This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001985 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM VE BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL-VENEZUELA: DEMARCHE TO MRE ON REFERENDUM, 
ANNOUNCEMENT OF PT PARTY SUPPORT FOR CHAVEZ 
 
REF: STATE 168747 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis Hearne. Reasons: 1.4 
(B)(D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary, Foreign Ministry (MRE) Andean Division Chief 
Rubem Barbosa disagreed with reftel demarche's assertions 
about GOV manipulation and harassment in the run-up to the 15 
August referendum, saying the MRE has received no such 
reports from the OAS observer mission or its embassy.  He 
said the close-call nature of the coming vote seemed to be 
creating a strange calm in which neither side wants to be 
accused of disruptive actions.  Brazil is heavily invested in 
the multilateral effort on the referendum and has ample 
reasons on the national level to fear instability in 
Venezuela, but the GOB is not making contingency plans for 
bilateral engagement in the event of a crisis. In related 
developments, Lula's PT Worker's Party announced on 5 August 
that the PT will send a delegation to Caracas to support the 
referendum and Chavez, but party president Jose Genoino 
stressed that support for Chavez is a PT position, not GOB 
policy.  End summary. 
 
VIEW FROM THE MRE: "IT'S TOO QUIET..." 
 
¶2. (C) On 5 August PolCouns demarched Minister Rubem Barbosa, 
Andean Division Chief at the MRE, providing reftel points and 
stressing USG concerns about harassment incidents and GOV 
efforts to manipulate the judiciary in the run-up to the 15 
August referendum. 
 
¶3. (C) Barbosa said the MRE is in daily contact with the OAS 
observer mission in Venezuela, which is headed by Brazil's 
OAS Permrep.  In that context Barbosa disagreed with reftel 
assertions about manipulation and harassment incidents, 
saying the MRE has received no such specific reports.  While 
noting critically Chavez's recent "bombastic remarks" about 
the USG, Barbosa said the observer mission and Brazil's 
embassy in Caracas are reporting a pre-referendum situation 
that is "quiet, almost too quiet."  Elaborating, Barbosa 
explained that the GOB had anticipated more friction, but 
that the "too close to call" nature of the coming vote, as 
indicated by polls and experts, seemed to be creating a 
strange calm in which neither side wants to be accused of 
blatant actions that could undercut their standing with 
voters and the international community.  A sudden spike 
indicating advantage for one side or the other could shatter 
the calm, Barbosa added. 
 
¶4. (C) As chair of the OAS Friends and with one of its senior 
diplomats heading the observer mission, Brazil is invested in 
-- and has its prestige associated with -- multilateral 
efforts to assure a peaceful and transparent referendum, 
Barbosa said.  Moreover, instability in neighboring Venezuela 
obviously would be a grave matter for Brazil across the 
board.  "For us, the stakes are incredibly high," Barbosa 
said, and there is profound concern within the MRE as 15 
August nears.  However, when poloff asked whether the GOB is 
currently gaming out contingency plans for bilateral 
political engagement in the event of an unfolding crisis, or 
considering its options for "day after" scenarios, Barbosa 
acknowledged that no such planning is underway.  Barbosa said 
the GOB does plan to send a high-level envoy -- possibly MRE 
Under Secretary for South American Affairs Macedo Soares -- 
to Caracas shortly after the referendum, to underscore to 
"the winner, whoever it is" that Brazil wants to work with 
Venezuela to assure a stable way forward. 
 
PT PARTY WILL SEND MISSION TO SUPPORT CHAVEZ 
 
¶5. (C) Jose Genoino, national president of Lula's PT Worker's 
Party, announced on 5 August that the PT will send a 
delegation to Caracas for a meeting with Chavez on 11 August, 
as a gesture of the PT's support for the referendum process 
and the continuation of Chavez in office. Genoino repeatedly 
stressed that the support for Chavez is a party position, and 
does not reflect the official GOB position of neutrality. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment. We cannot assess the accuracy of Barbosa's 
assertions that international observers are not reporting 
misdeeds, or that there is a fragile calm pervading 
Venezuela.  What we can say is that it is ever clearer that, 
while the GOB has impressively invested influence and 
credibility into the multilateral efforts on Venezuela, it 
does not currently appear prepared to take a meaningful 
bilateral role if there is an unfolding crisis after 15 
August.  On the national policy level, it appears to us that 
the GOB leadership has resolved to quietly cross its fingers 
and wait, perhaps expecting a Chavez win and hoping for some 
form of uneasy peace in the aftermath.  But hope is not a 
strategy, and it is worrying that the GOB apparently is not 
prepared for decisive engagement if there is a 
post-referendum meltdown, despite the political, economic and 
security issues at stake for Brazil.  The PT's wandering off 
to Caracas to embrace Chavez at this sensitive juncture, 
despite strenuous GOB efforts over the past several months to 
maintain a posture of objectivity, could further raise 
anxiety levels within the MRE and presidency as the GOB looks 
ahead to 15 August.  We will continue to engage with the MRE 
on Venezuela over the next several days, and will seek an 
appointment asap with Under Secretary for South American 
Affairs Macedo Soares. 
 
DANILOVICH