This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

150513Z Jul 04

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 HARARE 001157 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
¶E.  O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ZI VIP
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL VISIT ILLUMINATES ELECTION REFORMS, 
ATMOSPHERICS 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1110 (B) HARARE 1067 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Staffdel comprised of Majority 
Professional Staffperson Joan Condon and Democratic Party 
Professional Staffperson Pearl-Alice Marsh of the House 
International Relations Committee and USAID Congressional 
Liaison Susan Williams met with a host of interlocutors 
during a June 29-July 5 visit to Zimbabwe.  GOZ officials 
charted parameters of recently proposed electoral reforms 
but were vague on how such reforms might address difficult 
issues such as politically motivated violence and access to 
media.  Opposition MDC leaders and representatives of civil 
society generally recognized that the proposed reforms 
offered some opportunity for positive change but were 
pessimistic on prospects for adjusting fundamental flaws in 
electoral environment and administration.  ACTION REQUEST 
follows in paragraph 32.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
Election Commissioner: Unresolved Issues 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a meeting in his office June 30, Electoral 
Supervisory Commission (ESC) Chairman Sobuza Gula-Ndebele 
told the staffdel that he had yet to see a formal draft of 
the proposed electoral reforms reportedly approved by the 
ZANU-PF Central Committee June 25 (reftel).  However, he 
said that he had been told that the approved version adopted 
in most respects confidential recommendations made by the 
ESC.  The elements reported in the official press 
substantiated this.  He noted that his commission had 
recommended the Chief Election Officer be appointed by an 
independent body, not the president as reportedly designated 
in the reported reform package.  He predicted this would be 
the source of additional debate, and asserted that in any 
event the integrity of the appointment(s) could overcome the 
manner of selection if tenure and resources were secure. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Gula-Ndebele confirmed that the changes were 
expected to be implemented in time for parliamentary 
elections currently scheduled for March.  Timing would 
present a quandary, however - a constitutional amendment 
would be required in order to establish a truly independent 
commission with powers contemplated by the reported reforms. 
Passing the law and effecting a constitutional amendment in 
time to prepare for an election by March would be "a tall 
order" regardless of political will.  He was unaware of a 
set date for implementation but had heard it would be in 
August.  Difficulties might require postponement of the 
election by a few months, a delay to which the parties might 
agree.  He said study was being given to establishment of a 
new commission under existing law, but such an approach 
would be "untidy" and could yield a commission of inadequate 
authority and compromised independence. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Chairman emphasized that sanction power 
reportedly being accorded the new commission would 
distinguish it positively from his ESC.  He said that the 
new commission could pursue complaints filed by any party or 
pursue matters on its own initiative.  The Chief Election 
Officer would have administrative authority but could not 
overturn any decision of the commission, which would report 
to the Parliament, not the President.  He expected that the 
new commission would be able to draw from a range of 
sanctions, including "deduction of votes" for violations by 
a party.  He said that announced electoral reforms did not 
explicitly address "environmental" issues such as 
suppression of political violence and access to media but 
asserted that the new commission would have authority to act 
on such issues.  The Chairman said he favored as inclusive 
an approach as possible with respect to international 
observers, although he conceded that others in the GOZ 
disagreed.  He noted that deep ruling party suspicion of 
donor-funded NGOs was driving efforts to consolidate voter 
education efforts under supervision by the ESC or a new 
commission. 
¶5.  (SBU) According to Gula-Ndebele, the new commission 
would still have to rely on police to carry out some of its 
enforcement orders.  He expected that electoral courts 
mentioned in media reports would likely not be standing 
courts but would be composed of existing High Court and/or 
Supreme Court judges and sit on an ad hoc basis.  Commitment 
of adequate resources to support operation of the 
contemplated mechanisms would be a key test of the 
government's political will and central to their 
effectiveness. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Gula-Ndebele lamented Zimbabwe's highly polarized 
political climate, for which he asserted each party bore its 
share of blame.  He expressed hope that the parties, civil 
society and the international community would give the new 
commission a fair chance to gain the confidence of all. 
 
