This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 001845 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR JOECK 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL AG CM ER UK IT KE MO SF TS YM SU GM FR GR KS CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  RABTA 
CONVERSION 
 
 
This is CWC-89-04. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) In the aftermath of EC-37, delegation has been 
working closely with UK, Italy, and Libya, to facilitate and 
garner support for Libya's proposed change to the 
Verification Annex of the CWC, to enable the conversion of 
its former CW production facility at Rabta.  In particular 
the delegations noted have been attempting to secure 
co-sponsors for the proposal, an effort that achieved some 
degree of success with 12 SPs co-sponsoring.  As indicated 
below, a number of others have become co-sponsors since. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Germany and France continue to express disagreement 
with the approach taken by the US, UK, Italy, and Libya, 
albeit in a rather passive manner.  It remains unclear the 
depth of their opposition and whether they would actually 
break with consensus when the issue comes before the next 
session of the Council. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Based on conversations with the OPCW legal advisor, 
delegation believes the OPCW will show solid support for the 
proposed technical change.  We have been informed that a 
paper is already in the works that will provide a legal case 
supporting the proposal.  Delegation believes this document 
will be of critical importance in reassuring delegations who 
pay enough attention to these matters to actually care, but 
who lack the resources and/or inclination to conduct a legal 
analysis themselves. 
 
----------------------------------- 
MEETING OF PROSPECTIVE CO-SPONSORS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On Tuesday, 13 July, the delegation of Libya 
convened a meeting at the OPCW, the purpose of which was to 
energize select delegations to co-sponsor the Libyan proposal 
for a technical change to Article V of paragraph 72 of the 
Verification Annex of the CWC.  The meeting was attended by 
US, UK, Italy, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, South 
Africa, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Japan, Peru, Korea, and Serbia-Montenegro.  Invited but not 
present were Panama, Netherlands and Greece, while Bulgaria 
and Serbia-Montenegro attended at their own initiative, 
having not been on the initial list of invitees. 
 
Commentary from each of the delegations, where applicable, is 
as follows: 
 
-- Sudan:  Expects veterans of the OPCW, and the TS, to "help 
Libya find its way" now that it is in the OPCW.  Supports 
this request and the onus is on all of us to find a way to 
allow the conversion to go forward.  No instructions yet, but 
expect to be able to co-sponsor as soon as tomorrow (Note: 
Sudan has now in fact joined the list of co-sponsors.  End 
note.). 
 
-- Tunisia:  Tunisian delegate was the most effective speaker 
in the meeting.  She said Tunisia's view is very simple; they 
are looking at the aim and purpose of this change.  While it 
is good to have support from others like the US to address 
the AIDS and other disease issues on the African continent, 
ultimately African countries must take action themselves. 
Tunisia does not want to see this issue become highly 
politicized and thus blocked.  They hope for consensus. 
Libya is still new to the OPCW and thus does not know the 
legal and political intricacies of the OPCW, that is why the 
US, UK, Italy and others have been helping, and Tunisia 
welcomes this.  But there needs to be more support in the 
form of co-sponsors.  All African countries would be grateful 
for such support. 
 
-- Morocco:  Co-sponsors this initiative and enjoins others 
to do likewise. 
 
-- Algeria:  Full support and have already co-sponsored. 
Must work to convince others, especially in Africa, to 
support also.  This is a humanitarian issue on which Africa 
should find unanimity. 
 
-- South Africa:  Co-sponsor and support this initiative. 
 
-- Kuwait:  Support the initiative, but do not have 
instructions.  Anticipate having them in 3-4 days (Note:  A 
week later Kuwait still does not apparently have 
authorization to co-sponsor, and has been notably 
unresponsive to attempts by the UK delegation to contact them 
to enlist Kuwaiti support.  End Note.) 
 
-- Saudi Arabia:  Awaiting instructions, but anticipates 
being able to co-sponsor as soon as tomorrow (Note:  Despite 
this comment at the meeting, Saudi Arabia has still not 
co-sponsored the proposal). 
 
