This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

040528Z Aug 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001347 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PGOV PHUM NI DARFUR
SUBJECT: SANCTIONS/DARFUR DEMARCHE DELIVERED; MINDEF ALSO 
TALKS ABOUT POLIO, U.S. OUTREACH TO MUSLIMS 
 
REF: STATE 155894 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary.  The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche 
to the Minister of Defense, who was optimistic the President 
would deliver the requested speech on military 
accountability, but he had not spoken to the President 
regarding Nigeria's role in the Darfur peacekeeping mission. 
The Minister, who was defeated in the 2003 Kano State 
governor's election, also spoke freely to the Ambassador 
about the polio vaccine boycott there, and the need for 
greater U.S. outreach to the Muslim community of the north. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On August 3, Minister of Defense Dr. Rabiu 
Kwankwaso summoned the Ambassador to a meeting at the 
Ministry.  Also present at the meeting were Minister of State 
Dr. Rowland Oritsejafor, Special Assistant to the Minister of 
Defense Dr. Hafiz Abubakar, and Poloff (notetaker). 
 
¶3.  (C) Kwankwaso had just returned from a meeting in the 
U.S. with A/S Newman.  He said they had discussed the 2001 
Zaki-Biam ("Benue") massacre again, along with Nigeria's role 
in the Darfur peacekeeping mission.  Kwankwaso told the 
Ambassador that he was concerned about the enduring Zaki-Biam 
issue because Nigeria's relationship with the U.S. is 
"excellent," insisting that President Obasanjo is doing 
everything that could possibly be done (and "doesn't sleep" 
over Zaki-Biam, he added). 
 
¶4.  (C) The Ambassador said that there are indications that 
congressional opinions were moving toward support for 
restoration of the U.S.-Nigeria military training 
relationship, as in both countries' interest.  The Ambassador 
delivered the requested talking points on military 
accountability, explaining that while nevertheless there was 
no guarantee sanctions would be lifted, Nigeria's action 
would provide positive signals. 
 
¶5.  (C) Kwankwaso responded by immediately suggesting 
possible venues for the military accountability speech to be 
delivered, and asked if Obasanjo needed to deliver it 
himself, or whether he could send the speech to be delivered 
by someone else on his behalf.  The Ambassador answered that 
it was important for the President himself to deliver the 
speech.  Kwankwaso said he would draft a paragraph and show 
it to the president.  He was "happy," he said, and he 
expected the President to be happy too.  The Ambassador 
offered talking points (reftel) to assist with drafting the 
speech, which Poloff delivered to Kwankwaso's office shortly 
after the meeting. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) On Darfur, Kwankwaso said he had not met with 
Obasanjo since Kwankwaso's return from the U.S., but he knows 
that Obasanjo is not happy with the situation there and feels 
that it must be stopped.  Kwankwaso promised to contact the 
Ambassador again after meeting with Obasanjo. 
 
¶7.  (C) When the Ambassador mentioned his upcoming visit to 
Kano August 4-6, Kwankwaso, who was defeated in the 2003 Kano 
State governor's election, freely shared his impressions of 
Kano Governor Shekarau's handling of the polio vaccination 
campaign.  He said that Shekarau had a tiger by the tail with 
the polio vaccine boycott, shaping public opinion by speaking 
against the vaccine for some ten months for frivolous 
reasons, then expecting the public to follow his direction 
when he reversed course and said the vaccine was safe.  To 
support his theory, Kwankwaso said that in the Kano State 
village where the vaccination campaign recently restarted, 
two people were killed in community violence, an incident not 
reported by newspapers.  Shekarau, he said, had had no 
contact with Westerners from primary school through his 
university years, so his worldview was limited.  Comment: 
Shekarau, a member of the opposition All Nigerian People's 
Party (ANPP) and a surprise winner over the ruling People's 
Democratic Party (PDP) gubernatorial candidate Kwankwaso in 
2003, has been a thorn in the side of Obasanjo and the PDP 
since his election.  End Comment. 
 
¶8.  (C) A native of north Nigeria, Kwankwaso supported the 
American Corners opening in Kano because the U.S. needed to 
have a greater presence in the north.  In Kwankwaso's 
childhood, he had an American schoolteacher, and there were 
other Americans around the north, including the Peace Corps 
and the Voluntary Service Organization (VSO).  Now there is 
little U.S. contact with the north, and others have filled 
the vacuum with anti-U.S. propaganda.  While there are no 
"extremists" in Nigeria, he said, and no one "willing to put 
a bomb on his body," Kwankwaso wondered whether the lack of 
Western contact would leave future generations of Nigerians 
susceptible to terrorist recruiting.  Kwankwaso told the 
Ambassador he should "tell Washington to send more money," 
because it is "disheartening to see young men misled." 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The Ambassador said he had had preliminary 
conversations with Vice President Atiku regarding the 
reintroduction of Peace Corps to Nigeria, and was waiting for 
an invitation from Nigeria to the Peace Corps.  Kwankwaso 
said he would talk to the President about asking the Ministry 
of Education to write the invitation.  The Ambassador said he 
would meet with Atiku again upon Atiku's return from his U.S. 
vacation in about three weeks. 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment.  While the reception from Kwankwaso was 
positive and encouraging, he is clearly not a member of 
Obasanjo's inner circle.  Nonetheless, he seemed certain that 
Obasanjo would be receptive to the idea of giving a public 
statement on military accountability, so the Embassy might 
finally be able to report some progress by the GON on the 
nagging Zaki-Biam issue.  End Comment. 
CAMPBELL