This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X.6 
TAGS: MARR PGOV CASC CG MONUC
SUBJECT: NKUNDA STALEMATE CONTINUES 
 
 
Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: As of July 15, it is unclear whether ongoing 
negotiation attempts will end the stalemate with rebel 
commander Laurent Nkunda without a return to open conflict. 
Sustained rumors of an imminent FARDC attack on rebel 
positions in N. and S. Kivu have circulated for several 
weeks. As of July 15, however, the FARDC had not made a firm 
decision to start the offensive, and a number of diplomatic 
initiatives were still underway. Nkunda's poor negotiation 
history could provide the proximate cause for a serious GDRC 
offensive on Kalehe or Minova. Post will continue to monitor 
closely the fluid situation. End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Consistent, sustained rumors of an imminent FARDC 
attack on rebel positions in N. and S. Kivu have circulated 
for several weeks. As of July 15, however, the FARDC had not 
made a firm decision to start the offensive, and a number of 
diplomatic initiatives by the GDRC and the international 
community were still underway. In addition to recent talks in 
Brussels and ongoing talks in Washington, on July 9, 
Presidential Security Advisor Samba Kaputo told Charge that 
the GDRC would only use force if negotiations fail. On July 
12, Nkunda told a MONUC delegation that he was not formally 
negotiating with the GDRC, but was in regular contact with 
old RCD/G associates. (Note: There are credible rumors that 
¶N. Kivu governor Eugene Serufuli may be negotiating with 
Nkunda on behalf of President Kabila. End note.) 
 
MONUC-Nkunda Meeting 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) On July 12, MONUC Kivus Brigade Commander Jan Isberg 
and Head of Office Alpha Sow met with Nkunda in Minova, S. 
Kivu to discuss peacefully ending the stalemate, and 
investigating an alleged July 10 attack by Nkunda's forces on 
¶S. Kivu FARDC troops, allegations of child soldier 
recruitment, illegal taxation and harassment of civilians. 
Over the past few weeks, Nkunda has presented an unreasonable 
laundry list of demands to be met before he and his 
compatriot, Jules Mutebusi, would consider exile from the DRC 
for a to-be-determined length of time. These requests have 
included: 
--amnesty for those convicted of the LD Kabila assassination 
--amnesty for all involved in recent fighting in the Kivus 
--the removal of General Mabe from the S. Kivu military 
region and prosecution for targeting Banyamulenge in early 
June 
--an investigation into the Banyamulenge genocide 
--reparations for Banyamulenge who were killed, fled to 
Rwanda, or were looted 
--integration, 'with honor,' of Nkunda's and Mutebusi's 
troops into the FARDC. 
 
At the MONUC meeting, he presented two demands--- a thorough 
investigation by the transition government into crimes 
committed against the Banyamulenge and General Mabe's actions 
in early June, and to be able to peacefully return to Goma. 
He said he would not accept a military assignment outside the 
Kivus. 
 
¶4. (C) Nkunda told the MONUC delegation that he had nothing 
to do with the July 10 attempted flanking attack on S. Kivu 
FARDC forces southwest of Kalehe in the Bushaka/Lemera area. 
He said he thought the attackers might have been local 
defense forces from the Nyabibwe area (a village located 
between Minova and Kalehe) or N. Kivu forces 'hunting the 
FDLR/Interahamwe.' Nkunda said he would not rule out 
attacking Bukavu or Goma, in part because he found General 
Obed's (N. Kivu military regional commander) orders to arrest 
him if he entered Goma unacceptable. (Note: On July 14, 
General Obed confirmed to poloff that he had been instructed 
by the FARDC hierarchy to issue an arrest warrant for Nkunda, 
would arrest him if he entered Goma, and was ready for an 
Nkunda-led attack against the city. End note.) A MONUC Child 
Protection Officer who participated in the meeting told 
polcouns that Nkunda was 'irrational' throughout the meeting. 
 
Marching Towards Renewed Conflict? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Although eastward troop movements have slowed, 
advanced planning for an offensive in eastern DRC continues, 
supplies continue to move east, and troops continue to move 
between eastern garrisons. As of July 12, many military 
observers believed that the FARDC needed to attack before 
payday on July 30, and before its soldiers become demoralized 
and desert or start widescale looting and harassment of 
civilians. As of July 12, the FARDC reportedly had a plan of 
attack. However, on July 13, a MONUC official told polcouns 
that the FARDC 10th military region G-3 (Intelligence) 
officer forgot his briefcase with FARDC battle plans for the 
offensive in a car while he went into a bar outside Kalehe 
the night of July 12. When he came out, his briefcase was 
missing. At a minimum, the G-3 was imprisoned by the FARDC, 
and may have been killed. 
 
¶6. (C) On July 14, General Mabe told MONUC Bukavu that 
fighting had broken out, but later revised his story to say 
only that he had sent a mixed group of about 500 GSSP, MLC 
and Mai Mai troops north from Bukavu towards Kalehe. He said 
these soldiers went as far north as the N./ S. Kivu border 
without meeting resistance and stopped. There were also 
unconfirmed reports of an unknown number of troops loyal to 
Nkunda retreating from Kalehe towards Minova (north of Kalehe 
and south of Goma) or Masisi (northwest of Kalehe). On July 
13, about 10 small boats and attendant troops from the Navy 
arrived in Bukavu from Mbandaka to prevent attacks and/or 
resupply from Rwanda across Lake Kivu. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) As of July 15, it is unclear whether ongoing 
negotiation attempts will end the Nkunda stalemate without a 
return to open conflict. FARDC's limited deployment which 
stopped short of entering N. Kivu may have been a warning 
shot to encourage Nkunda to seek a real, negotiated 
settlement, and a thinly veiled threat against N. Kivu 
Governor Serufuli and General Obed to get Nkunda under 
control before Kinshasa does. Nkunda's increasingly 
irrational behavior and past refusals to negotiate in good 
faith could render negotiation attempts useless, increase 
tension, and provide the proximate cause for a serious, GDRC 
offensive on Kalehe or Minova. Post will continue to monitor 
closely the fluid situation. 
SCOTT