Mutasa: No American Observers (and an Aside on Food) 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In a July 2 meeting in his office at ZANU-PF Party 
Headquarters (where he is Party Secretary for External 
Affairs) Minister for Anti-Corruption and Anti-Monopolies 
Didymus Mutasa underscored the great attention being given 
electoral reforms by the party leadership.  He did not 
elaborate on details of the reforms but advised that they 
would be consistent with African standards. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Minister asserted that Zimbabwe was one of the 
most democratic of African nations by any standard and 
criticized the USG for applying a double standard against 
Zimbabwe.  He noted that the same day the USG condemned a 
Zimbabwean parliamentary by-election (Zengeza) during which 
one person was killed, it accepted the results of a Nigerian 
election in which more than two hundred reportedly were 
killed.  Mutasa said that Zimbabwean voters had "wised up" 
to the opposition's ineffectualness and subservience to the 
West and predicted a clean sweep for the ruling party in 
free and fair elections in March. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Mutasa reported that the GOZ no longer intended to 
submit its elections to Western scrutiny and would not 
include "British and Americans" among those invited to 
observe its March elections.  He proffered an article that 
reported U.S. senators calling for regime change in Zimbabwe 
as evidence of malign USG intentions.  When pressed by Marsh 
on the issue of American observers, he chuckled that he 
would make an exception only for her. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) When questioned about Zimbabwe's food security, 
Mutasa said that the GOZ was confident it had enough 
production to meet domestic demand for food.  He conceded 
that estimates could prove wrong, however, and urged that 
the international community be prepared to respond quickly 
should the country later find itself unable to meet its food 
needs. 
 
The Speaker: Give New Commission a Chance 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) At a meeting July 5 in his office at ZANU-PF 
Headquarters (where he is Party Secretary for 
Administration), Speaker of the Parliament Emmerson 
Mnangagwa opened with a long and familiar exposition on the 
history of land reform and bilateral relations.  He 
acknowledged that "mistakes had been made" in the 
implementation of land reform but that the GOZ was working 
hard to redress injustices and maladministration identified 
by the Utete Commission report.  The country was not in the 
process of consolidating gains and focusing on restoring 
production levels through support to new farmers. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Turning to elections, Mnangagwa emphasized that 
Zimbabwe had always conducted its elections in timely manner 
and accordance with the Constitution.  He conceded that the 
MDC had presented ZANU-PF with a serious challenge in the 
last national parliamentary elections but that the ruling 
party had responded well.  After recovering four 
parliamentary seats in by-elections since then, the party 
was confident it would do better this time.  Blair's 
statement on the floor of Parliament that exposed his 
government's collaboration with the MDC would hurt the 
opposition's prospects.  Mnangagwa asserted that reversal of 
the country's economic decline would further boost the 
ruling party's prospects. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Speaker briefly described anticipated 
electoral reforms that were consistent with the package 
described by Gula-Ndebele.  He said that the government had 
adopted the proposals, which would be forwarded to the 
appropriate parliamentary portfolio committee before being 
considered by the full legislature.  The committee would 
conduct public hearings on the proposals, on which all 
stakeholders would get an opportunity to offer input. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Mnangagwa conceded that there had been security 
problems in the conduct of some elections, particularly 
since the rise of the opposition in the late 1990's.  Even 
so, elections were much more peaceful than those in the 
early days of independence.  He expressed confidence that 
electoral reforms would address such problems.  The 
independent election commission would deal with 
environmental issues like media access and an election court 
would thresh out disputes fairly and quickly.  He urged that 
the new system be given a chance.  He observed that many 
Zimbabwean families had members from both major parties and 
predicted that Zimbabwe would eventually achieve a non- 
polarized polity like America's, given time. 
 
Opposition: Borrowed Election Reforms Inadequate 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) In a July 1 meeting in the Ambassador's office, 
MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai and Deputy Secretary General 
Gift Chimanikire briefed the staffdel on the opposition's 
situation and posture with respect to elections.  Tsvangirai 
judged that the election's outcome was predetermined, 
regardless of reforms.  The imploding economy, a compromised 
judiciary, inadequate access to media, and a government 
defiant to national and international opinion stacked the 
deck against the MDC. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) According to Tsvangirai, the government's 
announced electoral reforms were an admission that the 
existing framework was unfair.  He noted that many of the 
reforms were taken from the MDC's playbook.  Nonetheless, 
the proposals appeared not to address fully the five 
conditions laid out in the MDC "RESTORE" election demand 
document: rule of law (disbanding of militia, de- 
politicization of police); independent election commission; 
restoration of basic rights (repeal of AIPPA, POSA); popular 
confidence in system (adjustments to voting process; and 
integrity of voting secrecy.  The party would continue to 
mobilize domestic and international support for 
implementation of SADC standards.  Tsvangirai reiterated 
that participating in elections without the MDC's conditions 
being met would be futile, and the party would reserve 
decision on a potential boycott.  In the meantime, it would 
continue to collaborate on a platform with civil society, 
whose support he considered crucial. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Tsvangirai recognized the potentially important 
role of churches in effecting change.  He reported that the 
Mutare bishops troika had informed the party of ruling party 
plans on electoral reforms.  The troika had acted as a 
conduit in conveying to ZANU-PF the MDC's election demands 
as set out in RESTORE. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Chimanikire reported on a meeting the previous 
week in South Africa between MDC Secretary General Welshman 
Ncube, Vice President Gibson Sibanda, himself, and South 
African President Mbeki.  The MDC delegation told Mbeki that 
there had been no movement on talks with ZANU-PF.  They 
urged the need to have a joint parliamentary-presidential 
election and for Mugabe to commit to step down.  (Note: The 
next presidential election is slated for 2008.  End note.) 
Mbeki had told them he expected the ZANU-PF politburo by the 
end of June would authorize a negotiating delegation. 
 
