This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001324 
 
SIPDIS 
 
KINSHASA TO BRAZZAVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG UK
SUBJECT: UK AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL VIEWS 
 
 
1.)  Summary :  HMG is reviewing its policy towards the DRC, 
taking into account the UN Ambassador's view that President 
Kabila and the hard-liners around him have no real desire, 
protestations to the contrary, to see any transition take 
place that threatens their long-term power and access to the 
country's riches.  The Ambassador believes Kabila needs to 
hear a clear undivided message from the major members of the 
concerned international community to the effect that his 
current path is dangerous and will not receive our support. 
End Summary 
 
¶2. (C)  I paid an initial call on outgoing British Ambassador 
James Atkinson on July 8th.  He gave me  some of the elements 
of his end-of-tour assessment of policy towards the DRC--none 
of it positive. 
 
¶3.  (S)     Atkinson said that HMG and the other western 
donors (and HMG has an aid budget for the DRC this year of 70 
million dollars) had been led astray by the protestations of 
the current government.  There is, in fact, no desire for 
serious reform, or any real transition--at least one that 
would threaten their position.  Instead, they are determined 
to hold on to power and keep their access to what money they 
can.  In this respect it does not differ much from the days 
of Mobutu and, of course, many of the same people (or their 
sons) are in place now. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Joseph Kabila  is surrounded by hard-liners using 
him as a front.  The young man does not have his father,s 
occasionally brutal leadership style (and the DRC needs a 
forceful hand), but serves the interest of those who 
(probably) killed his father.  None of these want a 
successful transition to what would pass for a democratic 
system with the exception of the RCD.  These latter want to 
stay in power no less than the rest, but having no local 
ethnic base, depend on a reasonably successful transition to 
maintain their position here.  Otherwise, it is back to the 
East and to whatever can be salvaged of their position there. 
 
¶5. (C)  Kabila is also trying to assure that he remains as 
the only contender left with real military muscle.  He uses 
the "Maison Militaire" to go around the Ministry of Defense 
and while the troops belonging to other factions decay, the 
FAC under his command maintain a relatively advantageous 
situation. 
 
¶6. (C)  I asked who he could identify as the chief hardliners 
in the Kabila entourage.  He cited Katumba Mwabe (A Bemba 
from Katanga, he is a former governor of Katanga, former 
Minister of the Presidency and currently 
Ambassador-at-large), Mwense Kongolo (A Luba from Katanga, he 
is a former Minister of Justice under Laurent Kabila and 
Minister of Security under Joseph Kabila--from which he was 
suspended in October 2002 after unfavorable mention in the UN 
Panel report on illegal exploitation of Congolese 
resources.),  and  Gen. John Numbi.   He noted that all of 
these were Katangans.  Other hard-liners included Samba 
Kaputo (National Security Advisor.  From one of the smaller 
tribes in Katanga,  but he grew up in the Kasais.  He was 
Governor of Orientale Province under Mobutu.) and Evariste 
Boshab  (Kabila's Chief of Staff). 
 
¶7.  (C)  These have the support of Vice-President Bemba and 
his crowd.  Bemba does not want to be president; he just 
wants to keep his hands in the till. 
 
¶8. (C)  Atkinson said that FCO was sending a paper to Cabinet 
arguing that the presumptions on which UK support for the 
Kabila government were no longer supportable.  There was a 
need to be clear about the situation and the direction in 
which the DRC was being taken.  He agreed that any approach, 
to have any hope of success, needed to be a concerted Western 
effort.  I asked who he thought shared his views.  He replied 
he thought his analysis would not be rejected by most of the 
major embassies here, but said that the World Bank seemed 
happy to be shelling out the cash. 
 
¶9. (C)  What would a change mean?  The DRC leadership needed 
to be called to order-- diplomatically, of course.  (There is 
a strong Congolese sensitivity to criticism that could result 
in a counterproductive reaction if given an excuse.)  I 
gather that HMG may, if the paper is approved, be arguing 
this position shortly. 
 
¶10. (C)  Comment:  Atkinson is prone to overstating, or 
dramatizing, events, as was the case when he excitedly 
declared the March 28 security incident in Kinshasa a coup. 
His due assessment of the state of play reflects this 
tendency.   We agree-and have reported-that there are strains 
in the Transitional government, including the use of 
hard-liners around President Kabila.  However, we believe 
that, at least so far, Kabila remains able to balance these 
elements and remains committed to elections - elections which 
apparently he believes he can win. 
 
SCOTT