This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001525 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2014 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PINR CM NI
SUBJECT: INTERVENTION ON CAMEROON-NIGERIA MAY BE PREMATURE, 
CAUSE MORE TROUBLE 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 1472 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     ¶B. YAOUNDE 1301 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶C. USUN 583 
     ¶D. PARIS 6316 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: As per reftels from Abuja and Yaounde, 
Presidents Obasanjo and Biya have long been working together 
to implement the ICJ verdict on Nigeria's and Cameroon's 
border.  President Obasanjo has told us (Ref A) August 23 
that he and President Biya are "personally satisfied" with 
the status of the Bakassi handover, and that further movement 
by either side might wait until after Cameroon's presidential 
election in October.  In the absence of President Biya saying 
his perception is different, i.e. that there is a problem 
between him and Obasanjo, the best way to make the system 
work is to show U.S. interest but not create extra problems. 
A tripartite demarche with the UK and France in New York to 
the Nigerian and Cameroonian permreps (together) would work. 
A demarche to the GON (especially lower than Obasanjo), 
however, could be premature if there is no problem between 
the presidents.  It would be taken by Obasanjo as calling him 
a liar, and it would also create more diplomatic "white 
noise" that would have to be sorted out before the system 
could make progress -- even if that is after Cameroon's 
election.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Obasanjo has repeatedly told us, most recently telling 
Senator Hagel in Ref A, that he was handling the Bakassi 
issue personally with Biya, and that Biya and he were content 
with the system and its outcomes.  Cameroonian officials have 
long been expressing concern about the Mixed Commission 
meetings, and sought to enlist the USG, UK and France to 
pressure Nigeria.  Evidence from both sides suggests that 
details of the Nigerian withdrawal from Bakassi (if at all) 
and of the settlement of the maritime boundary, are closely 
held by the two presidents, and that both presidents have 
been extremely careful not to let the settlement play into 
their respective 2003 and 2004 presidential elections.  All 
agree that the two presidents have met often, and spoken by 
phone as well, in recent months. 
 
¶3. (C) At the moment, it seems very difficult to tell if what 
Obasanjo told Senator Hagel is accurate, or if there really 
is a problem between the two presidents that puts the system 
implementing the ICJ decision at risk.  It might be 
worthwhile to learn Biya's views firsthand.  If there is no 
problem, a USG demarche to the GON could easily create one by 
giving the impression that it was a pressure tactic from the 
Cameroonians -- and perhaps not even from the top there.  It 
will also create more "white noise" of distracting diplomatic 
activity at lower levels that would have to be sorted out by 
Obasanjo and Biya before they get down to finishing the 
Bakassi and maritime boundary arrangements. 
 
¶4. (C) If Biya says he is having a problem with Obasanjo, a 
USG demarche would still add to the diplomatic "white noise" 
and still could be a bargaining tactic by Biya, but at least 
we could say Biya said there is a problem.  We would not be 
the problem.  The British High Commission says they are not 
aware of any demarche being worked up in London to the GON, 
and they have the same perspective as we that the 
Biya-Obasanjo dynamic is key and a demarche now to the GON 
would be counterproductive to that dynamic. 
 
¶5. (C) In the meantime, it could be useful to show our 
collective interest in the outcome via a tripartite demarche 
with the British and French in New York to the assembled 
Nigerian and Cameroonian permreps.  Given Obasanjo's stated 
views, it would be counterproductive to bring up the 
September 15 date in that session, and the focus should be on 
our interest in the process reaching a successful (ICJ 
implementation) conclusion.  It might also be worthwhile, in 
a nuanced way, to note the frequent interaction between the 
two presidents and urge discipline on lower officials on both 
sides to avoid raising issues different from their principals. 
CAMPBELL