This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001456 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF AND PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS SU NI DARFUR
SUBJECT: DARFUR TALKS IN ABUJA AUGUST 23 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR DISSEMINATION ON THE 
INTRANET OR INTERNET. 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Darfur peace talks began in Abuja August 23 with 
an open plenary session chaired by President Obasanjo. 
Obasanjo called on the Sudanese parties to reach a settlement 
at the negotiations of the underlying political issues, not 
only deal with humanitarian and security issues, and approach 
the talks with open minds and no preconditions.  Obasanjo 
also underscored that the negotiations should be lead by the 
Sudanese parties, and that they needed to build confidence. 
He noted his desire to avoid any foreign (read Western) 
intervention, and to have a sizable AU protection force 
augment Sudanese security forces.  He welcomed foreign 
assistance and thanked the U.S., UK, EU and others for their 
assistance to date, but emphasized that the process must be 
African. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Obasanjo's speech matched a conversation he had with 
the Ambassador and a visiting codel/Eucom delegation (septel) 
on different issues earlier in the morning August 23. 
Obasanjo's bottom line on Darfur and other issues were that 
Africans needed to solve them, and foreign intervention was 
neither useful nor welcome in any but a technical assistance 
role.  The Darfur talks continued in that mode, as the other 
two sessions August 23 following the plenary to discuss the 
talks' agenda were closed to observers. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In other speeches at the plenary, AU chairperson 
Konare and others emphasized security and humanitarian 
considerations more than Obasanjo did.  Obasanjo's view won 
out in the draft agenda, which was presented to the Sudanese 
delegations in the first closed session.  The Sudanese 
parties did not speak in the plenary, and gave their opening 
remarks at the first closed session.  At the second closed 
session, which began at 8pm, the Sudanese parties asked for 
time to caucus (and rest).  The next session -- also closed 
to the observers -- was agreed for 11am the next day, August 
¶24. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Both rebel movements complained during the closed 
sessions that the observers had been present in all previous 
sessions at Ndjamena and Addis Ababa, and asked that they be 
included at all sessions in these talks.  At one point, 
Obasanjo reportedly asked them why they did not have more 
trust in Obasanjo and the AU.  Obasanjo went on to present a 
draft agenda based on the Sudanese parties' statements and 
other expressions at the Addis Ababa talks.  The agenda was 
not agreed August 23, and the August 24 session will have 
setting the agenda as its top priority. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The draft agenda has four parts. 
 
¶I.  Humanitarian Issues 
-  Presentation of humanitarian issues report by the UN. 
-  Presentation of humanitarian issues reports by the 
Sudanese parties. 
-  Modalities for improving the humanitarian situation. 
 
II.  Security Issues 
-  Implementation of the Ndjamena ceasefire. 
-  Disarmament of the janjaweed and other militias. 
-  Cantonment of the (rebel) movements. 
-  Release of prisoners. 
-  Strengthening of the AU peace support mission in Darfur. 
 
III.  Political Questions 
-  Governance. 
-  Discussion. 
 
IV.  Economic and Social Affairs 
-  Presentation by the parties of their respective positions. 
-  Discussion. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The AU mediation team is also proposing to the 
Sudanese parties that the negotiations be organized into four 
committees working the four agenda items, although the AU 
team told the observers in a briefing August 24 that there 
may not be enough interpreters and other support to run the 
four committees simultaneously.  The AU team at that 
observers briefing also took mentioned that they wanted to 
keep the observers on hand and would need their help.  In 
response to a British question, they mentioned a dynamic by 
which observers might be brought more into the process after 
the agenda is adopted, although this still had to be agreed 
by the mediators and the Sudanese parties. 
 
¶7. (SBU) We, in cooperation with the UK, EU and other 
Europeans are leaning on the AU to get at least some of the 
"observers" back into the negotiating room.  The rebels are 
pressing either harder.  That said, in the August 23-24 
sessions, Obasanjo personally took a strong position that 
will be hard to push back.  AU officials have counseled 
patience, holding out the promise that this is an evolving 
situation and that we will be much more directly involved as 
the formats are worked out.  We laid down markers, and 
reserve judgment. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The rebel movements have told us they are not happy 
with dividing into committees, nor not having the observers 
always in the negotiating room, but they plan to engage 
seriously in the talks. 
 
¶9. (U) Minimize considered. 
CAMPBELL