This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014 
TAGS: PREL ENRG TU RS
SUBJECT: PUTIN VISIT TO TURKEY SEPTEMBER 2-3 
 
REF: 02 ANKARA 2914 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  See paragraph 11. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary: The highest-level Russian visitor to Turkey 
since Podgorny in 1972, Putin will arrive amid steadily 
increasing bilateral economic ties -- particularly in Russian 
energy sales and interest in energy-sector investments and 
arms sales and one million Russian tourists in 2004 -- and a 
lively debate in Turkey about whether increased alignment 
with Russia represents a strategic alternative for Turkey. 
Embassy requests talking points about the visit to share with 
the GOT by August 31.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (C) Putin's visit will take place in the context of three 
important trends in Turkish/Russian relations.  First, Russia 
is steadily increasing its presence in Turkey's energy 
sector, both through exports of Russian gas to Turkey (Russia 
supplies over 60 % of Turkey's gas) and through increased 
transshipment of Russian crude through the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles.  The GOT is increasingly concerned about growing 
tanker traffic from the Black Sea traversing the Straits. 
Our contacts have acknowledged strong Russian pressure in 
favor of a trans-Thrace bypass pipeline backed by the Russian 
pipeline company Transneft (Note: the Russian-backed project 
competes with the trans-Thrace project of Trace Development 
Company in which there is U.S. commercial involvement.  End 
note). 
 
¶4. (C) Moreover, we have seen keen Russian interest here in 
buying Turkish energy infrastructure.  For example, Russian 
Transneft heads a consortium which won the privatization 
tender for the TUPRAS refinery in Izmit, Turkey's largest; 
the privatization is tied up in the courts and one contact 
has told us the GOT is considering re-awarding the sale to a 
Saudi-U.S. consortium.  There are persistent reports of 
Russian interest in Turkish natural gas networks and Ali Sen, 
an unsavory Turkish businessman with long-standing deep ties 
to Russia, heads a company which has just bought natural gas 
distribution rights in Izmir.  Gazprom General Director Yuri 
Kamarov visited Ankara August 24. 
 
¶5.  (C) Second, Russian/Turkish commercial links are 
increasing broadly through Turkish exports of goods and 
services (principally in construction) and Turkish imports of 
Russian raw materials.  The Russians are also interested in 
increasing arms sales to Turkey and have been pressing a 
Russian-Israeli attack helicopter. 
 
¶6.  (C) Third, over the last two and a half years there has 
been a lively debate in Turkey about the "Eurasia" (read: 
Russia) concept as an alternative for Turkey's general U.S. 
and EU strategic direction (ref).  This is an emotional 
rather than an analytical fashion.  Contacts enamored of the 
"Eurasia" concept either remain unaware of the strongly 
Russocentric and anti-Turkish nature of Alexander Dugin's 
thesis or scramble to assert that Dugin's recent rewrite of 
his book's preface, in which he makes a gesture toward 
Turkey, is sufficient evidence that there is a place for 
Turkey in the concept.  As "Sabah" Ankara bureau chief Asli 
Aydintasbas commented in the daily's Aug. 26 edition, Putin 
comes in an atmosphere of unprecedented positive feeling 
toward Russia, with not one discernible negative comment 
about Putin in the Turkish press in the runup to his visit. 
 
¶7. (S) In this context we have noticed a sea change in 
strategy by the Russian Embassy in Ankara, which is now using 
several fluent Turkish-speaking officers to cultivate a wider 
circle of contacts outside the traditional elites and leftist 
intelligentsia.  Good contacts have been steadily reporting 
to us that the Russian Embassy is making a concerted push to 
develop close relations with Turkey's religious brotherhoods 
and lodges and has been offering trips to Moscow and research 
opportunities in Russian institutes to a broader circle of 
political think tanks and consultants. 
 
¶8. (S) The approach is not subtle. Huseyin Kocabiyik, a 
prominent center-right political consultant/analyst and 
long-standing contact of ours, told us Aug. 24 that, while he 
and ruling AK Party MP Mahmut Kocak were recently in Baku, a 
Russian deputy foreign minister openly pitched to them the 
idea of Turkey's reorientation from the U.S./EU to a 
"Eurasia" partnership with Russia.  Similarly, Sergey 
Makarov, one of the most active Russian Embassy officers in 
Ankara, queried another long-standing contact of ours with 
strong Islamic credentials whether it would be productive for 
Putin to bring a proposal for bilateral political cooperation 
far beyond the Joint Eurasia Action Plan that the two 
countries signed on the margins of the 2001 UNGA. 
 
¶9. (C) We expect Putin will press the Turks on energy deals 
and other commercial ties and be keen to show that Russia and 
Turkey share a common strategy in the Caucasus, central Asia, 
and broader Middle East; the Russians have been keen to join 
the OIC and, given Turkey's status as ministerial-level 
chairman in office, may press for more than observer status. 
The Turks would like to see a definitive Russian break with 
the PKK.  The two sides are likely to press each other for 
further anti-terrorism commitments, with the Russians 
focusing on what they perceive as Turkish tolerance for the 
Chechen movement and the Turks trying to end residual Russian 
support for, or tolerance of, PKK activities through Russia. 
 
¶10. (C) Defense Minister Ivanov arrives Sept. 1 and the 
Russians may leave the discussion of arms sales at that 
level.  Although the Turkish military has heretofore shown 
almost no interest in acquiring Russian arms, Turkey's 
civilian procurement agency has demonstrated willingness from 
time to time to put politics above other considerations when 
awarding arms contracts. 
 
¶11. (C) Action Request:  We request that the Department 
provide us background and talking points for the visit that 
we can share with the Turks by August 31.  We would 
particularly appreciate talking points to encourage the Turks 
to talk from the same position the U.S. has on Georgia 
(including S. Ossetia, Abkhazia), Iran (especially nukes), 
Central Asia, Afghanistan, BMENA, Iraq, and energy issues 
(including Bosphorus bypass routes, tanker transit through 
the Straits, BTC). 
EDELMAN