This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

301738Z Jul 04

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001924 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/ER/CC, DS/ITA, DS/IP/EUR, EUR/UBI, NL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2014 
TAGS: PTER
SUBJECT: AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE HOLD EAC MEETING JULY 30, 2004 
 
REF: A) THE HAGUE 1915 B) THE HAGUE 1913 
 
(S/NF) 1. Post convened an EAC July 30 to discuss new 
developments regarding the Saudi/Somali surveillance incident 
and to discuss security procedures and requests to the 
Government of the Netherlands. 
 
(S/NF) 2. The DCM commenced the EAC meeting by informing the 
EAC of the bombing incidents outside the U.S. and Israeli 
Embassies in Tashkent. Turning to issues in the Netherlands, 
DCM stated that the LEGATT, who was scheduled to brief the 
EAC on new developments on the surveillance case, was still 
being debriefed by the Dutch prosecutors. The DCM stated that 
the LEGATT had informed him that some arrests had just been 
made and that the residences of the individuals would be 
searched later today. The DCM stated that the Dutch were 
making an effort to share information and requested various 
law enforcement sections to reach out to their contacts. 
 
(S/NF) 3. ORCA briefed the EAC on the Saudi/Somali 
surveillance incident and stated that they had been informed 
that some arrests had been executed. ORCA stated that as of 
now, prior to searches being conducted, the Dutch were 
finding little grounds on which to hold the individuals and 
this would be a test of new Dutch conspiracy laws, which 
could allow for holding the individuals. COS stated that the 
their British counterparts had voiced their displeasure to 
the Dutch on the information sharing time lag and had 
compared the reporting casings and surveillance to the 
Northern Ireland incidents. 
 
(S/NF) 4. The EAC reviewed the vulnerability of the Cotrolled 
Access Compound (CAC) being located inside the Embassy 
compound. The ARSO briefed the EAC about already-scheduled 
technical changes to the CAC, which would decrease the 
vulnerability. 
 
(C) 5. The EAC reviewed vulnerabilities of the CAC in 
Amsterdam.  The EAC concurred that visitors/applicants should 
be screened upon entering the exterior, before nearing the 
building. The ARSO will assign a Local Guard to the perimeter 
to hand wand visitors/applicants as an interim measure until 
the completion of the scheduled CAC relocation project. The 
ARSO will meet with the LGF Manager on Monday to discuss 
changing the security posture and LGF SOPs at the Consulate. 
NOTE: Post has requested additional LGF funding for an 
additional LGF position at the Consulate. The dramatic 
increase of DHS-mandated visa applicant interviews vastly 
exceeds the capability for which the current LGF staffing 
level was designed. The EAC concurs on the need for an 
additional Local Guard. 
 
 
(S/NF) 6. The Ambassador briefed the EAC on his actions to 
request increased security.  Over the last week, the 
Ambassador engaged the Deputy Director of the Dutch Security 
and Intelligence Service (AIVD) encouraging real-time 
information enchages and to ask that the AIVD provide a full 
briefing to the Mayor of The Hague and his senior staff. The 
Ambassador spoke with the Acting Director of AIVD today to 
request that post be allowed to liaison with the new 
couterterrorism coordinating group, termed the 
Couterterrorism Info Box, on a daily basis.  The Acting AIVD 
Director stated that he would provide an answer on Tusday 
August 3, 2004.  The Ambassador spoke with the State 
Secretary of the Ministry of Justice to request assistancein 
 
SIPDIS 
moving forward with the anti-ram barrier issue on the South 
side of the Embassy.  The State Secretary stated that upon 
the return of the Director of the  Ministry of Interior 
Monday, the Ministries of Justice and Interior would try to 
work with the city to address the issue early next week.  The 
Ambassador has been in contact with the 
Prime  Minister's advisor for law enforcment matters to ask 
for assistance in moving the request. In a meeting today with 
the Ambassador and the LEGATT, the Chief Prosecutor for 
Terrorism indicated that there would always be a relation on 
counterterrorism issues and the U.S. and therefore she would 
do what she could to keep us advised on a real time basis and 
would encourage the AIVD to do the same. 
 
