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Viewing cable 04ABUJA1673, DELTA VIOLENCE: KEEPING OUR POWDER DRY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ABUJA1673 2004-09-29 12:46 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001673 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2014 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV EPET PINS CASC ASEC NI DELTAVIOLENCE
SUBJECT: DELTA VIOLENCE: KEEPING OUR POWDER DRY 
 
REF: A. LAGOS 1982 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. ABUJA 1656 AND PREVIOUS 
     C. ABUJA 1486 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Although the military situation has been 
relatively quiet the past few days, there is much political 
movement among the major players.  A senior Defense Ministry 
source confirmed press reports that militia leader Asari, 
whom GON forces were trying to kill last week, is in Abuja 
today, September 29, to meet with President Obasanjo.  For 
now, the situation is too fluid for meaningful USG action, 
and militia leader Asari's targeting of expatriates and oil 
production could be ended by a deal even before the targeting 
was to take effect October 1.  That targeting could also, 
however, become more real (only Shell has reduced staff so 
far, not even a full drawdown), and in any case there will 
remain the deeper and wider problem of: 
 
-- the well-armed militias, 
-- the GON's not putting them out of business, 
-- their (USD 1 billion-plus) business stealing oil that 
funds both militias and GON officials; and 
-- the long-term threat of this environment to U.S. citizens 
and oil imports.  End Summary. 
 
2. (S) Dokubo Asari's militia, one of many in Nigeria's 
oil-rich Delta, this week threatened expatriate oil workers 
and demanded a halt to oil production from October 1 until 
the GON meets his demands for political and economic changes 
in the Delta.  The GON has attacked his militia the past few 
weeks, but he and it are still at large and capable of 
attacking oil company workers and facilities.  His threats 
may be political theater, however, and a political resolution 
to his personal grievances could occur at any time. 
 
3. (S) Today, September 29, Asari is in Abuja to meet with 
President Obasanjo.  The political situation among the GON, 
the Delta's well-armed militias, and the politicians who use 
those militias such as Governor Odili, moves rapidly.  The 
past two days have been relatively quiet militarily, perhaps 
as the various players recheck their alliances and the 
balance of power on the ground.  ChevronTexaco's Managing 
Director for Nigeria told us September 28 that he is more 
worried about human rights violations and collateral damage 
from GON operations against Asari's militia than about the 
threat from Asari's militia. 
 
DATT TRIP TO PORT HARCOURT 
 
4. (S) The Defense Attache and DAO/MARA staff visited Port 
Harcourt September 27-28.  The city had the outward 
appearance of normalcy, with a very minimal security force 
presence on the streets.  The people there reported an 
intensification of military activity and militia violence 
over the past three weeks, including GON formation of a 
"joint military task force."  One DAO contact indicated that 
on September 8, Asari and the GON had agreed on a ceasefire 
that held about a week, only to be broken by military action 
o/a September 15 when a military MI-35 helicopter attacked a 
number of localities in the vicinity of Tombia and Buguma, 
approximately 30km southeast of Port Harcourt.  An RSO 
contact indicated that this was part of a planned 90-day 
military campaign to eliminate Asari. 
 
5. (S) Estimates of the strength of Asari's militia ranged 
from a few hundred to a few thousand.  One DAO contact 
described a meeting of the militia's "central command" on 
September 27 to decide the group's next steps, attended by 
312 "commanders." 
 
OUTLOOK FOR USG ACTION 
 
6. (S) Post believes the situation is too fluid for 
meaningful USG action on Asari at this time.  Over the next 
weeks, maybe days, the situation may bring major changes. 
The critical point now is that the GON does not have 
sufficient forces in the Delta to finish off Asari's militia 
on the battlefield now or for the next few weeks, hence only 
political deals or Asari's capture/death would fundamentally 
change the threat from his militia.  Asari's fate, in turn, 
could make the Delta somewhat worse, but certainly will not 
resolve the overall Delta threat above (see Ref C). 
CAMPBELL