This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001916 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2014 
TAGS: PREL PHUM NL BM
SUBJECT: DUTCH PRESIDENCY REPLY ON BURMA/ASEM MESSAGE 
 
REF: A. STATE 157147 
 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 1836 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Dutch Presidency Special Envoy Hans van den 
Broek was reportedly pleased with the results his recent trip 
to Hanoi, Bangkok, Beijing and Tokyo to resolve the current 
impasse regarding Burmese participation in the upcoming 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).  The Dutch are reluctant to 
provide a formal readout of the trip at this time, and are 
prickly about describing internal EU deliberations on this 
issue.  Informally, however, a Dutch contact told us 
informally that a compromise solution is in sight, in which 
Burma would participate at ASEM and ASEM would issue a 
statement of dissatisfaction with Burma's human rights 
record.  The Dutch are clearly wary about appearing to exert 
pressure on either ASEAN or Burma.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. Poloff met July 29 with Eric Verwaal, Head of Asia and 
Oceania Department and Special Assistant to EU Presidency 
Special Envoy Hans van den Broek, who accompanied van den 
Broek on his recent trip to Asia.  Noting that ref A points 
had been successfully conveyed to van den Broek en route, 
Verwaal provided the following point-by-point response: 
 
-- The Dutch take note of the U.S. interest in the situation, 
but cannot comment on expectations or developments at this 
point. 
 
-- The Dutch are aware of the upcoming Burmese chairmanship 
of ASEAN, but think there is "some question about the extent 
to which pressure will be effective."  Verwaal noted that 
while ASEAN is "painfully aware" of the situation, having 
lost face when Burma did not follow through on expected steps 
this spring, he believed there was also substantial 
sensitivity among ASEAN members that external parties 
recognize that Burma is a full member of ASEAN. 
 
-- The Dutch believe the EU does not consider itself in a 
position to exert pressure on ASEAN regarding the situation 
(while noting there are always a variety of views among 
members).  The EU will keep up dialogue with Asian partners 
who were already aware of the situation, and have contacts 
with all parties involved. 
 
-- The Dutch take note of the U.S. plans not to send senior 
representatives to attend ASEAN meetings hosted by Burma in 
2006, but Verwaal noted what he saw as a possible discrepancy 
that Secretary Powell had attended the recent ASEAN Regional 
Forum in Jakarta which was also attended by the Burmese FM 
and defense officials. 
 
-- Finally, Verwaal said that the EU has certainly shared its 
view with its Asian partners that Burma must abide by 
international standards if it is to join the international 
community.  He commented, however, that such a status is "not 
a top priority" for the Burmese junta. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  In response to Poloff's request for a readout of 
the trip, Verwaal said he was reluctant to discuss ongoing 
"delicate negotiations."  Restating the delegation's initial 
response to a July 21 invitation to brief the Embassy upon 
van den Broek's return, Verwaal reminded that van den Broek 
would report directly and exclusively to FM Bot, who would 
report his conclusions at the informal "Gymnich" meeting. 
(Note:  We were informed separately that Van Den Broek 
provided a readout to FM Bot on July 26.)  Verwaal said that 
since no other partners, including within the EU, were being 
briefed during this initial phase, the Dutch were unable to 
brief the USG.  Overall, however, Verwaal commented that the 
talks held during the trip were constructive, "discussions 
were very good, and the level of reception showed an 
appreciation for the issues involved."  Verwaal added that 
the Dutch would be open and willing to exchange views with 
the U.S. and others regarding handling the approaching 
Burmese chairmanship of ASEAN once the EU had made a decision 
on the upcoming summit. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Verwaal was apologetic about not sharing more with 
us at this point, but insisted that it was in the best 
interest of "almost all parties involved."  Verwaal seemed 
especially sensitive about the possibility of imposing 
additional sanctions against Burma, stating (without being 
asked) that "the EU has no intention of undertaking economic 
sanctions."  Verwaal also argued that "external pressure" on 
ASEAN in general would have an adverse effect since ASEAN is 
still struggling to develop its own balanced approach to 
Burma. 
 
¶4. (C/NF) In a separate meeting June 27, Jaap Werner, 
Director for Political Affairs, told DCM and POLCOUNS that a 
compromise solution for the summit was in sight. Werner 
suggested that the EU would eventually agree to allow Burma 
to participate in the ASEM summit (albeit at a lower level) 
provided that ASEM clearly expressed dissatisfaction with the 
human rights situation in Burma.  Werner indicated that Van 
Den Broek's brief had been along these lines.  He cautioned 
that the EU had not yet reached consensus on the issue, but 
suggested that the Dutch would work toward developing one 
along the lines he described at the September Gymnich and 
GAERC meetings. 
 
¶5. (C) COMMENT:  It is unusual for the Dutch to be so 
cautious about sharing information.  The fact that we were 
told both before and after Van den Broek's trip that the MFA 
would not be able to brief us highlights the sensitivity of 
this issue and the delicacy of current negotiations.  As 
noted in previous reporting, Dutch officials -- including FM 
Bot and PM Balkenende -- believe the Dutch presidency will be 
judged in large part by the success or failure of its 
summits.  Their top priority, therefore, is clearly is to 
find a "compromise solution" to ensure that the meeting takes 
place.  END COMMENT. 
 
SOBEL