(C) 7. The DCM briefed the EAC on his actions to request 
increased security. On July 30, the DCM spoke to the senior 
Interior Ministry Official, Deputy Director General Lidewijde 
Ongering, stressing the urgent need to fast and full 
information sharing.  The DCM emphasized that while it was 
clear that Dutch security officials including the Dutch 
Security and Intelligence Service (AIVD) were making an 
effort to improve, our experience was that once a case became 
a police matter, information sharing deteriorated. 
Specifically, we need to know quickly what names, phone 
numbers, and other information was uncovered by the arrest of 
the Saudi and Somali surveillance suspects.  Secondly, the 
DCM asked for help in replacing the plastic traffic barriers 
alongside the Embassy with temporary concrete or metal 
"jersey barriers".  Ongering replied that she had 
participated in a security review on July 28th to discuss the 
Saudi/Somali surveillance incident that had included an 
assessment of the Embassy's physical security.  She repeated 
that the GONL's view is that "knowing what we know, the 
current level of protection is adequate and replacing the 
plastic barriers is not essential."  The DCM replied that the 
problem is what we don't know, protection is inadequate, and 
that should there be an attack, the failure to address that 
obvious vulnerability would be inexcusable in hindsight.  The 
DCM said the Embassy would immediately send a diplomatic note 
to the MFA and asked Ongering's support for a central 
government decision to override local authorities and install 
the barriers.  Ongering promised only to "take another look 
at the matter". Ambassador Sobel also contacted the Secretary 
General of the Ministry of Justice to request information 
with the intention to get quick action on the matter.  The 
Ambassador intends to meet with the Minister of the Interior 
when the Minister returns from vacation if the action has not 
already been taken in response to the anti-ram barriers. 
 
(S/NF) 8.  The DCM contacted the new Dutch Counterterrorism 
Coordinator, Joustra, and the DCM made the same pitch. 
Joustra promised that he would try to be helpful on both 
counts and promised to telephone the Ministry of Interior, 
the National Security Coordinator, and contacts in the 
prosecutors' department.  He agreed that it was essential to 
keep information flowing, particularly once the police and 
prosecutors became involved.  Joustra described the current 
situation as "growing quite seriously" and made clear he was 
not yet satisfied with the handling to date.  He indicated he 
was in touch with the Prime Minister's advisor for law 
enforcement matters, Paul van der Beek, and had brought him 
up to date.  In a subsequent conversation with the 
Ambassador, van der Beek indicated he had spoken to Joustra, 
who said he would urge the Interior Ministry to take action 
on our traffic barrier request. 
 
(U)  9. A diplomatic note was sent to the GONL requesting 
increased security and timely notification. The text of the 
note is as follows: "In view of the series of alarming 
surveillance incidents involving U.S. interests and the 
dramatic increase in significant threat information acquired 
by the Government of the Netherlands in recent weeks, the 
Embassy of the United States of America requests that the 
Government of the Netherlands act immediately to install a 
temporary anti-ram barrier on the Korte Voorhout, replacing 
the existing plastic barriers.  The City of the Hague has 
indicated that, although favorably disposed towards our 
multiple requests for a system of anti-ram bollards, no 
decision will be taken until September at the earliest.  For 
this reason, and in light of the current security 
environment, we ask for metal or concrete traffic barriers, 
as an urgent, interim protection measure. The Embassy of the 
United States also takes note of significant past delays in 
apprising us of important security incidents such as hostile 
surveillance of the chancery.  We recognize and appreciate 
that there has been a deliberate effort to improve 
information sharing and a recent incident was reported in a 
more timely fashion.  We request that any information with a 
possible bearing on the security of U.S. facilities, 
personnel and citizens be reported in full without any delay. 
 We recognize that early information is often fragmentary and 
inaccurate, but strongly prefer quick notification and urge 
the Government of the Netherlands to fully avail itself of 
the counter-terrorism resources of the U.S. by requesting 
checks of our databases. 
 
(U) 10. The RSO briefed the EAC on his actions to request 
increased security measures from the GONL. The RSO has 
contacted the Deputy Director of Protocol for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to inform him that post would be sending a 
diplomatic note and requested his support for pushing for 
increased perimeter security. The RSO contacted the Director 
of Crises Management and Security Matters to request his 
support for posts' official request for increased perimeter 
security and in gaining support from the municipality. 
 
(U) 11. The ARSO briefed the EAC on her actions to request 
increased security measures from the GONL. The ARSO contacted 
the Deputy Director of the Dutch Public Order Police (BOB), 
responsible for fixed observational posts located at 
diplomatic and Dutch government facilities. The BOB has 
extensive camera monitors that they monitor. The ARSO 
requested a signal/feed from the BOB cameras to augment the 
Embassy's view of the exterior perimeter. 
 
(S/NF) 12. Subsequent to the EAC meeting, FBI LEGATT Brussels 
arrived from a meeting with the KLPD and the prosecutor 
supervising the investigation regarding the Saudi/Somali 
surveillance incident on July 26, 2004. LEGATT advised the 
EAC security subcommittee that the two surveillants, along 
with two other identified individuals, had been arrested this 
afternoon.  Authorities promised LEGATT additional 
information as it becomes available. 
 
SOBEL