Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04ACCRA1810, SURVEY OF GHANA'S EVOLVING BANKING SECTOR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04ACCRA1810.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ACCRA1810 2004-09-07 12:52 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Accra
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ACCRA 001810 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
MCC FOR ROD NORMAN 
TREASURY FOR ALEX SEVERENS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KMCA EFIN ECON GH
SUBJECT: SURVEY OF GHANA'S EVOLVING BANKING SECTOR 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (SBU) The Government of Ghana's (GoG) sound macro policies 
have led to lower inflation and interest rates, paving the 
way for local banks and insurance companies to introduce 
innovative new products and vie for the 95 percent of 
Ghanaians who do not use the formal financial system.  Banks 
can no longer survive on high-interest bearing government 
securities, and must aggressively compete for the relatively 
few low-risk clients for loans and other financial products. 
Banks must contend with the Central Bank's recently mandated 
higher capital requirements.  Econoffs surveyed the most 
competitive of Ghana's 18 banks, and also met with insurers 
and regulators.  While bankers largely express optimism about 
Ghana's economy and their own growth opportunities, they are 
aware that stronger competition and stiffer regulation will 
likely instigate mergers, acquisitions, and failures in the 
next few years.  End Summary. 
 
Background on the Banking Environment 
------------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) Large government deficits and debt, volatile 
inflation, and high interest rates over the last 20 years 
limited development of Ghana's financial sector.  This 
macroeconomic instability has been accompanied and 
exacerbated by: (i) government hoarding of the available 
credit, (ii) heavy government ownership in financial sector 
companies, (iii) inconsistent yet excessive regulation, and 
(iv) high (44 percent) reserve requirements.  Given these 
impediments, it is little wonder that the banking system 
serves only five percent of Ghanaian households.  However, 
there have been signs of improvements in the last year.  Post 
met recently with banks, insurance companies and government 
regulators to discuss how the changing macroeconomic 
environment is affecting bank operations, and to gauge 
whether stronger competition and new regulatory requirements 
could provoke a shakeout in the industry. 
 
3. (SBU) Tighter monetary policy and more prudent fiscal 
policies together have forced down inflation and interest 
rates.  The 91-day Treasury Bill, considered the benchmark 
rate in Ghana, fell from a high of 35 percent in 2003 to the 
current 17 percent rate.  The 12-month inflation rate peaked 
at 30 percent in April 2003, and fell to 10.5 percent in 
April 2004.  Year-on-year inflation increased slightly to 
12.4 percent in July 2004 and is expected to stay in the 
10-15 percent for the rest of the year. 
 
4. (SBU) A frequent criticism of Ghana's banking sector has 
been that banks have no incentive to lend as long as they can 
be profitable simply holding T-Bills and rolling them over 
every 91 days.  Banks respond that the Bank of Ghana (Central 
Bank) requires them to hold government securities in order to 
fulfill the 35 percent secondary reserve requirement (Note: 
the primary reserve requirement is nine percent.  End Note). 
While true, Ghanaian banks have willingly met these 
requirements, since high interest rates on government 
domestic debt have resulted in Ghanaian banks having among 
the highest return on equity of any banking system in Africa. 
 (Note:  Ghanaian banks also profit from the 10-15 percent 
spreads between lending and saving rates, although this 
should diminish as banks compete to attract new customers. 
End Note) 
 
5. (SBU) With rates edging downwards, margins are shrinking 
and banks are being forced into serving their traditional 
financial intermediary role to maintain profit levels.  At 
the same time, the Bank of Ghana has issued new prudential 
regulations giving banks until 2005 to increase their 
capitalization to 70 billion cedis (about USD 7.8 million). 
Combined, these events may force local banks, especially the 
marginal performers, to reform, merge or fail. 
 
Impact of Lower Interest Rates on Banking Sector 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
6. (SBU) There are 18 banks operating in Ghana, with four of 
them holding 64 percent of assets.  The Bank of Ghana has 
also received several applications to establish new banks. 
Most bankers and the Bank of Ghana bank supervisors believe 
this number is too high for the market, and expect increased 
competition and new capital requirements to force a wave of 
mergers or closures in the next few years.  The regulators 
were noncommittal on whether the GoG would allow bank 
failures or intervene in the market. 
 
Focus on SME Lending 
-------------------- 
7. (SBU) In response to the changing market, the most 
competitive Ghanaian banks -- Ecobank, SG-SSB, Home Finance 
Company (HFC) -- are launching innovative products to attract 
new customers.  Banks are also considering riskier small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs) because established companies 
and individuals already have banking relationships.  All the 
banks Post conferred with emphasized how important it was now 
to cater to SME clients.  However, Ecobank, HFC and other 
medium-sized but aggressive banks are making this sector a 
priority.  Ecobank is leading the way with over 30 percent of 
its USD 80 million portfolio targeted to the SME sector. 
Large banks in Ghana insist they are maintaining 
profitability through higher fees and increased volume, but 
are also being forced to pursue SME clients.  Even Standard 
Chartered, which traditionally serves blue chip companies, is 
eyeing the SME market. 
 
