This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 002745 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR P, EUR, IO, IO/UNP, EUR/WE, EUR/AGS, EAP/J 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2014 
TAGS: KUNR PREL GM JA FR RS IT UNSC
SUBJECT: ITALY - HIGH-LEVEL CONCERN RE UNSC REFORM 
 
REF: A. STATE 135590 
 
     ¶B. ROME 02168 
     ¶C. ROME 01425 
     ¶D. ROME 00548 
 
Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  This cable contains action requests.  Please see para 
¶8. 
 
¶2. (C)  Summary: The Government of Italy is becoming 
increasingly concerned about any UN reform that could result 
in a permanent UNSC seat for Germany and/or Japan. The 
Italians fear that an increase in the number of peranent 
UNSC seats would result in a less efficien UN, a Security 
Council less amenable to the intrests Italy shares with the 
US, and, ultimately,would relegate Italy to a permanent 
second tier rle in Europe. The Italians believe that Germany 
ill present a plan that will have a reasonable chace of 
getting the two-thirds majority necessary o amend the 
Charter. Italy is focusing its lobbyng efforts on the major 
regional powers that the German plan would exclude; the 
medium-sized state interested in protecting their regional 
standin; and the US and China, which would have to ratify 
any amendment, along with the other P-5, before t could 
enter into force. Italy seeks, at a minimum, US public 
neutrality on the issue and a privae assurance that "Italy's 
vital interests and th efficient functioning of the UNSC" 
will be take fully into account by Washington. End Summary. 
¶2. (C)  The Government of Italy is becoming increasingly 
concerned about any UN reform that could reult in a 
permanent UNSC seat for Germany and/or apan, but not Italy. 
The Italians consider this issue one of their highest foreign 
policy priorities and are using every possible opportunity to 
enlist U.S. support for their position, as evidenced in the 
June 16 meeting between U/S Grossman and Italian Ambassador 
Vento (ref A), the June 4 meeting between A/S Jones and MFA 
Political Director Giampiero Massolo (ref B), the February 
visit of G-8 Political Director Davies to Rome (ref C), 
ongoing exchanges with Embassy officers and repeated public 
statements by high level officials, most recently FM Frattini 
in London June 22.  This concern has also been raised with 
President Bush by both PM Berlusconi and President Ciampi. 
 
¶3. (C)  The nominal Italian argument is that UN reform 
resulting in an increase in the number of permanent UNSC 
seats would mean a less efficient UN, and a Security Council 
less amenable to the interests Italy shares with the US. 
Their mostly unspoken but more potent fear is that granting 
Germany a permanent seat would relegate Italy to a permanent 
second tier role in Europe and also weaken the G-8 (ref C). 
Embassy has encouraged the Italians to focus on UN reform in 
broader terms, and has stressed that Security Council reform 
is likely to be so contentious that consensus will be 
difficult. 
 
¶4. (C)  The Italians agree that it will be a difficult 
process, but believe that Germany is focused on presenting a 
plan to the UNGA in early 2005 that has a reasonable chance 
of getting the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the 
Charter.  Retired Ambassador Paolo Fulci (Permrep to the UN 
during the last serious discussion of expansion in the 
mid-90s) explained to POL MC how the Germans hope to avoid 
the regional rivalries that stymied consensus and prevented 
any proposal from reaching a vote in the 90s.  Ten years ago, 
South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt had arguably equal claims to 
a permanent African seat; now, South Africa was clearly 
ascendant over the others in terms of GNP and regional 
influence.  Similarly, Mexico and Argentina were no longer 
equal rivals with Brazil for a permanent Latin American seat. 
 In this circumstance, the Germans believe it possible to 
cobble together a package of permanent seats that would 
attract the necessary 130 votes, despite the vociferous 
objection of those members that would miss the cut. 
 
¶5. (C)  With no hope of swaying those major regional powers 
who stand to benefit from the expected German plan, Italy is 
focusing its own lobbying effort in three directions: 
 
-- those major regional powers the German plan would exclude; 
 
-- medium-sized states which may fear diminution of their 
regional standing if a neighbor is promoted to permanent 
membership; 
-- and the two permanent members -- the US and China -- which 
the Italians believe should have reason to be opposed to 
expansion (China solely because of its rivalry with Japan) 
and which would have to ratify any amendment, along with the 
other P-5 countries, before it could enter into force. 
 
In seeking to influence the medium-sized and smaller states, 
we can expect the Italians to be as blatant as they claim 
Germany is in promising bilateral economic and political 
benefits to those who support them, while arguing that once 
the Germans have their seat, they will have no incentive to 
keep their promises. 
 
¶6. (C)  As an alternative to permanent seats for named 
countries, Italy will argue that there should be additional 
rotating regional seats.  FM Frattini's deputy chief of staff 
told DCM that Italy could accept that such rotating seats be 
weighted so that states like Germany and Japan (and Italy) 
could have more frequent turns than smaller states.  With 
their EU partners, particularly the smaller ones, Italy is 
prepared to argue (though apparently has not done so yet) 
that there should be no expansion until ratification of the 
EU Constitution at which time the EU could claim a new 
permanent seat.  It attributes French and UK endorsement of 
German aspirations to a desire to head off the EU-seat 
option, lest it lead other EU members to try to force UK and 
France to cast their votes on an EU, rather than national, 
basis. For France and the UK, accepting a permanent German 
Security Council seat is a lesser evil than establishing a 
single EU seat. The possibility of an EU seat effectively 
dies if Germany has its own seat.  Without the support of at 
least one of the "big three" the single seat proposal would 
have no chance of success, even under qualified majority 
voting 
 
¶7. (C)  The Italian government recognizes that, in an 
eventual UNGA vote, the US will have the same official weight 
as Luxembourg, and that a two-thirds vote in UNGA is required 
to amend the Charter. The Italians also recognize that all 
the P-5 members must ratify the amendment and thus, in 
theory, any one of the five ultimately holds veto power after 
the two-thirds vote in the General Assembly. The Italians do 
not want to get to this point and are working to avoid the 
possibility of an UNGA vote. Therefore, as the neuralgic 
reaction reported in ref A indicates, the Italians fear that 
any USG signal of support for expansion will be taken by 
Berlin as bolstering its case and adding an air of 
inevitability to the process.  Italy seeks from the US -- at 
a minimum -- public neutrality on the issue, and a private 
assurance that "Italy's vital interests and the efficient 
functioning of the UNSC" be taken fully into account by 
Washington. A/S Jones' assurance (ref B) that we will look 
closely at UNSC reform clearly resonated with Italian policy 
makers. 
 
¶8. (C)  Action Requests: 
-- for USUN: Embassy Rome would welcome comment on the 
expected role of the Eminent Persons Panel report expected 
this fall. 
-- for Department: Not only Italians, but Germans and 
Japanese, plus officials of other regional powers may raise 
this issue with increasing frequency. We recommend that 
Department provide worldwide guidance that can be used with 
all interlocutors.  From our point of view, it would be 
wisest not to allow anyone to take either our support or our 
opposition for granted.  Rather, we suggest that our position 
make clear that we will examine carefully any specific 
proposal for expansion with an eye to judging whether it 
would enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council. 
-- for all posts: Embassy Rome would appreciate being 
included in any reporting on your host nation's view on UNSC 
expansion. 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m 
 
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 2004ROME02745 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL