This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001550 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, PRM/ANE 
BEIJING PLEASE PASS CHENGDU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2014 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL BT IN NP UNHCR
SUBJECT: NEPAL: UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE ON BHUTANESE/TIBETAN 
REFUGEE ISSUES 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1096 
     ¶B. KATHMANDU 1418 
     ¶C. KATHMANDU 1479 
     ¶D. KATHMANDU 1054 
     ¶E. KATHMANDU 1147 
     ¶F. KATHMANDU 4544 
     ¶G. KATHMANDU 1288 
     ¶H. KATHMANDU 1319 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UNHCR Representative Abraham Abraham 
expressed the hope to the Ambassador on August 4 that the 
verification of Bhutanese refugees would resume.  Meanwhile, 
for the first time, some Bhutanese refugees had begun to ask 
for immediate third-country resettlement.  On Tibetans, UNHCR 
was sending letters to border officials to encourage respect 
for the "Gentleman's Agreement," was planning to quietly 
establish a UNHCR border post, and was planning a seminar for 
border officials on refugee issues by the end of the year. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
============================ 
BHUTANESE REFUGEES - PROCESS 
============================ 
 
¶2. (C) During a call on the Ambassador on August 4, UNHCR 
Representative Abraham Abraham noted that Embassy support for 
UNHCR had visibly affected GON attitudes towards refugee 
issues.  On the Bhutanese refugee front, Abraham, who had met 
on August 3 with State Minister for Foreign Affairs Prakash 
Sharan Mahat, believed it likely the bilateral process would 
restart.  It appeared as though the Royal Government of 
Bhutan (RGOB) was ready to leave the 22 December incident 
behind and restart the process.  Although he could not 
confirm whether the next meeting would be at the Ministerial 
or technical level, Abraham thought perhaps at the Joint 
Verification Team (JVT) level.  Mahat had sounded optimistic, 
 Abraham reported, even though no dates had been set for the 
next step in the verification or repatriation process.  The 
Ambassador, who had spoken with Mahat on August 2, agreed, 
and informed Abraham that he raised the refugees everytime he 
saw Mahat.  It was fair to be guardedly optimistic that a 
16th round might occur; of course, that did not mean any real 
progress would be made.  However, Indian involvement with the 
issue could make a real difference, and it appeared that the 
GON had been actively courting the GOI to get involved. 
Abraham noted that when he gave a talk at the think tank in 
New Delhi in May, there appeared to be a recognition that 
India had an important role to play regarding Bhutanese 
refugees. 
 
¶3. (C) Abraham stated that he had asked the GON (via Mahat) 
to allow UNHCR to begin processing third-country resettlement 
for the most vulnerable cases (i.e., families with a female 
head-of-household, refugees that had suffered from 
trafficking or abuse).  Moreover, some refugees, no longer 
willing to wait for the bilateral process to bear fruit, had 
also started asking UNHCR for a third-country solution. 
According to Abraham, Mahat stated that the repatriation 
process would have to begin before any third-country options 
were considered.  Otherwise, resettlement could undermine the 
credibility of the bilateral negotiation process, the RGOB 
might be let off the hook and Nepal would be left with the 
refugees.  However, the Foreign Ministry would start internal 
discussions on how to move quickly on the most vulnerable 
refugee cases. 
 
