R 171752Z AUG 04
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0784
WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BAGHDAD 000531 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/14 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PARM KISL SOCI IZ
SUBJECT: SHAHRISTANI COMMENTS ON NAJAF 
 
CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS ROBERT FORD FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND 
(D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In his call on Ambassador Negroponte, Dr. 
Hussain al-Shahristani was critical of the Iragi Interim 
Government's (IIG) handling of the situation in Najaf, 
believing that it has made Muqtada al-Sadr stronger and 
has cost the Government much support.  He urged against a 
military solution in Najaf, stressing that the grievances 
of supporters of the Mehdi army need to be addressed. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Dr. Hussain al-Shahristani, a nuclear scientist, 
President of the Iraqi National Academy of Science and 
prominent leader of Iraq's Shias, called on Ambassador 
Negroponte on August 14. 
 
¶3. (C) After initial introductions and pleasantries, the 
discussion turned to the situation in Najaf.  Dr. 
Shahristani said that he had been in Najaf previously, on 
a day of very heavy fighting.  He had wanted to see 
Muqtada al-Sadr in order to mediate.  Unfortunately, the 
fighting was too severe to enable Shahristani to go 
behind the military lines to meet with al-Sadr. 
 
¶4.  (C) The major problem at this time, said Shahristani, 
is that al-Sadr has gained strength and he and his Jaysh 
Mehdi are being seen sympathetically by increasing 
numbers of Iraqis -Q in large part because of clumsy 
handling of the situation by the IIG and Coalition 
forces.  He is seen as an underdog and has received 
considerably more popular attention than he deserves. 
Shahristani believes that there can be no military 
solution to the al-Sadr problem and the way it has been 
handled thus far is not in the best interests of the 
country.  Moreover, poor handling of al-Sadr in the media 
Q- statements insulting him, particularly by the Prime 
Minister and others -- has only aggravated the problem. 
It should be understood, said Shahristani, that the great 
majority of al-Sadr's supporters are very poor, deprived 
people, mostly Shia, who have gained nothing since 
Saddam's fall.  He also said that many of al-Sadr's 
supporters bear deep resentment for generations of 
poverty, deprivation and exclusion.  Their living 
conditions remain terrible. (In some areas of Sadr City, 
he noted, children have to walk through sewage to get to 
school.)  Their anger now has resulted from a sense that 
they are still excluded, even from the political process, 
and al-Sadr has taken advantage of that.  But al-Sadr and 
his supporters have also been able to gain sympathy among 
many Sunnis. 
 
¶5.  (C )Ambassador pointed out that some of the sense 
that nothing has changed is due to the lack of visibility 
of some of the improvements.  Few people can see or 
appreciate what has been done to provide for the flow of 
oil and the generation of more electricity, for example. 
Shahristani acknowledged that, but said that much more 
that is visible could be done.  An example of a program 
that had both visibility and tangible gains was a 
privately-funded "Work-for-Food" project in Karbala that, 
he said, was highly successful.  It had a budget of USD 
10,000, there was a program which employed about 450 men 
cleaning streets and individuals were paid with food 
baskets. 
 
¶6. (C) There was a time last year, Shahristani said, when 
he believes al-Sadr was willing to join in the political 
process, but he was pushed aside Q- particularly by 
educated Iraqis who had spent years in exile.  At times, 
al-Sadr has been receptive to joining in the political 
process; at this time he is not Q- and this would not be 
a good time to speak to him as he sees political gain in 
confrontation. 
 
¶7.  (C ) Shahristani does not believe that al-Sadr wants 
an Islamic state.  What he believes al-Sadr wants is 
respectability and, indeed, a share of power.  Al-Sadr 
has been able to successfully tap the long-standing 
desire on the part of many Shia for recognition and has 
gained the support of large numbers of people who have 
been marginalized and poor for generations -- descendants 
of laborers who had been the feudal poor and feel they 
have nothing to lose. 
 
¶8.  (C ) Ambassador commented that it would be strange to 
suggest that Sadr has a right to hold the city of Najaf. 
The Government's response to try to assert control over 
Najaf looks reasonable.  Shahristani agreed, saying that 
the Mehdi Army should disarm and retire from the city. 
He believes, however, that it is important to distinguish 
between the Mehdi insurgents and those, particularly in 
the Sunni triangle, who continue to hope for a 
resurrection of the Saddam regime.  What he considers the 
poor handling of al-Sadr and the Mehdi Army, particularly 
by a number of those in the IIG, has only intensified the 
situation and created more tensions.  The fighting in 
Najaf, he believes, was avoidable.  It has cost the 
Government much-needed support and led al-Sadr to take 
less rational positions.  Shahristani asked the 
Ambassador to use his influence to caution the IIG, 
believing that the U.S. has an important role to play, as 
does the United Nations. 
 
¶9.  (C) Shahristani does not consider Muqtada al-Sadr 
either helpful or admirable.  Neither does he see him as 
a serious religious leader.  However, he believes that 
the way to deal with al-Sadr is for him to be drawn into 
the political process rather than be forced into a 
confrontation.  More importantly, the poor, downtrodden, 
mostly Shia supporters of al-Sadr need to be given reason 
to feel that their circumstances are improving and that 
they have a stake in the new Government. 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT:  Shahristani spoke quietly but earnestly 
about the grim situation confronting the Shia urban poor. 
He is a man of considerable integrity and is both 
dedicated to democratic values and the betterment of Iraq 
overall.  As a leader of the Shia community and close to 
Grand Ayatollah Sistani, his views can also be said to be 
the voice of Shia moderation.   That said, already by the 
evening of August 12, Iraqi Government National Security 
Advisor Rubaie was in Najaf trying to negotiate with 
Sadr.  Had Shahristani actually reached Sadr, a confused 
negotiating situation might have grown even more 
confused. 
 
 
NEGROPONTE