This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001479 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, NSC FOR DORMANDY, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PREF NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: HOME MINISTER KHADKA ON MAOISTS, REFUGEES, 
IRAQ 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1422 
     ¶B. STATE 153894 
     ¶C. KATHMANDU 1443 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (a,b,d). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary.  Nepal's Home Minister Khadka discussed the 
role of the Nepal Police in the Government of Nepal's 
counter-insurgency effort as well as Tibetan and Bhutanese 
refugee issues with Ambassador Moriarty on July 27.  Khadka 
suggested he was supportive of the idea of Nepal supplying 
troops to protect the UN in Iraq, but was concerned about 
reactions by political parties not currently in the 
government.  End Summary. 
 
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Counter-Insurgency Efforts and Domestic Politics 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2. (C) Newly-appointed Home Minister Purna Bahadur Khadka 
told the Ambassador during a meeting on July 27 that he was 
grateful for USG support for Nepal's counter-insurgency 
effort.  Without the U.S. support, Khadka intimated, the 
Maoists could not be defeated (biographical information of 
Khadka conveyed Ref A).  Drawing parallels between the U.S. 
war on terrorism and Nepal's internal struggle, he noted the 
hardships the Maoist insurgency had inflicted on the people 
of Nepal.  The Maoists' strength needed to be curtailed in 
order to bring the insurgents back to the negotiating table 
and to enable the country to restart the democratic process. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador inquired into the role of Nepal's Armed 
Police Force and civilian police force, both of which fall 
under the authority of the Home Ministry, in combating the 
insurgency.  (NOTE: The Armed Police Force is a paramilitary 
force.  Only about one-third of the civilian police carry 
arms.  END NOTE.)  The Minister explained the GON's desire 
for Nepal's police forces to take over certain functions from 
the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), including physical protection of 
sensitive installations, such as radio towers.  However, the 
Nepal Police were too inadequately trained and too poorly 
equipped (according to Khadka, the police primarily carry 
aging .303 rifles) to increase their counter-insurgency 
responsibilities.  The Minister beseeched the Ambassador to 
provide U.S. assistance in the form of training and equipment 
to Nepal's police.  The Ambassador sympathized, but explained 
the legal hurdles to providing lethal assistance to civilian 
police forces. 
 
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Refugee Issues 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Turning to refugees, Ambassador Moriarty raised the 
need for the GON to issue travel documents to refugees who 
were eligible for U.S. immigration benefits.  In 2003, the 
Nepali cabinet had approved issuance of travel documents to 
over 100 refugees who were entitled to immigrant status to 
the U.S.  Now, another list of roughly 120 refugees would 
soon require GON review and approval.  The Ambassador 
requested Khadka's assistance on this issue, suggesting the 
Cabinet consider adopting a procedure for the issuance of 
travel documents in such cases that would not require 
individual approval. 
 
¶5. (C) The U.S. was encouraging the Government of India (GOI) 
to help seek a resolution for the repatriation of over 
100,000 Bhutanese refugees residing in seven camps in Eastern 
Nepal, the Ambassador noted.  It appeared that the GOI was 
taking more interest in the issue, and worried that the 
situation in the camps might become a destabilizing influence 
in the region.  Khadka agreed that GOI involvement would be 
critical to move the issue forward.  Meanhwile, the GON and 
Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) were discussing revisions 
to the GON report on the 22 December 2003 incident in 
Khudunabari Camp.  The Minister was optimistic that the next 
bilateral meeting would lead to progress on the repatriation 
of refugees to Bhutan. 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador also emphasized the need for the GON to 
continue to abide by its refugee policy issued in August 2003 
upholding the principle of non-refoulement and providing 
UNHCR access to all asylum seekers.  He expressed concern 
that local officials in districts along the Nepal-China 
border were unaware of the GON's policy.  Khadka was 
noncommital, but agreed to discuss the issue further with the 
Foreign Ministry. 
 
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Troops for U.N. Protection in Iraq 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) The Ambassador emphasized the need for international 
support to provide force protection to the UN Mission in 
Iraq, and asked whether the GON would supply troops (Ref B). 
As the Deputy Prime Minister had done (Ref C), Khadka did not 
respond directly.  Instead, he noted that the government's 
response to the request would have to come from the Prime 
Minister.  Meanwhile, he worried that the position of the 
Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) 
might complicate the issue.  (Note: CPN-UML, essentially 
transforming itself into a European-style social democrat 
party, is the largest and arguably the most popular party in 
Nepal.  The Ambassador plans to raise the issue at the 
earliest opportunity with CPN-UML General Secretary Madhav 
Kumar Nepal.  End Note.) 
 
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Comment 
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¶8. (C) Khadka's perspective on the Maoist insurgency, that 
the government must first degrade the Maoists' military 
strength before restarting peace talks, is similar to that of 
his Prime Minister and Nepali Congress-Democratic party 
leader Sher Bahadur Deuba.  Meanwhile, Khadka's care in 
responding to questions on refugee issues, particularly 
Tibetan refugee issues, reflects Nepal's need to walk a 
tightrope in balancing its relations with China and with the 
West.  End Comment. 
MORIARTY