This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

291515Z Jul 04

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001910 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI - PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR/SCE - 
MITCHELL/SHEARER, L/EUR - LAHNE, INR/WCAD - 
SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM BK HR SR NL ICTY
SUBJECT: ICTY: REGISTRY SEEKS AGREEMENTS ON SENTENCING 
ENFORCEMENT AND WITNESS RELOCATION 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 1831 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a July 28 meeting with Ambassador Sobel, 
Hans Holthuis, the Registrar of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), sought USG 
assistance with respect to the enforcement of sentences and 
the relocation of witnesses.  Holthuis specifically requested 
that the USG consider negotiating a sentencing enforcement 
agreement with the ICTY, under which the United States would 
agree to let ICTY-convicted individuals serve their sentences 
in U.S. prisons.  He also asked whether the United States 
might be in a position to consider an agreement for the 
relocation of witnesses, though he acknowledged that the 
current ad hoc approach has proven capable of meeting ICTY 
needs.  End Summary 
 
¶2. (SBU) As the ICTY looks ahead to the conclusion of its 
trials and appeals (2008 and 2010 respectively), it is 
reaching out to governments for assistance in two key areas: 
enforcing sentences and relocating witnesses.  Registrar Hans 
Holthuis has been visiting other Embassies in The Hague and 
has received "positive" indications from several new European 
Union states (including the Baltics, Hungary and Slovenia) 
that they may consider entering into agreements on both 
issues. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Registrar's request for sentencing enforcement 
assistance stems from the increase in sentencing judgments 
issued by the Tribunal, and the projected further escalation 
in such judgments as the ICTY moves toward 2010 (the target 
date for the conclusion of all appeals under the completion 
strategy).  The Scheveningen prison, in which fifty-nine ICTY 
indictees are detained pending trial, appeal or final 
sentencing judgment, is neither designed nor permitted to be 
a permanent holding facility for the service of sentences. 
Thus, the ICTY looks to governments to make their prisons 
available to hold convicted indictees.  In all but one case, 
the ICTY arranges such transfers in accordance with 
agreements reached with states.  The prisoner transfers are 
conducted under the auspices of the ICTY, and the detention 
of convicts is under host state laws and regulations.  At 
present the Tribunal has sentencing enforcement agreements 
with Denmark, Spain, France, Sweden, Austria, Norway, 
Finland, Italy and the United Kingdom, and one exchange of 
letters permitting ad hoc transfers with Germany. 
 
¶4. (SBU) ICTY informs us that the following states have 
enforced or are currently enforcing sentences of the Tribunal: 
 
State             Number/Identity of Convicts 
------            --------------------------- 
Austria           2/Dosen, Sikirica 
Finland           4/Aleksovski, Furundzija, Delic, Landzo 
Germany           2/Tadic, Kunarac 
Italy             1/Jelisic 
Norway            3/Erdemovic, Kovac, Vulkovic 
Spain             3/Todorovic, Josipovic, Santic 
Sweden            1/Plavsic 
 
France is due to accept its first prisoner transfer shortly. 
Embassy also understands that the UK may accept a prisoner 
soon.  Two further convicts were released directly from the 
Tribunal, having served their sentences under ICTY detention: 
 Kolundzija, Simic.  A further indictee, Tihomir Blaskic, may 
be released directly from the ICTY soon, since his 45 year 
sentence was reduced today to nine years, most of which he 
has already served as a detainee in Scheveningen. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Though based on a model enforcement agreement, some 
agreements reflect specific state requirements.  For 
instance, Germany's lack of assent to a formal agreement has 
kept its cooperation efforts ad hoc.  (Comment: According to 
Holthuis, this ad hoc system is redundant as potential host 
States can always deny a request from the Tribunal to house 
convicts.  End Comment).  Notably, the Spanish agreement 
differs regarding the monitoring of the facilities in which 
transferred convicts are held.  According to the model 
agreement, host States allow the International Committee for 
the Red Cross (ICRC) to inspect its prison facilities "at any 
time," with the frequency of the visits determined by ICRC. 
Spain modified this requirement, agreeing to set up a four 
member "Parity Commission" in which two members of the 
Tribunal and two members of the Spanish government work 
together in inspecting facilities at specified intervals. 
¶6. (SBU) Witness relocation, usually provided for witnesses 
whose testimony endangers their safety, has been arranged on 
a few occasions by the USG on an ad hoc basis.  Given the 
nature of threats, these offers have included not just 
witnesses, but also their families.  The USG has used both 
protected witness status and refugee status as a mode of 
entry into the country.  Though this has only been provided 
in a few cases, Embassy is currently working with the 
Department on possibly relocating the family of a particular 
witness (reftel). 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: The ICTY requires additional agreements in 
order to meet the increasing number of indictees convicted. 
Similarly, the increased number of trials means an increase 
in the number of witnesses who may need relocation.  In both 
situations, ad hoc approaches are less efficient and less 
effective than a framework agreement approach.  That said, 
both requests raise special issues involving legal capacity 
and financial and bureaucratic support.  Embassy believes 
that both of the Registrar's requests deserve careful 
consideration.  End Comment. 
SOBEL