
progress report and left positive about Turkey's prospects. 
AKP's passage of major legal reform packages and 
constitutional amendments have been well-received by the EU. 
However, implementation is slow and uneven.  In addition, the 
government regularly gives the EU pause with initiatives such 
as the recent attempt to re-criminalize adultery and 
fornication and an earlier attempt to permit the wearing of 
Islamic headscarves (turban) in public buildings.  Whether PM 
Erdogan is pandering to his conservative constituency, 
competing with Foreign Minister Gul to demonstrate his 
Islamist credentials, or showing the strength of his 
religious convictions despite his best attempts to present a 
democratic facade, is a matter of speculation.  Turkey's 
continued reluctance to cancel its annual fall military 
exercises on northern Cyprus, as it did over the past several 
years (and as the Greeks are prepared to do this year), 
threatens to negate the goodwill engendered in the EU by 
northern Cyprus's positive April vote on UN SYG Annan's plan 
to unite the island.  Still, most observers expect Turkey to 
get a qualified "yes" from the EU in December. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶6. (C)  Turkey recognizes that its national interest is best 
served by the establishment of security and stability in Iraq 
and has actively contributed to the country's reconstruction 
efforts.  The GoT offered to send troops to Iraq (an offer we 
declined) and approved the use of Incirlik Air Base for 
tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and trained Iraqi diplomats.  It 
authorized the transit of US troops out of Iraq, and 
permitted the transit to Iraq of supplies for U.S. forces and 
of humanitarian goods.  Turkish companies have been awarded 
contracts totaling USD 500 million and Turkish exports to 
Iraq have grown to more than USD 1 billion in the first half 
of 2004.  At any one time 5-6,000 Turks are working in Iraq. 
 
¶7. (S) Although our macro-interests in Iraq coincide, we 
approach some issues and events from different vantages, 
creating friction.  Those currently impacting our dialogue on 
Iraq are: 
 
(C) Trucker Security: The recent spate of Turkish truck 
driver abductions, and the subsequent murder of several 
drivers, has become a grave concern for the government given 
continued overwhelming disapproval by the Turkish population 
of the U.S.-led effort in Iraq.  The GoT recognizes its own 
interest in remaining in Iraq, but faces a public relations 
problem over mounting accusations that it is not doing enough 
to protect its citizens there.  While understanding that the 
U.S. cannot escort every Turkish truck into/out of Iraq, per 
Ref D, the GoT is asking for our help to establish other 
security measures, such as the provision of regular 
communication about the security situation, assistance to 
establish secure trucker rest stops, and increased escorts 
where possible. 
 
(C) Talafar Operation: Recent Multi-National Force Iraq 
(MNFI) action against insurgents in the largely Turkmen city 
of Talafar in Northern Iraq have strained relations (Reftels 
A,C).  GoT concern about potential casualties among the large 
Turkmen population in that city prompted a request to the 
U.S. to use restraint in the operation, and a warning that 
fallout from the operation could jeopardize Turkey's overall 
cooperation with the U.S. on Iraq.  The GoT also warned 
against any change in ethnic balance of Talafar leadership 
that would result in greater Kurdish authority.  Turkish 
press reports carrying exaggerated casualty figures and 
conspiracy theories about U.S. plans to change the 
demographics of the area created a highly charged media 
environment.  Perhaps suffering from the fatigue of an 
extended overseas trip and the resulting information lag 
about the actual situation on the ground, FM Gul made an 
uncharacteristic breach of the moderate tone set by the GoT 
on the issue with a threat to stop cooperation with the U.S. 
in Iraq if situation continued.  Following the Embassy's 
immediate request for clarification, he walked back from this 
statement, reiterating Turkey's continued commitment to 
assist the people of Iraq.  Post and Embassy Baghdad are 
working with the GoT to facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to the region. 
 
