This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001771 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KISL YM COUNTER TERRORISM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: SA'DA FIGHTING: UPDATE AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
REF: A. SANAA 1686 
     ¶B. SANAA 1663 
 
Classified By: CDA NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.5 (A AND D). 
 
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Summary and Comment: 
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¶1. (S)  After an estimated 400-500 deaths, a large number of 
injured on both sides and roughly 400 al-Houthy supporters 
detained, the fighting in the Sa'da region in the north of 
Yemen remains inconclusive. A cease-fire was recently 
announced by the Government but non-official accounts 
indicate that the fight continues. Rumors abound concerning 
the role of the tribes in the region, the fate of al-Houthy 
himself and the possible spread of the fighting beyond the 
Merran mountains into the urban areas of Sa'da. The ROYG has 
accused al-Houthy of having procured foreign connections and 
funding and would have us believe that this is, therefore, a 
fight against international terrorism. Post cannot verify 
such claims nor justify such a conclusion. Nevertheless, the 
conflict has developed into a major test of the state's 
ability to exert its authority and crush a rebellion that, in 
the eyes of many here, has already caused rifts that could 
lead to serious sectarian and/or tribal strife. (Comment: It 
is not in the U.S. interest to allow President Saleh to be 
personally humiliated in this fight nor the state 
institutions to become weakened as a result of it). End 
summary and comment. 
 
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Origins of the conflict: 
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¶2. (S) Per ref(a), al-Houthy's provocations date back two 
years when his lectures/sermons turned more radical and 
lambasted the government for its "encouragement of foreign 
invaders." al-Houthy's sloganeering (death to America, death 
to Israel) led to demonstrations against the U.S. which 
resulted in the arrest of some of his supporters. Having 
first supported al-Houthy's break with the Islamist al-Haq 
party and the formation of a new "Shabab al-Mou'mineen" (The 
Believing Youth) group, our contacts and interlocutors differ 
on what led to President Saleh's about-face with al-Houthy. 
Many refer to a presidential visit last year to Sa'da while 
enroute to performing "Omra" in Mekka. It is said that Saleh 
was practically turned away from speaking at a local mosque 
with anti-American and anti-Israeli chants. Other stories 
speak of a confrontation between al-Houthy and the Governor 
of Sa'da in which Saleh took the side of his Governor and 
ordered the arrest of al-Houthy. Some say al-Houthy was 
simply "invited" to appear before Saleh, an offer which he 
turned down, precipitating a confrontation with the soldiers 
who were dispatched to escort al-Houthy to Sanaa. 
 
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al-Houthy's movement: Sectarian or ideological in nature? 
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¶3. (S) The ROYG would have us believe that they are engaged 
in a fight against international terrorism because of 
al-Houthy's purported regional connections. Saleh has 
personally described al-Houthy's "rebellion" as inspired by 
Iran. His ministers have endorsed this view but have also 
pointed at times to possible support from Saudi Arabia. The 
Saudi Government has recently issued a statement denying any 
involvement and supporting Saleh in his quest to restore law 
and order in Sa'da. Iran has also distanced itself from 
al-Houthy (FM Qirbi received a phone call to that effect from 
the Iranian ambassador to Sanaa while he was at lunch with 
Ambassador and DCM last week. The Iranian ambassador promised 
a statement but we have not yet seen it). Regardless of 
claims and counter claims, we have not seen any intelligence 
confirming al-Houthy's alleged links to international 
terrorism or to official Iranian support. Further, 
conversations with the moderate Islamist party, al-Islah, 
have revealed a very strong distaste by this Sunni movement 
to what they describe as a Shia (Zaidi) rebellion. The 
socialist YSP, although critical of Saleh for rushing into an 
armed conflict, have also described al-Houthy's movement as 
sectarian and a potential threat to national unity. Saleh and 
his ministers, in fact, unselfconsciously refer to al-Houthy 
supporters as Shia, indicating that they think of them as a 
religious rather than a political faction. Several 
independent interlocutors have referred to the  Zaidis as 
ardent believers, still, in the return of the Imamate under 
Zaidi control and on that bases reject the legitimacy of the 
republic. 
 
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What's at stake for the ROYG? 
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¶4. (S) Regardless of the origins of this fight and of any 
possible outside connections for al-Houthy, the confrontation 
between him and President Saleh has taken on a dynamic of its 
own with serious consequences for both sides. Several hundred 
al-Houthy followers are currently in Sanaa jails. They are 
reportedly being "interviewed" by Supreme Court Judge 
al-Hitar who has thus far failed to persuade any of them to 
denounce al-Houthy. Should al-Houthy fall into government 
hands, the Government intends to charge him with serious 
crimes against the state, but promises a fair trial. This, of 
course, provided he survives his capture. Despite continued 
talk of mediation efforts, for Saleh, the al-Houthy rebellion 
has lasted too long and cost too many lives to allow for a 
negotiated settlement. The challenge is not only personal for 
the president, it has also put the prestige of the state on 
the line. If al-Houthy, reportedly with some tribal support 
(jealous over their turf being trampled by the government), 
can evade the arm of the law with impunity it would set a 
very bad precedent for other Zaidis and possibly tribes and 
political factions around the country who may also entertain 
questions regarding the legitimacy of the republic. Religious 
strife between Sunnis and Zaidis may also, according to some 
local observers, be a dangerous outcome of a failure to 
suppress al-Houthy's movement. Such scenarios cannot but ring 
alarm bells for the Saleh regime at a time when he is 
desperately trying to promote Yemen as a partner to the U.S. 
and the European countries in development and democratization 
projects in the Middle East. Saleh has personally asked us, 
the French and the Saudis for public statements of support 
for his government in its confrontation with al-Houthy. 
 
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What's at stake for the USG? 
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¶5. (S) Pending further information, post cannot confirm or 
rule out any links of al-Houthy to international terrorism. 
That said, al-Houthy's rhetoric and behavior are dangerous 
for internal stability and for U.S. interests in Yemen and 
the region. Antipathy for the U.S. is clearly very strongly 
felt by al-Houthy and his followers. Further, a failure to 
bring the al-Houthy movement under control would risk having 
the Sa'da region wriggle out of the central government's 
control and would encourage tribes in the region to assert 
their own rejection of the state's writ in their areas. the 
Saleh government, for all its shortcomings, has committed 
itself to fighting regional terrorism and to implementing 
political and economic reforms in cooperation with the USG 
and the EU. A discredited and weakened regime would not be 
able to follow through on such commitments. 
 
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Policy Comment: 
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¶6. (S) Whereas U.S. assistance to Yemen on the social, 
political and economic fronts has been substantial and 
unabashed, assistance on the military front (particularly as 
related the recent Sa'da fighting) has been more low key and 
low-profile. This, in our view, is as it should be, given the 
balancing act Saleh has to perform in cementing his ties with 
the west while retaining the posture of the leader of an 
independent and sovereign country. Our support also needs to 
drive a balance between supporting stability and security 
without encouraging the rash use of force while disregarding 
human rights and the rule of law. 
End comment. 
KHOURY