-- Japan: Supports the idea of making a change to permit 
conversion of Rabta, but have not received final 
instructions.  Is still looking at political/legal 
implications of proposal.  Informally, UK and US lobbied hard 
for support of this particular change and against France.  UK 
is being very candid in portraying French dissent as 
unfounded and politically motivated.  Japan closed its 
commentary by noting that if SPs choose to pursue this 
change, obtaining consensus would be important (Note:  In the 
days following the meeting, Japan indicated it will not 
co-sponsor the Libyan proposal, and even its support for the 
proposal now seems lackluster.  Delegation believes Japan has 
no particular concern over the proposal itself, but is 
waiting for the politics to play themselves out before 
supporting any particular course of action.  End note.). 
 
-- Korea: No formal instructions, but asked two (unhelpful) 
"clarifying" questions: 
 
      1)  Is it accurate to say in the last sentence that all 
other provisions  continue to apply?  Wouldn't para 66 and 
69, for example, continue to apply.  UK pointed out that para 
66, and others, were in fact being changed and that the text 
said that "except for".  Para 69 would continue to apply. 
After the meeting, Korea approached delegation and delegation 
assured him that we, UK and Italy, had done a thorough legal 
analysis and that it was literally true that all other 
provisions would continue to apply.  To say simply, as he was 
proposing, that "other" (sans "all") provisions apply, might 
beg questions about which do and which do not continue to 
apply.  Korea seemed to accept this. 
 
      2)  Shouldn't we use the phrase "earliest practicable" 
in reference to the EC setting a deadline for submission of a 
request to convert?  Delegation explained that the phrase 
earliest practicable was both accurate and useful in the 
second instance (of CSP action) since technical and 
operational factors would have to be taken into account to 
determine how quickly an SP could effect a conversion. 
However, in the case of the EC setting a date for submission 
of a request, the same clause would actual have the opposite 
effect by possibly begging arguments about what constitutes 
"earliest practicable" in this context.  Again, Korea seemed 
to accept the point. 
 
-- Czech Republic:  is reviewing the document and considering 
it positively, but no final instructions. 
 
 
-- Ukraine: Made no comment during the meeting, nor since. 
 
-- Bulgaria: Is interested in the subject, but only asked one 
clarifying point about when Libya's actual extension request 
would be submitted. 
 
-- Serbia-Montenegro:  Does not oppose the initiative, but 
have no instructions yet. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  In addition, Yemen and Cameroon provided Libya 
with letters of co-sponsorship prior to the meeting. 
 
--------------------------------- 
DELIVERY OF THE PROPOSAL BY LIBYA 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Subsequently, on Friday 16 July, Libyan Ambassador 
Zakia Abdussalam M. Sahli presented Libya's request for a 
technical change to the Director General.  Included in the 
package (all faxed to State AC/CB on Friday, 16 July) were 
Ambassador Sahli's letter containing the request for a 
technical change, an Annex containing the actual text of the 
proposed change, an Annex providing additional information 
about the proposal, an Annex listing co-sponsors, and finally 
letters from States Parties that had co-sponsored prior to 
the formal request being made.  The co-sponsoring SPs at the 
time of the submission were Algeria, United States, United 
Kingdom, Cameroon, Eritrea, Italy, Kenya, Morocco, South 
Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, and Sudan. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Since the formal submission, Greece has indicated 
it will co-sponsor the proposal, and the delegation has been 
advised by Korea that it anticipates providing its letter of 
co-sponsorship sometime during the week of 19 July. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Delegation is aware that the Libyan Ambassador is 
lobbying hard on a bilateral basis, to include working on 
Iran, which we're told supports the idea but is not in a 
position to co-sponsor yet.  Some mention has also been made 
about her meeting with the Bulgarians, which could represent 
an interesting turn of events.  Czech Republic speculated to 
the delegation that Bulgaria's interest and desire to attend 
the 13 July meeting stems from its interest in discussing 
Rabta, but also the fate of Bulgarian medical personnel who 
are apparently under a death sentence in Libya for allegedly 
deliberately spreading HIV. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) While co-sponsorship to date has been satisfactory, 
delegation believes that follow-up effort with some 
delegations may yet prove fruitful.  In particular, 
delegation intends to lobby Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and 
possibly Netherlands, to co-sponsor.  In addition, it has 
become clear that UK also continues to actively court other 
delegations, notably Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
 
