This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 002496 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, SA/INS, DRL/PHD, DRL/ILA, G/TIP 
STATE FOR CA/OCS/ACS/NESA, M/P FOR JAY ANANIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2014 
TAGS: ELAB MOPS PREL PHUM ETRD EAID KU IZ IN RP
SUBJECT: IRAQ TRAVEL BAN: US MILITARY PRESSES INDIA AND 
PHILIPPINES TO EXEMPT NATIONALS UNDER MILITARY ESCORT 
 
REF: A. STATE 169976 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 2425 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 2006 
     ¶D. KUWAIT 1834 
     ¶E. KUWAIT 1835 
     ¶F. KUWAIT 1683 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matthew Tueller, Reason 1.4(b) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  The Embassy hosted an August 5 meeting 
between representatives of the Coalition Forces Land 
Component Command (CFLCC) and representatives from the Indian 
and Phillipines Embassies concerning the travel ban that both 
India and the Philippines have imposed, prohibiting their 
nationals from entering Iraq (Ref B).   Military supply 
convoys are now stacking up at the Kuwait-Iraq border, with 
the main transportation contractor, PWC, estimating that only 
a few days' supply of food and water remain in Iraq.  CFLCC 
BG Jack Stultz emphasized that the military treats drivers of 
all nations as if they were American soldiers, offering the 
same level of protection and quality of life provisions.  He 
stressed that support convoys entering Iraq through the 
military crossing are always under military control, and 
requested that the Governments of India and the Philippines 
allow their nationals traveling under US military escort to 
enter Iraq through the coalition crossing.  The Indians said 
that they were primarily concerned with the kidnapping of 
Indian nationals.  The Philippine Labor Attache said that he 
had already prepared a memo for his government seeking relief 
from the ban, and said that the Philippines government is 
amenable.  The GOK says it would permit Indians and Filipinos 
to enter Iraq through the military border crossing if so 
instructed by Manila and New Delhi.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On August 5, the Embassy hosted a meeting between 
representatives of the Coalition Forces Land Component 
Command (CFLCC), led by Brigadier Generals Jack Stultz and 
William Johnson, and representatives from the Indian and 
Phillipines Embassies concerning the travel ban that both 
India and the Philippines have imposed, prohibiting their 
nationals from entering Iraq (Ref B).  As a result of the 
ban, US military supply convoy operations -- which are 
heavily dependent on Filipino and Indian drivers -- have once 
again been halted, with reports of almost 1,000 trucks 
stopped at the Kuwait-Iraq border.   Since 75 percent of all 
supply convoys enter Iraq from Kuwait, any disruption has 
serious consequences (Note.  As of August 5, a representative 
from the main transportation contractor, PWC, estimated that 
only a six day supply of PWC-delivered food and water 
remained in Iraq.  End Note.).   CFLCC hoped that by 
providing more information on security provisions made for 
foreign national truckers in US military-escorted convoys, 
the Indians and Filipinos could be persuaded to exempt their 
nationals who are working for US military contractors from 
the travel ban. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) BG Stultz thanked the Indian and Filipino diplomats 
for attending and, noting the centrality of Indian and 
Filipino drivers to US operations in Iraq, expressed his deep 
concern over the current ban prohibiting their nationals from 
entering Iraq.  BG Stultz emphasized that the military treats 
drivers of all nations as if they were American soldiers, 
offering the same level of protection and providing access to 
dining, sleeping and truck maintenance facilities at convoy 
support centers along the supply route.  He offered a 
detailed description of the various convoy operations 
currently crossing the Kuwait-Iraq border through the 
coalition crossing point, as well as the security measures 
that the military undertakes to protect them.  These convoys 
are always, he stressed, under military control. 
 
¶4.   (SBU) The Indians, who asked if any statistics were 
available on the number of convoys that had come under 
attack, said that they were primarily concerned with the 
kidnapping of Indian nationals.  They did concede, though, 
that they did not have any information to suggest that the 
hostages were taken from military convoys.  BG Stultz 
acknowledged that there are many non-military contractors 
operating in Iraq over whom the military has no control and 
whose drivers, security cannot be guaranteed. 
Significantly, however, BG Stultz specified that no hostages 
have been taken from a military convoy since April 9 (at that 
time, one US soldier and one foreign national driver were 
abducted; the soldier is still missing, but the foreign 
national driver escaped).  Because the military could provide 
sufficient security for drivers traveling with military 
escort, he continued, the military was requesting that the 
Government of India and the Philippines grant an exemption to 
their travel ban and allow their nationals traveling under US 
military escort to enter Iraq through the coalition crossing. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Indians said that they would relay the request to 
New Delhi, but cautioned that during the last travel ban, the 
Kuwaitis were adamant that either all Indians would be 
permitted to cross, or none would be allowed to enter Iraq. 
EconCouns clarified that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
expressed a willingness to apply the ban selectively, 
imposing it only at the civilian crossing but allowing Indian 
and Filipino drivers to pass at the military crossing.   The 
Indians then made another appeal for the military to provide 
death benefits to the families of ten Indian drivers killed 
in Iraq (Refs C and E), saying that "these small things help 
us in talking to our government."  BG Stultz noted that there 
are 3500 contractors working in Iraq, many of whom are not 
affiliated with the US military, and thus the military needed 
to investigate to determine if these individuals were working 
for a military contractor/subcontractor. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Philippine Labor Attache Angelo Jimenez, who said 
that the availability of first aid for Filipino drivers was a 
major concern, requested a map showing all of the convoy 
support centers in Iraq and pressed the military 
representatives for estimates of how long drivers would need 
to wait for medical treatment if they came under attack. 
According to Jimenez, the Philippines Embassy had received 
reports of non-military casualties not receiving treatment. 
BG Stultz urged Jimenez to notify him immediately if he 
received any such reports. 
 
¶7.  (C) Jimenez said that he had already prepared a memo for 
his government seeking relief from the ban.  According to 
him, the Philippines government is amenable because they are 
being pressured by Filipinos who need the jobs.  (Note.  In a 
follow-up telephone conversation with EconOff on August 7, 
Jimenez said that he already sent one memo and is preparing a 
second, more detailed report.  He does not expect to have 
feedback from Manila until Monday, August 9.  End Note).  He 
emphasized, however, that there needed to be a very clear 
method of differentiation between those nationals working 
with military protection, and those working for non-military 
contractors.  CFLCC staff again stressed that the only 
individuals who may use the coalition border crossing are 
those under military escort; non-military contractors must 
use the civilian crossing at Al-Abdaly.  Therefore, the 
military was seeking an exemption for foreign national 
drivers seeking to cross the Kuwait-Iraq border at the 
coalition border crossing only.  Jimenez asked if there were 
similar control points at the Jordanian and Turkish borders 
that would separate military from civilian traffic; BG Stultz 
confirmed that there were.   Finally, Jimenez requested that 
the military provide him with a point of contact with whom 
his embassy could work in case the ban was relaxed and there 
were problems with implementation.  The military agreed to 
identify a point of contact in the Embassy, who would then 
coordinate with the operations center at Camp Arifjan. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) COMMENT.  While both the Indians and the Filipinos 
promised to transmit BG Stultz's assurances to their 
respective capitals, the Filipino attache seemed more 
receptive to CFLCC's message than the Indians.  The Indians' 
more guarded response may be due, in part, to the fact that 
not all of the problems that led them to impose their 
May/June travel ban have been addressed (most notably, the 
lack of death benefits for Indians killed in Iraq; refs C and 
E).  CFLCC and the Embassy are working together to ensure 
that the Indians' outstanding concerns are adequately 
addressed.  END COMMENT. 
TUELLER