8. (SBU) SME lending involves more rigorous client 
interaction and more detailed investigation of the quality of 
business proposals.  SG-SSB, a bank in which French company 
Societe Generale recently bought a controlling share, told 
Post that it can take three weeks to process a loan from a 
new SME client, demonstrating how much time and effort is 
needed.  Across the industry, the number of staff and their 
required skills will also need to expand, and banks will also 
have to update software platforms and even move branch 
locations to serve SMEs.  The extra effort will increase 
operating expenses and reduce profitability in the short 
term.  However, in the long run, banks that successfully 
develop these clients without increasing their level of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) should maintain a competitive 
advantage over the less adaptive banks. 
 
9. (SBU) Ghana's banks are still recovering from the massive 
devaluation of the cedi in 2000/2001, causing many companies 
to default on their loans.  The NPL rate peaked in 2001 at 28 
percent and has fallen only to about 20 percent (2003 data). 
Defaults are generally higher when interest rates are high. 
As rates become more affordable, a riskier clientele will 
enter the system, but these clients will also have less 
trouble servicing their debts.  So, the quality of bank 
portfolios should improve in a stable, lower-interest rate 
environment. 
 
Concerns Over Currency Risk 
--------------------------- 
10. (SBU) A growing concern among bankers is the growth of 
dollar-denominated loans.  Over the last few years, 
businesses seeking lower interest rates have increasingly 
sought to borrow in dollars.  This violates the banking adage 
that you should borrow in the currency in which you do 
business.  Similar circumstances developed in the late 1990s, 
which contributed to the high NPL rate following the cedi 
depreciation in 2000.  Ghana remains extremely vulnerable to 
external shocks and commodity price shifts, which could in 
turn affect the exchange rate.  Although several bankers 
voiced concerns about the increased currency risks, they also 
acknowledged their limited ability to reject requests for 
dollar loans due to their fear of losing valuable clients to 
competitor banks. 
 
Government Involvement in Financial Sector 
------------------------------------------ 
11. (SBU) Bankers were unanimous in their optimism that the 
GoG will maintain macroeconomic stability.  All cautioned 
that the single-digit inflation projection for 2004 is 
unlikely, but emphasized that consistent and stable inflation 
is a more important goal in the short to medium term.  They 
broadly criticized the GoG's ownership position in the 
financial sector, especially in parastatals Social Security 
National Trust (SSNIT) and Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB). 
SSNIT is one of the biggest drags on the financial sector. 
It holds 15 percent of total financial sector assets, yet is 
poorly run and politically influenced.  GoG commitment to 
overhauling SSNIT management would improve overall asset 
quality in the country. 
 
12. (SBU) Although GCB is the largest bank in Ghana, holding 
24 percent of total banking sector assets and 18 percent of 
all assets in the financial system, it is the least 
innovative in the sector.  Until recently, the GoG has been 
reluctant to privatize its ownership share in GCB, and too 
often uses GCB to fund questionable government programs, 
including petroleum subsidies.  Recently, the GoG has 
considered seriously floating GCB shares on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange, which would dilute the GoG's ownership percentage, 
and, hopefully, reinvigorate the bank. 
 
Ghana's Insurance Industry is Perking up 
---------------------------------------- 
13. (SBU) The insurance sector is growing in Ghana, but has 
been hindered by the poor reputation and quality of the 
government-owned State Insurance Company (SIC).  SIC's market 
share has steadily declined (from about 90 to 45 percent) as 
the number and quality of private insurers has increased. 
The GoG has drafted a new insurance bill that will end SIC's 
monopoly on providing insurance to state employees. 
Inflation is the biggest enemy of the insurance business, so 
if the macroeconomic environment remains predictable and less 
volatile, the sector should continue to grow.  This would be 
good news for Ghana's economy, since insurance companies are 
often the largest sources of domestic investment. 
 
Constraints on Growth 
--------------------- 
14. (SBU) Lower rates alone are not a cure all for Ghana's 
financial sector.  Savings rates in Ghana are low, so there 
is a small deposit base.  The GoG's Long-Term Savings Bill -- 
currently before Parliament -- aims to remedy this by 
providing incentives for savers.  The credit culture in Ghana 
is weak, with many inexperienced borrowers who simply do not 
intend to repay their loans.  There is also a history of 
borrowers abandoning bad loans at one bank, only to open a 
new account at a different bank where again the loans go 
unpaid.  The Ghanaian bankers association is working to 
establish a credit reference bureau so that new clients can 
be checked. 
 
Comment 
------- 
15. (SBU) In Ghana, macroeconomic stability is slowly working 
its way through the economy and is beginning to impact the 
financial system.  Vast improvements in asset quality and 
private sector growth (through greater access to investment 
capital) will not come over night, but the trend is positive. 
 Individual banks are already beginning to feel, or at least 
worry about, lower profits from debts assets and increased 
competition for good loan clients.  If the downward trends in 
inflation and interest rates continue over the next two to 
three years, Ghana could experience a wave of mergers, 
buy-outs and possibly bank failures.  End Comment. 
YATES