This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LILONGWE 000844 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/S ADRIENNE GALANEK 
DEPT FOR INR/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2014 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR ECON EFIN MI
SUBJECT: A TECHNOCRAT TAKES OFFICE: MUTHARIKA AT 100 DAYS 
 
REF: A. LILONGWE 586 
 
     ¶B. LILONGWE 839 
     ¶C. LILONGWE 559 
     ¶D. LILONGWE 838 
     ¶E. LILONGWE 404 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Officer Peter W. Lord, reasons 1.5 (b/d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (C) Elected by a small margin and achieved only with 
former President Bakili Muluzi's support, President Bingu wa 
Mutharika has made surprisingly independent strides in 
rooting out corruption, instilling fiscal discipline, and 
professionalizing government.  His operating assumption is 
that if he runs government well, he will garner the support 
necessary to carry out reforms, with or without Muluzi and 
the United Democratic Front (UDF).  However, with Mutharika's 
technocratic approach to running government has come a 
general disregard for the public's perception of his actions 
and a disinterest in managing the politics of the presidency. 
 Mutharika has also given very little attention to HIV/AIDS 
and privatization.  While he is still learning the boundaries 
of his power, Mutharika is faring well in regaining the 
international community's confidence in the government of 
Malawi, which will ultimately unlock financial resources. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
SEPARATING PARTY AND STATE: UDF VS. GOM 
--------------------------------------- 
¶2. (C) Since his inauguration on May 24, President Bingu wa 
Mutharika's biggest political problems have been with his own 
party.  A move to make the ruling United Democratic Front 
(UDF) party separate from government, coupled with a 
disinterest in managing the politics that go with the 
presidency, has left Mutharika outside the party fold and 
caused party loyalists to question his allegiance to the UDF. 
 Muluzi, as party chair, continues to demonstrate that he 
rules the UDF by making whistle-stop tours and by managing 
the internal party politics.  Without Muluzi, Mutharika would 
likely take additional steps to make a more clear distinction 
between the UDF and the GOM, but Mutharika would also have an 
unruly UDF on his hands, ready to actively work against the 
administration's reform initiatives. 
 
ROOTING OUT CORRUPTION: ON THE ROAD TO ZAMBIA? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶3. (C) With Mutharika's zero-tolerance policy on corruption 
and repeated statements about prosecuting offenders at all 
levels of government, civil society and the media have 
speculated that Muluzi will be brought to book (reftel A). 
Officials at the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) have also 
intimated that they plan to prosecute "at the very highest 
levels of government" (reftel B).  In order to preempt a 
Zambia-style corruption investigation, Muluzi has tried to 
make Mutharika politically dependent on him (reftel C). 
However, continuing tension between Muluzi and Mutharika 
indicate that Muluzi's plans have not been successful and 
that Mutharika sees little value in Muluzi's political stock. 
 If the ACB does investigate Muluzi for corruption, it is 
unlikely that Mutharika will protect him, as Mutharika 
promised to do during the campaign period. 
 
MAKING A PROFESSIONAL GO OF IT 
------------------------------ 
¶4. (C) Most impressive since Mutharika took office has been 
his commitment to appointing professionals to senior GOM 
positions.  The cabinet is largely composed of qualified 
technocrats, and the Director of Public Prosecutions, Army 
Commander, and Secretaries to the President and Cabinet are 
all qualified individuals.  A focus on putting the right 
people in the right jobs has resulted in a re-ordering of the 
principal secretaries in all ministries and has reverberated 
through the civil service as a demand to perform.  Also 
encouraging is the seemingly independent operation of these 
individuals with the authority of their offices, which was 
not the case under Muluzi. 
 
¶5. (C) While Mutharika's "professional government" has been 
well received by civil society and the media, his dismantling 
of Muluzi's political patronage system and empowerment of 
government offices to investigate and prosecute wrongdoing 
have increased the tension between Mutharika and Muluzi's old 
guard in the UDF.  Many of Muluzi's most loyal, now the 
subject of corruption investigations, are embittered and have 
only been kept in check by Muluzi.  Without Muluzi, there 
would be a much more vocal opposition to Mutharika in the UDF. 
 
NOTABLY ABSENT: HIV/AIDS AND PRIVATIZATION 
------------------------------------------ 
¶6. (C) Although Mutharika has given fiscal discipline and the 
government budget a great deal of attention, he has put 
privatization of statutory corporations on hold.  The 
privatization of Malawi Telecommunications, Limited (MTL) was 
frozen in final negotiations almost as soon as Mutharika took 
office, without announcement or explanation.  Although 
Mutharika's economic reforms have produced optimism in the 
private sector (reftel D), his statist economic origins 
remain a clear influence in his policies.  How Mutharika 
treats the parastatals will reveal much about his commitment 
to private sector as the engine of economic growth. 
 
¶7. (C) Apart from a few statements at the recent SADC 
Heads-of-State meeting in Mauritius, Mutharika has said 
almost nothing about HIV/AIDS.  With an infection rate of 
over 14 percent dramatically affecting Malawi's productivity 
and large amounts of resources coming for prevention and 
treatment, the Mutharika administration will have to take a 
more active role in HIV/AIDS leadership to make meaningful 
gains. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶8. (C) Mutharika has a window of opportunity in that most 
Malawians genuinely believe that with proper leadership, 
corruption can be controlled and the economy will turn 
around.  In addition, the international community is eager to 
resume financial support.  Mutharika's initial gestures 
toward reform have done much to regain the GOM's credibility, 
which Muluzi seriously wounded in the run-up to the 
elections.  However, while Mutharika has thus far been able 
to garner political support by "doing the right thing," he is 
not as politically astute as his predecessor.  He does not 
recognize the importance perception plays in politics, and he 
does not realize the value of loyalty in partisan politics. 
 
¶9. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. As Mutharika continues to bank on 
opposition support, Muluzi will try to prove his political 
worth to Mutharika by keeping the UDF old guard in check and 
working the grassroots for support for the UDF.  In the end, 
Mutharika may find that he needs Muluzi more than he thinks 
in order to affect political change, and Muluzi will be an 
eager aide in order to protect and position himself in the 
long-term.  END COMMENT. 
RASPOLIC