This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004733 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2014 
TAGS: PREL EPET TU GG RS
SUBJECT: PM ERDOGAN VISITS GEORGIA 
 
REF: ANKARA 2948 
 
(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter; 
reasons E.O. 12958, 1.4 (b, d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: According to preliminary readout, Erdogan 
brought Saakashvili and Zhvania a message of "Turkish support 
for the GOG" in South Ossetia and Abkhazia but urged 
restraint, dialogue and, in Abkhazia, easing the CIS 
economic embargo.  In response to Erdogan's emphasis on the 
importance to Turkey of BTC, Saakashvili promised smooth 
completion.  Although both sides focused on improving 
economic ties, the visit appeared to produce few concrete 
results.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In temporary absence of prime ministerial foreign 
policy advisor Davutoglu, who accompanied Erdogan, we provide 
following preliminary readout of Erdogan visit; further 
readout upon Davutoglu's return. 
 
¶3. (C) MFA DDG for Caucasus Tezgor, who did not accompany 
Erdogan, characterized the visit as successful since both 
President Saakashvili and PM Zhvania received PM Erdogan and 
participated in the visit's main events.  Tezgor asserted 
there was "good chemistry" between Saakashvili and Erdogan. 
 
South Ossetia 
------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Tezgor claimed that Erdogan gave Saakashvili a strong 
double-edged message on South Ossetia (Tezgor drafted the 
talking points) in their one-on-one meeting:  Turkey supports 
Georgia's territorial integrity and independence, but urges 
restraint and dialogue, including with Russia.  According to 
Tezgor, Erdogan's readout to his advisors was that 
Saakashvili understood the message and was receptive. 
 
¶5. (C) Tezgor tried to depict the visit as a healthy signal 
to Russia of Turkish support for the Georgian government.  He 
added that because of its proximity to Russia, the Turks view 
South Ossetia as requiring a different approach than that 
used by Saakashvili to end the Ajara crisis.  However, two 
days before the visit, Georgian Charge Tabatadze regretted to 
us that that the Turks have shown no real policy or specific 
proposals on South Ossetia.  Admitting that Erdogan offered 
the Georgians no specific proposals during the visit, Tezgor 
off-handedly averred, "They have to tend their own garden." 
 
Abkhazia 
-------- 
 
¶6. (C) On Abkhazia Erdogan reiterated Turkish support for the 
GOG, encouraged the GOG to communicate better with Turkey's 
ethnically-Abkhaz community, and urged the GOG to support 
easing the CIS embargo on Abkhazia Tezgor claimed.  As in 
past conversations with us, Tezgor argued that easing the 
embargo will improve Saakashvili's image in the region, 
decrease Russian influence, promote better import control, 
and foster reconciliation.  Tezgor asserted further that the 
embargo gives Russia a strong economic hand and has had no 
effect on the Abkhazian political situation since it was 
imposed.  In contrast, Georgian Charge Tabatadze predicted 
that easing the embargo will be perceived as a sign of GOG 
weakness and will encourage more separatism. 
 
¶7. (C) The Turks stand to benefit from easing the embargo, 
Tezgor acknowledged.  Turkish MFA claims that Turkey's 
sizable ethnically-Abkhaz community (Tezgor and his deputy 
put the number at 450,000) criticizes the GOT position as too 
pro-Georgian and continues to pressure the MFA for change. 
Turkey also wants a piece of Abkhazia's economic pie. 
 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Erdogan reportedly emphasized BTC's importance to 
Turkey and the necessity of finishing work on time and 
without interruption; Tezgor said he worded the PM's talking 
points "in line with U.S. policy."  Saakashvili promised BTC 
completion will go smoothly, Tezgor added. 
 
Turkish Investment in Georgia:  Visit Fulfills Low 
Expectations 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶9. (C) Erdogan took more than 100 businessmen with him. 
According to Georgian Charge Tabatadze, the GOG used the 
visit to focus on getting more Turkish investment.  Erdogan 
publicly told the press that Turkey aims to increase 
bilateral trade from 2003's USD 426 million to USD one 
billion.  However, Tabatadze expected the visit to produce 
few results, and he appears to have been right. 
 
¶10. (C) Tezgor conceded the visit produced no concrete 
economic results.  Plans for Turkish renovation of the Batumi 
airport are at the feasibility study stage, including on the 
sticky issue of financing.  The Turks have been pressing 
Georgia for a double taxation agreement as an incentive for 
Turkish investors and unsuccessfully tried to convince 
Saakashvili during his May visit (reftel).  Although Erdogan 
publicly stressed the importance of a double taxation 
agreement during this visit, no agreement was reached. 
Tezgor said the visit was too spur-of-the-moment for this 
type of deliverable; he predicted a double taxation agreement 
by the end of the year. 
 
¶11. (C) Erdogan and Saakashvili visited the Turkey/Georgia 
border crossing at Sarp; Erdogan instructed the Turkish side 
to work with greater efficiency (reciprocating a similar call 
on the Georgian side by Saakashvili during his May visit to 
Turkey). 
¶12. (C) Comment: Tezgor has consistently intimated to us in 
the past that the MFA sees Russia as having a more coherent 
Caucasus policy than the U.S.  Russian Ambassador Stegny 
called on Erdogan just before the trip.  Foreign policy 
advisor Davutoglu continues to promote his "strategic depth" 
concept (Turkey should develop close ties with Russia, Iran, 
other neighbors, and the Muslim world as a counterweight to 
U.S. influence).  We will measure how much these factors 
influenced Erdogan's approach when we call on Davutoglu. 
EDELMAN