¶18.  Tsvangirai asserted that Mbeki remained potentially 
crucial but lamented that Mbeki never used the personal 
channel established between them.  He observed that Mbeki 
tended to use indirect means to communicate and had made 
misrepresentations in the past, leading to an "uneasiness" 
between them.  Tsvangirai noted that the party would 
continue to reach out to other African leaders, and that 
Sibanda was seeking meetings with the leaders of Senegal, 
Ghana, Kenya, and the AU.  He urged that the USG maintain 
pressure on Mbeki and others in the region, particularly 
with an eye to next month's scheduled SADC Summit in 
Mauritius. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) In a July 3 meeting with the staffdel in his 
home, MDC MP and Secretary for Legal Affairs David Coltart 
elaborated further on election themes.  Some of the proposed 
election reforms would be helpful to the MDC but not 
decisively so.  The party was very cash-strapped and 
handicapped by the ruling party's exploitation of state 
machinery for campaign purposes.  Despite intimidation and 
other challenges, the MDC was remarkably healthy, albeit 
quiet for now.  It was mobilizing for elections, and he 
reported that he had received 100 percent support in a local 
caucus to confirm his candidacy in the upcoming election. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) Coltart asserted that the ruling party had no 
intention of allowing the opposition to win more than a few 
token seats in March.  According to Coltart, ruling party 
fears of retribution over massacres during the 1980s and 
vested interests accumulated during the past four years of 
land reform squelched any hope that the party could reform 
itself.  He predicted that its pervasively oppressive 
character would not change regardless of the outcome of 
elections or the health of the opposition.  Even government 
institutions such as the legislature and judiciary would 
remain incapable of exerting independent checks and 
balances.  Only decisive internal and external pressure 
could force change. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Coltart characterized ZANU-PF's election platform 
as built on four central lies: the economy was improving; a 
bumper harvest was in; the GOZ was attacking corruption; and 
the MDC was finished.  He claimed that much of the 
international community had bought into some or all of these 
lies.  He emphasized the importance of the international 
community remaining resolute in the face of growing stasis. 
Given the centrality of food manipulation to ruling party 
control of the populace, it was essential that donors 
planned an effective response to the inevitable GOZ plea for 
food aid once the elections were concluded to the ruling 
party's satisfaction.  In this vein, Coltart recognized that 
the truly needy had to be supported but urged that donors 
use their leverage to force the GOZ to open their books, de- 
politicize food, and establish more effective and 
transparent political and economic policies.  He noted that 
the generosity of countries like the United States had 
allowed the regime to survive to date. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) In closing, Coltart urged the USG to use United 
Nations organs to press the GOZ.  He sought support for a 
"responsibility to protect" doctrine advocated by the 
Canadian Prime Minister at the most recent UNGA as a 
foundation for responsible humanitarian intervention. 
 
Civil Society: International Community Must Press 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶23.  (SBU) At a lunch with the staffdel June 30 at USAID, a 
group of prominent NGO representatives offered perspectives 
on the upcoming elections.  Many cast outside engagement as 
potentially decisive in balancing the electoral playing 
field and some credited South African pressure with ZANU- 
PF's proposed reforms.  The upcoming SADC summit could prove 
pivotal to the ruling party's ability to sell its election 
to domestic and international audiences; as such,  it 
offered the international community a point of leverage that 
should be exploited.  Specifically, the USG should press 
individual SADC members to adopt meaningful standards in 
Mauritius.  Of central importance was going beyond election 
administration to address environmental issues like media 
access, freedom to campaign, and political violence. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) One participant cited growing tensions within the 
party as contributing to some impetus for reform.  Old 
ideologues who were not genuine reformists were supporting 
reforms for short-term political gain within the context of 
internal personality-driven power struggles.  While Mugabe's 
supremacy was unchallenged, internal party elections and 
power shifts could have a tremendous impact on the conduct 
of future elections and the health of civil society.  That 
said, the ruling party lacked any genuine constituents for 
reform and the witch-hunt atmosphere prevailing under the 
party's counter-corruption efforts was chilling open 
discussion and fueling counter-productive posturing. 
 