(S) PKK/Kongra-Gel: The lack of visible U.S. action against 
the PKK in northern Iraq remains a source of GoT frustration. 
 As the number of reported attacks by Iraq-based PKK 
terrorists continues to mount, U.S. claims of non-military 
action against the PKK/Kongra-Gel ring increasingly hollow. 
Recent U.S. action against Iraqi insurgents in Talafar has 
only underscored to the GoT and the Turkish man-on-the-street 
(who relies on an irresponsible and sensationalist print 
media as his primary news source) that the U.S. is willing 
and able to use force against terrorists when it is in our 
interest.  Turkey maintains some 1,500 Special Forces 
personnel in northern Iraq aimed at preventing the launching 
of terrorist acts by the PKK/KONGRA-GEL.  In private they 
have refrained from threatening specific action against the 
PKK, but publicly PM Erdogan and FM Gul have promised that 
Turkey will do what it needs to do to take care of its own 
people.  TGS officials have been unusually silent on the 
issue, although TGS/J-3 Chief LTG Yalcin was pointed in his 
initial meeting with our new ODC Chief, MG Sutton. 
 
----------- 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
 
¶8. (C) Ankara is positively considering NATO's proposal that 
the Turkey-led High Readiness Corps (HRC) in Istanbul take 
over the command of ISAF for six months beginning in February 
¶2005.  Turkey previously led ISAF II from June 2002 to 
February 2003.  However, Turkey has two conditions to 
accepting this mission - a firm commitment by another country 
to take over six months later (based on the delay it 
experienced in departing from ISAF II when it took several 
months to find a successor), and NATO payment of HRC 
transport to/from Afghanistan.  We understand that the NATO 
Budget Committee is positively considering the transport 
request.  Whether Turkey deploys only a headquarters staff or 
a more robust force is still an open question, although 
Turkey's (and NATO's) success may revolve around whether 
security can be provided for the expected parliamentary 
elections.  Turkey also dispatched three medium-lift 
helicopters to Afghanistan, bringing its total contribution 
of personnel there to 220. 
 
---------------------------- 
INCIRLIK AIR BASE OPERATIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S/NF) Cargo Hub: Over the past year, the GoT has 
permitted increased use of Incirlik Air Base to transit 
forces and humanitarian goods and supplies for our forces in 
Afghanistan and the operation of tanker aircraft to support 
missions to/from both Iraq and Afghanistan and has authorized 
the transit of U.S. troops from Iraq and the transit of 
detainees to and from Guantanamo.  We have also requested the 
use of Incirlik as a logistics hub to transship cargo into 
and out of Iraq and to temporarily base six C-17 aircraft and 
130 support personnel, and asked for increased access to 
nearby Konya Range for Fighter aircraft training, many of 
which would stage out of Incirlik during their training 
rotations.  Despite repeated inquiries with the MFA, TGS and 
the Prime Ministry, we have been unable to get a categorical 
response to these requests.  Each ministry has blamed GoT 
silence on their counterparts.  On September 10, MFA Deputy 
Director General Suna Ilicak allowed that the decision was 
being made at the interagency ministerial level.  She 
expressed the hope for a decision in advance of your visit. 
There some speculation that the GoT may try to delay a 
response until after the U.S. elections in November or the 
December EU Summit. 
 
----------------- 
ISSUES TO DISCUSS 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (S/NF) F-16 Basing: Given the difficulty of eliciting a 
response on the cargo hub request, we expect to encounter 
significant obstacles with a request to permanently base 48 
F-16s at Incirlik, an idea that we have floated only 
informally in the context of the global defense posture 
review.  To our knowledge, the U.S. has never based aircraft 
in Turkey on a permanent basis.  To gain agreement would 
likely require modification or renegotiation of the 1980 
bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), 
which provides only for the rotational basing of aircraft 
under a specific mandate.  Renegotiation of the DECA would be 
a difficult proposition given chronic Turkish complaints over 
declining security assistance levels and differences over 
DECA interpretation, particularly related to dependent hires 
and off-base law enforcement and force protection activities 
by U.S. forces.  It would also provide the GoT an opportunity 
to renegotiate DECA terms we consider favorable.  Turkish 
officials view all other Incirlik use requests as related to 
the F-16 proposal, which has complicated consideration of 
these requests and delayed GoT responses.  We are still 
awaiting an answer to PM A/S Bloomfield's question: Would 
Turkey entertain a formal proposal if one were made?  Our 
interlocutors have said this is another question for 
Ministers to decide, but it would still be useful for you to 
remind your interlocutors that Washington is still waiting 
for a reply. 
 