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GERMANY AND FRANCE 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU)  UK has informed delegation that Germany and France 
continue to disdain the proposal, though delegation does not 
believe they have taken any specific action locally other 
than to express disagreement.  Also via the UK delegation, 
Germany has stated, purely informally and not/not as an 
expression of a change in Germany's position, that its 
preference would be to see Rabta simply destroyed rather than 
converted.  What's more, UK has said German resistance to the 
proposal is strong in Berlin, and that Germany shares 
France's objections to the proposal.  It therefore appears 
that the more moderate tone Germany struck in our meetings 
may be hardening. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Delegation also recalls that on the margins of the 
EC session, Germany delegate Peter Beerwerth stated that 
Rabta represented a dilemma for German politicians, because 
of past "illegal" transfers of equipment to Libya, and the 
attendant political fallout.  Specifically, Germany would 
need to see the actual Libyan conversion plan before agreeing 
to any course of action.  Delegation therefore recommends 
conveying, with Libya's concurrence of course, a copy of the 
conversion plan to Germany at the earliest possible date. 
 
--------------------------- 
VIEWS OF OPCW LEGAL ADVISOR 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) On Wednesday, 21 July, del rep had a lengthy 
discussion with the OPCW legal advisor, Santiago Onate on, 
among other things, the Rabta conversion request.  During the 
conversation it became clear that both Onate and the OPCW 
Director General are very favorably disposed to the Libyan 
proposal for a technical change, and delegation expects 
senior OPCW leadership will continue to be a positive force 
in this process.  Onate stated he was in the process of 
developing a legal paper supporting the proposition that the 
change being sought in the Libyan proposal was indeed 
"technical", and did not require an Amendment to the 
Convention.  In various conversations Onate had become aware 
that some delegations were questioning whether a change of 
this nature could honestly be considered "technical".  The TS 
position is that it is indeed and Onate's charter therefore 
is to make the legal case to support that position.  Onate 
expected that at least some elements of his legal paper would 
be included in the DG's opinion when it is eventually 
proffered.  Del rep assured Onate we viewed this as a 
positive course of action and agree that making the legal 
case would be an important element of our future success. 
The legal view of the TS was likely to carry a great deal of 
credence with delegations that lack either the resources or 
the inclination to conduct their own legal analysis, but who 
nevertheless want assurance that they are subscribing to a 
"legitimate" course of action. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In the course of the conversation, Onate expressed 
his belief that there would be a lot of value added in 
approaching GRULAC countries, who would have a natural 
affinity for this kind of action (because of the humanitarian 
element) but who may not understand the issues.  Del rep 
concurred that while there was widespread "support" for the 
initiative, it was support borne, in many cases, of 
ideological affection rather than real understanding of what 
was being proposed.  If another SP seriously called into 
question the validity of the approach, such supporters might 
waiver.  All that would need to happen to see the process 
hamstrung would be for them to request more time to consider 
the proposal.  Del rep noted that in that sense, perhaps more 
time should be spent solidifying and shoring up the support 
of those who have already expressed their support, but 
expressed hesitation at the idea of the US or UK or Italy 
approaching GRULAC, as this was a Libyan proposal and the 
optics of that could be a bit dubious.  On the other hand, 
Libya had demonstrated that it did not have, at least not 
here in The Hague, the depth of understanding of the issues 
and the proposal, to educate others and convince them that 
this is a supportable proposal.  Onate responded that perhaps 
the TS could fill the expertise void created by the absence 
of the three main co-sponsors.  A presentation by, for 
example, Mr. Trentadue, who is Argentine, and himself, would 
be particularly well received.  He suggested arranging a 
meeting of GRULAC for Libya to make a presentation to, again 
supported by the TS.  As a final observation on this aspect 
of the issue, Onate stated his belief that the Guatemalan 
Ambassador would also be an excellent advocate with GRULAC 
countries.  He knows OPCW business and enjoys a very good 
reputation. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Onate indicated he had heard no direct feedback 
from either France or Germany, though he was familiar with 
their positions on the proposal.  He gave no indication that 
he or the DG were particularly concerned about the prospect 
of facing criticism from France or Germany over support for 
this initiative.  In a surprising aside, however, he 
indicated that Charge de Cabinet Rafael Grossi had spoken to 
French delegate Sophie Moal-Makame the day before (20 July) 
and had subsequently stated, apparently with some degree of 
confidence, that the French "would come around".  Onate could 
not elaborate on the specifics of the conversation or the 
cause for Grossi's optimism. 
 
¶15.  (U)  Kellogg sends. 
 
RUSSEL