¶25.  (SBU) Echoing Gula-Ndebele, some noted potential 
constitutional complications associated with the reform 
proposals.  Postponement of elections until June - permitted 
by the Constitution and not without precedent - might be 
advisable.  Representatives recounted a familiar litany of 
problems in the election environment: a climate of impunity 
for violent ruling party supporters, opposition's 
inaccessibility to media outlets, contraction of the 
independent media, Tsvangirai's outstanding treason trial 
verdict, and abuse of food.  Placement of National Youth 
Service graduates ("Green Bombers") throughout the civil 
service and economy to spy on and intimidate the general 
populace was cited as a growing systemic problem.  Domestic 
politics in South Africa presented an additional 
complication: the land issue's continued importance there 
and the fact that many South Africans regarded Mugabe as a 
"messiah" had to weigh heavily in any South African 
politician's calculations on policy toward Zimbabwe. 
 
Bishops: Still Engaged 
---------------------- 
 
¶26. At a dinner with the staffdel at the Ambassador's 
residence June 30, Bishops Trevor Manhanga and Patrick 
Mutume (Bishop Bakare, the troika's third pillar, was unable 
to attend) described their views on elections and related 
issues.  They advised that ZANU-PF Party Chairman John Nkomo 
outlined for them the previous week elements of planned 
electoral reform essentially consistent with reported 
versions.  They also met at length with ZANU-PF Information 
Secretary (and Mugabe confidant) Nathan Shamuyarira at 
 
SIPDIS 
length.  Nkomo had conceded the procedural and timing 
difficulties presented by the apparent need for a 
constitutional amendment in order to establish an 
independent election commission.  The bishops said any issue 
implicating a schedule for Mugabe's departure appeared 
problematic. 
 
¶27. (SBU) The bishops concluded that the reforms were 
"serious" but said that Nkomo was unable to offer specifics 
on key issues, such as the commission's actual independence. 
"Chinamasa (Minister for Justice) is still working on them." 
The bishops were led to believe that current Registrar- 
General Mudede and Minister for Home Affairs Mohadi would 
have no meaningful role in implementing the reformed system. 
¶28.  (SBU) The bishops advised that they would seek to meet 
with Mbeki and Tanzanian President Mkapa in an effort to 
stimulate more pressure on Mugabe within the SADC community. 
They characterized Mbeki as frustrated; he realized that 
Mugabe did not view him as a peer.  The bishops suggested 
that on a personal level, Mozambican President Chissano and 
Kenneth Kaunda would have better rapport with Mugabe.  Mbeki 
remained a potentially pivotal player, however, and had 
suggested earlier that Mugabe agreed to move a Presidential 
election up to 2005. 
 
¶29.  (SBU) The bishops explained that the ruling party's 
proposed electoral reforms were intended principally for 
external consumption but could be complicated by succession 
politics within the ruling party.  ZANU-PF remained a united 
party to the outside world but conflicting aspirations to 
the presidency were fragmenting and paralyzing it within. 
 
Other Meetings 
-------------- 
 
¶30.  (SBU) During their visit here, the staffdel also met 
separately with Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono (ref A); 
local directors of from World Food Program, World Vision, 
CARE, and Catholic Relief Services; displaced farm workers; 
representatives of Justice for Agriculture; members of the 
Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN); and a bipartisan 
group of parliamentarians.  They also visited a number of 
USAID-funded projects, including business opportunity 
centers, a center to support AIDS orphans, and a clinic that 
promotes the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV/AIDS. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶31.  (SBU) The staffdel visit presented a timely opportunity 
to canvass major players on proposed electoral reforms that 
occupy center political stage here.  The wide-ranging 
discussions confirmed our assessment that the government 
assembled its proposals without much formal input from the 
outside but drew significantly from outside ideas - indeed, 
the ESC, the MDC, and South Africa all appear to be in 
position to take some credit.  The opposition and civil 
society appear prepared to engage seriously on the issues 
but are not optimistic that the playing field will be 
leveled. 
 
¶32.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: We share the view that the ruling 
party's efforts in this area are geared largely to a 
regional audience.  Treatment of election standards at the 
August SADC Summit in Mauritius appears to be a diplomatic 
priority for the GOZ and, as such, a potential point of 
leverage.  In that vein, we would urge renewed USG efforts 
to engage SADC members to have SADC endorse the so-called 
SADC-PF election norms and standards and, either 
individually or as a group, to undertake efforts to press 
the GOZ to address election environment issues (media 
access, freedom to campaign, political violence) beyond the 
proposed electoral reforms. 
 
¶33.  (U) The staffdel did not have the opportunity to clear 
this message. 
 
SULLIVAN