This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001418 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
NSC FOR XDORMANDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS PREF NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: DEUBA PLANS ELECTIONS ABOVE ALL ELSE 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1080 
     ¶B. STATE 153894 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. During their first meeting on July 23, Prime 
Minister Deuba reiterated to the Ambassador Nepal's gratitude 
to the U.S., and especially to President Bush, for supporting 
Nepal's development and counter-insurgency efforts.  Deuba 
emphasized the need for a coalition of democratic forces, to 
include the palace, to force the Maoists into genuine 
negotiations.  However, despite many in the Nepali Congress 
party wanting to join the government, Koirala would not, 
Deuba feared.  Secret negotiations with the Maoists could 
occur but no ceasefire would be offered, and phased elections 
would go forward even absent an agreement with the Maoists. 
While personally in favor of a Royal Nepal Army force to 
protect the UN in Iraq, the PM said he needed cabinet 
consensus for an affirmative reply.  Finally, Deuba affirmed 
the need for Indian help to send the Bhutanese refugees home 
"with dignity;" he likewise affirmed Nepal's continued policy 
to allow Tibetans refugees to transit to India.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) As he did when called upon by the Charge on June 10 
(Ref A), Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba began his meeting 
with the Ambassador by warmly thanking the United States for 
its development and counter-insurgency support to Nepal. 
Deuba, in particular, singled out his 2002 Oval office 
meeting with President Bush where he had heard the 
President's views on violence, and stated, "I was really 
impressed by him."  Deuba asked the Ambassador to convey to 
President Bush his warmest regards.  (NOTE:  Deuba is the 
only Nepali Prime Minister to have met an American President 
at the White House, a source of significant pride for Deuba, 
and an important event in recent Nepali political history. 
END NOTE.) 
 
=================================== 
INSURGENCY - DEUBA'S WAY FORWARD... 
=================================== 
 
¶3. (C) The Prime Minister believed it was important for the 
political parties and the King to form a bloc with a 
consensus position to face the Maoist threat to Nepal. 
However, despite his many meetings with the leader of the 
Nepali Congress Party (NCP), Girija Prasad Koirala, and 
despite the desire of many "friends" in the NCP to join the 
government, it did not appear Koirala would allow the NCP to 
join.  Meanwhile, Koirala's public statements regarding his 
interactions with the Maoists were "inconsistent," according 
to the Prime Minister. 
 
=============== 
NEGOTIATIONS... 
=============== 
 
¶4. (C) Deuba noted he was working to form a bottom-line 
consensus position among the parties and the King so he could 
move forward to test the Maoists' seriousness about 
negotiations.  International pressure on the Maoists from all 
quarters was important to prepare the ground for productive 
negotiations.  Increased pressure on the Maoists by the 
Nepali security forces would also help.  Meanwhile, the 
government was close to completing an MOU with the UN 
Commission on Human Rights as well, to deal transparently 
with human rights criticisms leveled at the GON and Nepali 
security forces. 
 
¶5. (C) Multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy could 
not be up for negotiation, Deuba cautioned, or the King would 
not accept it.  Moreover, the Maoist call for a 
constitutional assembly was also not acceptable to the King. 
Noting he was caught between the parties and the palace, 
Deuba stated a strong preference for secret negotiations, and 
insisted that a ceasefire, which would allow the Maoists to 
regroup as they had done during previous ceasefires, would 
not be called.  Meanwhile, the government had budgeted for a 
"Peace Secretariat," intended to improve the institutional 
knowledge and negotiation techniques of the government should 
negotiations come to fruition.  The Ambassador stated that 
the U.S. would help wherever possible, but urged that the 
Peace Secretariat be as "apolitical" as possible, to prevent 
it from becoming a political football of the parties. 
 
============ 
ELECTIONS... 
============ 
 
¶6. (C) Dialogue with the Maoists was the priority, Deuba 
stated.  Nevertheless, uncertain about whether the Maoists 
really meant to lay down their arms and give up their 
one-party state vision meant the government must prepare for 
elections, peace or no peace.  Repeating the Natwar Singh 
mantra of, "If elections could go forward in Kashmir, why not 
here?" Deuba stated he planned to talk to the security forces 
to develop a plan for phased elections starting no later than 
April 2005.  Agreeing that the Maoists would try to prevent 
free elections from occuring, Deuba believed that security 
could be provided that would allow people to feel safe to 
vote freely.  In any case, he noted, without an elected 
parliament it made no sense to have a Prime Minister. 
 
==== 
IRAQ 
==== 
 
¶7. (C) Deuba stated that he was personally in favor of a 
Nepali Army force to help protect the UN in Iraq, but he 
would have to have consensus agreement in the cabinet for the 
decision to go forward.  He would raise it in the cabinet, 
but also asked Ambassador Moriarty to help push a positive 
decision with the Prime Minister's coalition partners, 
especially the UML party members.  (NOTE: The Ambassador will 
meet with the senior UML-party member of the government, 
Deputy Prime Minister/Finance Minister Bharat Mohan Adhikari, 
on July 26.  END NOTE.) 
 
======== 
REFUGEES 
======== 
 
¶8. (C) Deuba insisted that Nepal wanted to see the Bhutanese 
refugees return home to Bhutan "with dignity."  To that end, 
the GON would do whatever it could to move the process 
forward.  However, Indian encouragement of the GOB would 
help.  Turning to Tibetan refugees, Ambassador Moriarty 
raised the importance of Nepali border officials being 
clearly informed of Nepal's "Gentleman's Agreement" to allow 
Tibetan refugees to safely transit to India.  Deuba agreed, 
adding that GON officials should already know correct 
procedures.  Despite pressure from China, Deuba insisted, 
Nepal was working in close cooperation with UNHCR. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶9. (C) Deuba, having successfully formed a four-party 
coalition government, now faces the difficult task of 
creating consensus between the member-parties and the palace, 
in an environment where little trust exists.  While Deuba 
focuses on phased elections in a seriously questionable 
security environment, many other actors, such as the CPN-UML, 
appear solely focused on participating in talks with the 
Maoists in hopes of winning the role as successful 
peacemaker.  While free and fair elections are unlikely to be 
attainable, all indications are that until the Maoists face 
more serious threats to their own well-being and ability to 
influence in Nepal, negotiations are also likely to be 
nothing more than a dead end. 
 
¶10. (C)  It was heartening to hear Deuba's reactions on both 
refugee communities in Nepal.  Despite external pressures, 
the GON does appear committed to walking a tightrope between 
the West and China on the Tibetans; unfortunately, as with so 
many things in Nepal, a gap exists between the government's 
intentions and the practical realities on the ground. END 
COMMENT. 
MORIARTY