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C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 002644 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
HQ USSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
USAID DCHA/OTI FOR RPORTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2014 
TAGS: PGOV KIRC PHUM KDEM EPET VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ CAMPAIGNS ON THE PUBLIC'S DIME IN REFERENDUM 
 
REF: CARACAS 02316 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR REASON 1.4 (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) Using state finances and manipulation of the structure 
established in the media accords, President Hugo Chavez 
mounted a much more impressive campaign in the referendum 
than the opposition.  Pro-government advertising and 
propaganda filled Venezuelan newspapers, overshadowing the 
little opposition advertising to be found. The government 
hijacked the public purse to buy hundreds of pages of 
pro-Chavez, pro-"revolutionary" propaganda, a tactic the 
opposition could not match. On the electronic front, more 
opposition ads finally began getting through the CNE to be 
aired on private TV stations in early August, though still 
lagging behind the number of pro-Chavez ads. The opposition, 
however, had an edge in private TV and print media outlets in 
terms of editorial and opinion pieces, as well as in overall 
media coverage of the Chavez government and the referendum. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
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PRINT ADVERTISING & PROPAGANDA 
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¶2. (U) While Venezuela's four main private television 
channels have lost money throughout the presidential recall 
referendum campaign because of Chavez's use of presidential 
"cadenas," most of the print media--many of them 
pro-opposition--have profited from campaign advertising and 
government "announcements."  Full page color advertisements 
often run under the innocuous banner "Venezuela: Ahora Es 
Para Todos" (Venezuela: Now It's for Everyone).  At times 
warm and fuzzy, non-offensive, and not overtly-political 
(think Reagan's "Morning in America" campaign), they extol 
the virtues of the government's social and economic programs, 
especially the missions.  The message is clear enough: These 
benefits are brought to Venezuelans thanks to President 
Chavez.  The announcements are thinly-veiled pro-revolution 
advertisements funded by government ministries and agencies. 
 
¶3. (C) According to internal tracking research by El Nacional 
newspaper, the biggest government advertisers in seven 
leading newspapers are: the Ministry of the Secretary of the 
Presidency;  the National Electoral Council (whose 
advertising tends to focus on the voting process and is, 
therefore, not political in the same way as others), and 
state oil company PDVSA.  Other big spenders include the 
governments of the State of Miranda, the Office of the Mayor 
of Caracas, SENIAT (the tax authority), and the ministries of 
Finance, Energy and Mines, and Defense.  The ads covered in 
the research are not all political, but PAS monitoring 
confirms that many of the entities listed above regularly run 
ads related to the Chavez's anti-recall campaign. 
 
¶4. (C) By far the biggest beneficiary of the government's 
spending spree has been Ultimas Noticias, a working class 
news tabloid (in the vein of New York's Post or Daily News), 
which leans moderately toward the president in its editorial 
positions.  67% of the public-sector print advertising 
expenditures, for a total of almost 1,000 pages (92,500 
column centimeters) in July alone, went to Ultimas Noticias, 
according to the El Nacional research.  A senior executive of 
Cadena Capriles, which publishes Ultimas Noticias, reported 
that 75% of the company's July revenue ($2,083,333 at the 
official exchange rate) resulted from government advertising. 
 At this point, the executive said, Ultimas Noticias is only 
accepting these ads, turning away private-sector clients. 
 
¶5. (C) Other newspapers have also profited from the 
government's splurge on the anti-recall campaign, but to an 
exponentially lesser degree. In second place, El Universal 
 
has garnered approximately 16% of public sector advertising, 
followed by El Nacional (10%), Diario 2001, El Globo, and 
Meridiano (each with 2%), and El Mundo (1%). 
 
¶6. (C) PDVSA, despite being only the third most spendthrift 
public-sector advertiser, was the most notable advertiser, 
with daily, color, full-page ads in at least one newspaper, 
and usually in several.  The ads took one of two tactics: 
either PDVSA as reporter, or PDVSA as missionary.  As 
reporter, PDVSA informed the Venezuelan public about 
newsworthy events involving the president (one of his 
meetings with Argentine President Nestor Kirchner, for 
example).  This type of ad consists of a full-page ghosted 
picture of Chavez in a commanding pose or shaking the hand of 
a foreign dignitary, with a printed report over the picture. 
In the others, PDVSA promoted Chavez's social missions and 
the use of Venezuela's oil riches for "the people." 
According to the El Nacional study, 72% of the oil company's 
July advertising ran in Ultimas Noticias, 19% in El Nacional, 
and 9% in El Universal, for a total of 137 pages. 
 
¶7. (C) Chavez's Comando Maisanta and his Fifth Republic 
Movement (MVR) also ran daily ads in most newspapers 
featuring the president and "No" slogans, often half pages in 
the broadsheets but also multiple fractionals sprinkled 
throughout a newspaper.  Compared to the pro-Chavez camp's 
healthy, full-color advertising campaign, the opposition's 
print campaign was meager at best. "Si" advertising appeared 
in the form of one or two small, black and white fractionals 
in each paper.  Easy to miss due to poor design and 
infrequency, the "si" ads were easy to miss and easy to 
forget. 
 
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TELEVISION UPDATE 
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¶8. (C) Private television executives charged that the 
National Electoral Council (CNE) held back most opposition TV 
advertising until the end of July.  Under the media accords 
that governed the electronic media campaign, the CNE approved 
the content of all TV ads before they went to the stations 
with the understanding that each side would have three (later 
changed to seven) minutes on each network each day, to be 
paid in credit by the CNE.  The CNE, however, approved many 
"no" ads  while approving only one "si" spot for most of the 
month of July.  The situation improved for the opposition as 
of August 10, when RCTV and Venevision received and aired 12 
of Coordinadora Democratica's spots and received 20 approved 
"no" spots.  Televen received 19 "si" spots and 39 "no" spots 
in the final stretch. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9. (C) Chavez and his government never intended this campaign 
to be a fair fight, and they got their wish. Despite having 
an edge in terms of editorial coverage and opinion pieces in 
the private media, under the media agreement the opposition 
was handicapped from the beginning by the CNE's requirement 
for approval of all television advertising, while the 
Chavistas suffered no such delays. As for the print media, it 
has been plain to anyone gleaning a Venezuelan newspaper that 
the state funded the Chavez campaign. 
Shapiro 
 
 
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      2004CARACA02644 - CONFIDENTIAL