This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001515 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, AF; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PREF EAID MARR NI CD SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: STATE OF PLAY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Despite the rebel movements' inexperience 
in conducing serious negotiations, the unwillingness of the 
"Teflon" government delegation to accept any responsibility 
for the situation on the ground in Darfur, and the broad 
latitude the mediator has permitted the parties to digress 
and request delays, the African Union-sponsored Darfur 
negotiations have reached the point that the two sides are 
examining an integrated draft text (sent to AF/SPG) for an 
agreement on humanitarian issues.  The parties have been 
charged to return to the plenary this afternoon to offer 
official observations on the text, which would give the 
rebel movements - as well as international assistance 
delivery organizations - much of what they seek in the 
humanitarian sector.  While acceptance by the parties cannot 
be assumed, they have moved forward at a pace surprising to 
veterans of the IGAD peace process between the GOS and SPLA. 
Both the rebels and GOS say they are committed to staying 
the course.  The AU mediation had initially planned to take 
a break once agreement had been reached on humanitarian 
issues, but now has decided to keep the parties in Abuja to 
try reaching a deal on security too.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) The AU-sponsored negotiations between the Government 
of Sudan (GOS) and the two Darfur rebel moments (Sudanese 
Liberations Army - SLA - and the Movement for Justice and 
Equality - JEM) that began August 23 have led to the 
presentation of a draft agreement on humanitarian issues by 
Mediator Hamid al-Ghabid on August 30.  Those taking the GOS- 
SPLA/M negotiations as a benchmark were very surprised that 
the parties reached this point this quickly.  Others 
lamented the distractions that have been created by the 
inexperience of the JEM and SLA leaders, who were quick to 
ask for delays when goaded by the GOS delegation or by 
reports of further violence on the ground in Darfur. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Neither rebel delegation appears to be well 
organized.  JEM leader Khalid Ibrahim has not appeared in 
Abuja, and although Ahmed Lissan seems to be in titular 
charge of the team, he clearly is not in full control.  On 
the SLA side, Abdulwahid Nour, Mini Minawi, and Adam Shogar 
are all here, while Dr. Sharif Harir is doing much of the 
talking on the floor.  They are backed - literally on the 
floor of the plenary, where the teams sit behind the leader 
- by a coterie of field commanders, giving visible 
demonstration of the phrase "consistently looking over their 
shoulders." 
 
¶4. (SBU) The GOS delegation, on the other hand, is extremely 
disciplined under the leadership of Minister of Agriculture 
and Forestry Dr. Magzoub El-Khalifa Ahmed, supported by 
Deputy Foreign Minister Abdullah Nour.  Nour is the former 
governor of North Darfur and, the rebels say, claims to be 
"Emir of all the Arabs in Darfur" (he himself has asserted 
that to some of the western observers).  The rebels have 
accused him on the floor of being one of the leaders of the 
Jingaweed.  Thus far both in the sessions and in private, 
Magzoub has tried to be the patient voice of reason, calmly 
enduring SLA and JEM outbursts with measured responses. 
That said, he has also been adamant that the rebels are the 
cause of all the problems, and the government has taken the 
necessary steps to provide security and humanitarian 
assistance.  The Jingaweed, very narrowly defined as the 
traditional desert bandits, must, of course, be held 
accountable.  However, the nomadic herders, who also carry 
guns - like those led by Musa Hillal - have only acted in 
self-defense and must retain their weapons for this purpose. 
Magzoub is reputed to be among the most obdurate of the 
"hard-liners" in Khartoum, and has not yet been tested by 
either the rebels or the mediator to come to grips in real 
negotiations 
 
