This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 002151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
GENEVA FOR CD DEL, UNVIE FOR IAEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2014 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ETTC PREL PARM BR NPT IAEA
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS 
CONDITION OF SUPPLY 
 
REF: A. STATE 180283 
 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 1045 
     ¶C. BRASILIA 1221 
     ¶D. BRASILIA 1069 
     ¶E. BRASILIA 909 
     ¶F. BRASILIA 1005 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis Hearne, reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Poloff delivered ref A talking points to Ministry 
of Foreign Relations Sensitive Technologies and Disarmament 
Division (MRE/DDS) Deputy Director Manuel Montenegro, who is 
well versed on Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) matters. 
Montenegro had participated in the recent NSG plenary meeting 
in Sweden and his comments likely reflect the thinking of his 
superiors within Itamaraty. Poloff also exchanged brief 
pleasantries with Ambassador Sergio Duarte, President of the 
2005 NPT Review Conference, and his assistant Jandyr Ferreira 
dos Santos. 
 
¶2.  (C) Responding to the Brazil specific points in ref A, 
Montenegro sought to clarify the GOB position on conclusion 
of the Additional Protocol (AP).  Montenegro stressed that 
the GOB does not have any "conceptual" problem with the AP 
and "would get there eventually," implying a Brazilian 
disposition to sign the protocol at some point in the future. 
 However, Montenegro said he was certain that Brazil could 
not complete its internal policy consideration of the issue 
in time to adhere to the AP prior to the 2005 NPT Revcon.  In 
that regard, he noted that Brazil's congress had issued a 
"caveat" to the MRE that the congress wants to see "concerted 
effort towards nuclear disarmament" among weapons states if 
it is to consider approval of the Additional Protocol. (Note: 
Under Brazilian law, the Additional Protocol would almost 
certainly have to be approved by Brazil's congress, as it is 
a substantive addendum to an international treaty. End note.) 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Responding further to ref A points, Montenegro said 
Brazil continues to oppose implementation of the AP as a 
Condition of Supply (COS) for trigger list transfers in the 
NSG.  Montenegro was surprised that the USG was continuing to 
press for the UK/Austrian proposal to establish AP 
implementation as a COS since, following the NSG Plenary and 
after GOB delegation discussions with the UK and Austrian 
delegations, it was Montenegro's understanding that the 
UK/Austrian text was "dead." Montenegro further said that the 
GOB is against the use of the NSG as a kind of "cheerleader 
for the AP." 
 
¶4.  (C) Comment: Montenegro is a candid MRE specialist in 
non-proliferation issues, and we suspect he is offering a 
realistic assessment of the deliberate pace the GOB will take 
toward the AP, even as senior Brazilian officials continue to 
indicate a disposition to eventually sign on.  His assessment 
reinforces views expressed earlier this year by FM Amorim and 
Defense Minister Viegas to visiting Energy Secretary Abraham 
and former NP A/S Wolf (refs E and F). The public statements 
in April by Science and Technology Minister Campos that 
Brazil would sign the AP in time for the 2005 NPT Review 
Conference now seem isolated and too optimistic.  We believe 
the GOB's reservations probably continue to include: (1) 
reluctance to appear to bow to external pressures, from the 
USG, IAEA or in the context of the NSG; (2) concern with 
perceptions that the AP pressure on Brazil in some fashion 
lumps Brazil in the suspect company of North Korea and Iran, 
when the GOB feels Brazil ought to be seen as a model citizen 
in non-proliferation; (3) concern that the GOB needs an 
"air-tight" case on the merits of the AP before taking the 
matter to Brazil's congress, which only reluctantly ratified 
the NPT and may renew its criticisms of a perceived lack of 
disarmament progress among the weapons states.  We will 
continue to try to gain more clarity on the thinking within 
the GOB on these issues. 
 
Danilovich