¶4. (C) UNHCR had been pressing the GON to allow UNHCR to 
carry out a profiling of the refugees and a socio-economic 
survey of the seven refugee camps and surrounding local 
areas, Abraham noted.  The profiling was designed to better 
identify those in need of special protection (i.e., those who 
might not safely return to Bhutan no matter the established 
conditions of repatriation), and would provide the refugees 
better identification.  It was part of a new worldwide system 
UNHCR was putting into place.  Better identification would 
help especially with security concerns that had arisen from 
the Maoist insurgency.  The survey would ideally give UNHCR a 
better understanding of the refugees' economic conditions 
compared to nearby Nepali locals, which would allow UNHCR, 
working with donors, to design better programs for the 
refugees.  The survey would also help establish a baseline of 
refugee needs.  Moreover, it would help those willing donors 
to design development programs for the surrounding 
communities; this could alleviate economic imbalances and 
tensions between the local areas and the refugees.  UNHCR 
also planned to develop an information campaign about the 
rights and responsibilities of the refugees.  Thus far, 
however, the GON had demurred on the survey.  Abraham 
insisted that there was no intention of reducing levels of 
support to the refugees; the intent was to better direct the 
support to refugee needs.  UNHCR Nepal was also responding to 
directions from Geneva to look at ways to hand off 
maintenance of the refugees to other partners, to retain 
UNHCR's primary focus on protection.  Meanwhile, Abraham had 
met with NGOs who had been interested, but wanted support 
from donors and a blessing from the GON to participate.  The 
Ambassador understood that the GON may fear the survey 
because it could look like the beginning of local integration 
into Nepali society and reduce the pressure on the RGOB. 
Abraham understood, and added that at the same time the 
profiling was important to get a head count of the refugees, 
it might also reveal much fewer refugees in the camps, 
possibly as low as 80,000. 
 
================ 
TIBETAN REFUGEES 
================ 
 
¶5. (C) Turning to Tibetan refugees, Abraham explained that to 
date the GON had not responded to UNHCR's request to issue 
instructions regarding the terms of the "Gentleman's 
Agreement" to its border officials.  (NOTE: The Ambassador 
has raised this issue with the Prime Minister and Home 
Ministry, but also did not receive a clear response.  END 
NOTE.)  Despite this, Abraham had been penning letters 
explaining the GON's obligations and the practice used to 
bring Tibetan refugees to Kathmandu, and had sent these 
letters to border officials each time his staff (or those 
from the Tibetan Refugee Resettlement Center) made border 
visits.  He also planned to send more staff for longer visits 
to the Kodari border crossing point, ultimately to establish 
quietly a more permanent UNHCR office.  It would be ideal if 
the U.S. could provide assistance to staff such a post, 
Abraham added.  Increasing UNHCR's border presence would 
ideally reduce the chances of refoulement.  Meanwhile, UNHCR 
had hired a local lawyer to join the border missions. 
Additionally, UNHCR planned to hold by the end of the year a 
seminar for border officials (i.e., Ministry of Home, Army, 
Armed Police Force, civilian police) on international law and 
regulations protecting refugees.  Meanwhile, the efficiency 
of processing refugees for onward transit to India had been 
improved by adding additional UNHCR staff at the Tibetan 
Refugee Resettlement Center, and by the agreement of the 
Indian Embassy to interview increasing numbers of cases each 
day. 
 
==================== 
AHMADIS IN KATHMANDU 
==================== 
 
¶6. (C) Abraham also mentioned increasing numbers of Ahmadis 
arriving on the direct flight from Karachi seeking UNHCR 
protection and resettlement.  About 160 Ahmadi asylum seekers 
had thus far arrived in Kathmandu, and according to reports, 
many were also appearing in Hong Kong and Sri Lanka.  UNHCR 
Nepal may request extra support from Geneva to interview them 
to determine the possible refugee status of this latest group 
of asylees. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶7. (C) UNHCR continues to design and test potential solutions 
to the difficulties the organization faces operating here, 
such as the plan to eventually open an office at the Kodari 
border crossing where most Tibetans transit and asking donors 
to support a development program in areas surrounding the 
Bhutanese refugee camps.  However, there is little UNHCR can 
do to help with the strictly bilateral verification process 
on Bhutanese refugees.  Should some repatriation eventually 
occur, it remains unclear who would provide monitoring and 
protection to the refugees in Bhutan.  Abraham noted that the 
RGOB had not allowed UNHCR to open a country office in 
Bhutan, a sign that UNHCR would not be able to fulfill its 
protection mandate in Bhutan under any eventual repatriation. 
 It remains to be seen how many of the Bhutanese refugees 
would be willing to voluntarily return without UNHCR in 
Bhutan to verify their safety. 
MORIARTY