¶5. (SBU) The dynamics around the mediator have also been 
distracting, with various representatives from the Arab 
League, Libya, the UN, and even from the AU pressing 
different agendas and seeking personal recognition.  The 
departure of Peace and Security Chairman Djinnet early in 
the process took away a key ally.  So did that of UN Advisor 
Mohammed Sahnoun, which allowed the team dispatched by UN 
SRSG Pronk from Khartoum to take over the UN mantel and 
press a more "local" agenda.  At one point this group 
asserted that the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JIM) has 
resolved the humanitarian issues, while the August 5 "Pronk 
Plan" had taken care of security.  USDEL, the EU, and the UK 
pressed this back quickly and decisively. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On the other hand, the departure of the senior AL, 
Libyan, and other UN representatives has allowed al-Ghabid, 
with strong support from the observer delegations, to 
gradually take control of the process.  Nigerian Foreign 
Minister Adeniji and Special Representative for Darfur 
Abdulsalami Abubakar are now managing the talks for the 
Nigerians, although President Obasanjo remains engaged on 
the periphery.  These changes have allowed USDEL and the EU 
observers to move from the plenary back rows to a seat at 
the table with a microphone. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The agenda forged during the first two days by the 
mediator and the Nigerians outlined four major issues: 
humanitarian, security, political, and social and economic. 
It was thought that the humanitarian issues would be the 
easiest place to make progress.  Some among the mediation 
had planned to get quick agreement there, and then adjourn 
this session.  USDEL has pressed hard that the parties need 
to remain engaged so long as they are prepared to do so.  At 
a minimum, the parties should not be allowed to leave 
without dealing with the security issues and making all 
possible efforts to solidify and implement the ceasefire. 
Al-Ghabid said he agreed, and that he wanted to finish 
security at a minimum, maybe go through the entire agenda if 
the parties are willing to remain engaged.  While he agreed 
with the observers that taking the parties as far as they 
can be prodded to go would preserve whatever momentum might 
be generated, it would also end the issue of whether the 
venue should be changed at the next round. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The venue question, however, seemed to be fading 
away.  Although the Libyan representative continues to press 
the parties in the corridors, the rebels do not want to do 
it.  More importantly, Obasanjo is emphatically against it. 
He has done a good deal of work, including some direct 
meetings with the rebel movements, to bring them along.  He 
personally espoused their outrage at reports of new bombing 
of civilians on August 26, and is following up directly with 
Bashir.  (Note: BG Okonkwo confirms that Obasjano called 
Bashir, but does not have a detailed readout.  End Note.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) Besides the question as to how serious the 
government is about achieving agreement with the rebel 
movements, USDEL is also concerned that Al-Ghabid does not 
have to have a well-thought out sense of where he wants to 
take the talks, or even how to get there.  He is becoming 
more decisive in the chair, but wants the observers (i.e, 
the U.S., UK, EU, UN, and even Sant' Egidio) to do the face- 
to-face diplomacy with the parties.  USDEL and the EU have 
pushed back, as he and his team must take the lead with the 
parties - with our strong support. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment:  The tabling of an integrated text just a 
week after beginning negotiations demonstrates that the 
mediators and the parties want to move the process forward 
at an ambitious pace - despite the ups and downs that the 
inexperienced rebel delegations have introduced in the 
plenum.  The initial response later today by the parties to 
the mediator's draft on humanitarian issues may or may not 
be a test of where the parties are.  It requires the 
government to make some significant concessions on access, 
air corridors, and delivery of relief supplies through 
Libya.  It calls for an expansion of the AU observer 
mission, and creation of a parallel observer cell for 
humanitarian issues.  They should not, however, be 
concessions the government cannot afford to make.  Even 
should they (surprisingly) agree to the full text, it does 
not mean they will make the concessions that really count 
further down the road on security and on a political 
settlement.  The rebels, on the other hand, would get much 
of what they asked for that actually pertains to 
humanitarian issues, and they have acknowledged this.  They 
say they intend to seek clarifications and ask for 
strengthened language on observers.  If they stick to this, 
they may get an agreement on the first part of the agenda, 
and put the process on a firmer footing. 
 
¶11. (U) Minimize considered. 
CAMPBELL