This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LILONGWE 000839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EB/IFD/ODF MARLENE BREEN 
STATE FOR EB/IFD/OMA FRANCES CHISHOLM 
STATE FOR AF/S TED CRAIG 
TREASURY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS/AFRICA LUKAS KOHLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2014 
TAGS: ECON EFIN KCOR PGOV PREL MI
SUBJECT: NOISE ABOUT CORRUPTION IN MALAWI 
 
REF: A. LILONGWE 586 
     ¶B. LILONGWE 728 
 
Classified By: Econ Officer William R. Taliaferro, reasons 1.5 b and d 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) Malawi's new administration has been very public about 
its intention to bring corruption under control.  President 
Bingu wa Mutharika has replaced the chief government 
prosecutor, who in turn has publicly targeted several former 
ministers and ruling party members. The noise of a crackdown 
has garnered political support for Mutharika, and may buy 
just enough credibility to tip donors to release budgetary 
support sooner.  End Summary. 
 
 
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A NEW SHERIFF IN TOWN 
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¶2. (U) Beginning with the controversial replacement of 
sitting Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Fahad Assani 
with novice lawyer Ishmael Wadi, the Mutharika administration 
has been loudly declaring war on corruption.  The DPP's 
office, which has sole authority to prosecute cases forwarded 
by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), had been seen as a 
barrier to rooting out corruption at the cabinet level. 
Under Assani, several cases involving ministers and senior 
ruling party officials had been refused, creating the 
perception that he would only go after "small fish," and then 
only with permission from the Government. 
 
¶3. (U) Mutharika's July appointment of Wadi, who is only 
three years out of law school and has no experience with 
criminal law, was an early signal that he intends radical 
change.  Sacking Assani was a controversial move, which 
elicited a brief storm of protest (including calls for 
impeachment) and a civil lawsuit.  By early August, though, 
the controversy had died down, and Parliament unanimously 
confirmed Wadi. 
 
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NAMING NAMES IN THE PRESS 
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¶4. (U) Since his appointment, the new prosecutor has used the 
press to announce his targets, which include several former 
ministers and senior members of the ruling United Democratic 
Front (UDF) party.  The UDF is the party of both Mutharika 
and former president Bakili Muluzi. Significantly, his 
accusations have been seconded in the press by Mutharika's 
chief of staff, Ken Ng'oma.  Mutharika confines his own 
anti-corruption statements to broad generalities, but UDF 
members have roundly criticized his staff's penchant for 
trial by press. 
 
¶5. (U) Accounts vary about who Wadi is targeting, but the 
most prominent potential cases are these: 
 
-- Humphrey Mvula, CEO of the parastatal Shire Bus Lines, 
deputy director of the UDF, and leader of the UDF's militant 
youth wing Young Democrats, who was arrested for malfeasance 
at Shire.  He was later released, but the press regularly 
quotes Wadi declaring his intent to prosecute Mvula.  Mvula 
has since been fired from Shire. 
 
-- Cassim Chalumpa, current vice president and former 
minister of finance and education, who is thought to have 
been involved in fraud involving school-building funds. 
 
-- Clement Stambuli, former information minister, suspected 
of unspecified malfeasance in office. 
 
-- Peter Fachi, former minister of justice; Patrick Mbewe, 
former local government minister; and Monjeza Maluza, former 
home affairs minister, for arranging the fraudulent sale of 
used Land Rovers to the GOM as new. Mbewe is also thought to 
have been involved in corruption around contracts for 
national ID cards. 
 
-- Friday Jumbe, former minister of finance, thought to have 
profited from illegal sales from the strategic grain reserves 
during the 2002 hunger crisis. 
 
-- Dumbo Lemani, former minister for water development, for 
manipulating the Petroleum Control Commission's fuel import 
allocations for personal profit. 
 
 
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LESS NOISE FROM THE PROFESSIONALS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Anti-Corruption Board, which is responsible for 
investigating corruption but still cannot prosecute on its 
own, has kept comparatively quiet about specific cases.  They 
have talked publicly about a few investigations, including 
that of Chakufwa Chihana, the sitting minister of 
agriculture, who is alleged to have bribed local election 
officials leading up to the May 2004 elections.  They have 
also mentioned a new investigation into the suspicious death 
of Kalonga Stambuli, a long-time Muluzi associate who broke 
with him in the late 1990s, fled into exile, then returned in 
2003 as a Muluzi ally and investment banker.  Up to now, 
neither Wadi nor the ACB has named Muluzi as a target of any 
investigation, although he is the most obvious target--and 
the most dangerous (reftel A). 
 
¶7. (C) In a recent meeting with the DCM and pol/econoffs, the 
senior management of ACB indicated that it is now 
investigating or preparing to prosecute a number of cases 
involving officials "at the very highest levels of 
government."  The Mutharika administration has decided in the 
last week to double ACB's operating budget, despite a general 
tightening of the state budget.  Even so, the ACB still has 
considerable capacity building to do, especially regarding 
international law enforcement cooperation and investigation 
of financial crimes. 
 
 
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COMMENT: BUYING POLITICAL SUPPORT, AND TIME 
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¶8. (C) Though the administration's public pronouncements have 
angered Muluzi loyalists, they seem to be popular with the 
opposition, to the extent that some observers now describe 
the President's UDF party as a de facto opposition.  This 
much is certain: the noise about corruption investigations is 
buying Mutharika some political independence from the old 
guard of the UDF, including Muluzi himself. 
 
¶9. (C) Whether this tactic will give him enough support to 
pursue a responsible fiscal agenda, and to defend his 
corruption-busting against more concerted political 
maneuvering from UDF, remains to be seen.  Among donors, who 
certainly constitute another intended audience, there is 
still some skepticism about the noise level.  They would be 
more impressed with court cases and convictions.  However, 
with a potential currency crisis perhaps two or three months 
away, the donors need to make a decision soon about whether 
to release funds.  In the absence of enough time to see the 
whole judicial process completed, noise alone might make a 
difference. 
 
 
RASPOLIC