¶11. (C) PSI: Turkey has made an important commitment to 
non-proliferation with active participation in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  It endorsed the PSI 
Statement of Interdiction Principles, participated in the 
Krakow PSI Anniversary Meeting in May as well as in the 
August Operational Experts Meetings in Copenhagen and Oslo, 
and offered to host the 2006 PSI Operational Experts Group 
maritime interdiction exercise.  However, continued GoT ire 
at Turkey's exclusion from the PSI Core Group after Russia 
was admitted last May is taking a toll.  While initially 
signaling its interest in participating in the October 1 
Newport Gaming Exercise, the GoT is re-thinking its 
representation and considering downgrading its overall level 
of PSI participation.  TGS is likely to reiterate its request 
for Core Group membership to you.  While acknowledging GoT 
interest in this forum, you should emphasize the value of the 
Experts Group and participation in exercises and offer full 
USG support for GoT to host the 2006 maritime exercise. 
 
¶12. (C) CT CoE:  The GoT is prepared to begin classes at the 
Center of Excellence for Counter Terrorism as soon as this 
December and to begin full operation in June 2005.  According 
to TGS officials, the CoE is currently about 50 pct staffed. 
Informally, TGS understands that the USG will offer one 0-6 
Navy officer for the Deputy Commandant slot at the center 
beginning FY 06, however  officials are eagerly awaiting a 
formal USG response to the letter of request for personnel 
submitted by GEN Basbug to GEN Pace in August.  Given the 
late start date of the proposed Navy official, TGS has 
inquired whether the USG can also provide an interim official 
to begin work this winter.  EUCOM and JCS J-5 are working on 
an interim fill solution, which may be a recalled 0-6 
reservist.  Only after receiving the formal U.S. response 
will TGS approach other countries for contributions.  You 
should welcome the establishment of this center, confirm the 
proposed U.S. contribution.  JCS J-5's RADM Loren was to give 
the definitive answer on CoE staffing during an October 
visit, but his trip has been postponed. 
¶13. (C) Military Procurement: The May cancellation of three 
major tenders for attack helicopters, unmanned aerial 
vehicles and main battle tanks has capped a down year for 
U.S. defense contractors.  While IMF-mandated fiscal 
restraint may be a factor, Turkey's drive to strengthen its 
own defense industries and to increase business with 
EU-origin companies are realities.  A tender for the purchase 
of up to 17 Seahawk Helicopters is pending.  Boeing just 
completed difficult negotiations over the design of its AEW&C 
aircraft for Turkey.  Some good news on the Foreign Military 
Sales front is the Peace Onyx III F-16 CCIP Upgrade for the 
Block 40s and 50s.  The Letter of Request was submitted to 
DSCA in June and our Letter of Response is expected by the 
end of the calendar year.  The Undersecretariat for Defense 
Industry is in the process of trying to buy out Lockheed 
Martin's shares in the aircraft assembly company, TAI.  Post 
understands that Turkey may issue a new tender for attack 
helicopters as soon as this fall.  However, if the tender 
contains open source code requirements, U.S. firms will be 
shut out of the competition.  Your visit, as well as the 
simultaneous DSCA-led Security Cooperation Working Group 
meeting, will provide an opportunity to gauge the Turkish 
military's long-range procurement plans. 
 
¶14. (C) Iraq: We need to encourage the Turks to deal more 
with the IIG and not to turn to us every time they have an 
issue in Iraq.  You should remind your interlocutors that the 
IIG is sovereign.  We can be helpful in persuading the IIG to 
take constructive positions, but we can best do so only after 
Ankara has raised an issue with Baghdad.  By increasing its 
bilateral dialogue with the IIG, Turkey would be helping the 
new government get used to governing and strengthen the 
foundation for future, positive Turkey-Iraq relations. 
 
¶15. (C) Cyprus: Turkey currently has the moral high ground on 
the Cyprus issue, but growing frustration at the continued 
isolation of Turkish Cypriots, despite their positive vote 
for a settlement, could lead the Turks to do something 
unhelpful.  You should encourage TGS and MFA to cancel this 
fall's Toros exercise on the island. 
EDELMAN