This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 001871 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI VM ETMIN RELFREE CTERR
SUBJECT:  VIETNAMESE ACADEMICS RETAIN SUSPICIONS OF THE U.S. 
 
 
¶1.  (U)  SUMMARY:  At least some Vietnamese think tankers 
continue to view the United States with suspicion, both 
regarding our international strategy in general and actions 
more specifically toward Vietnam.  Much of the domestic 
sensitivities by these academics nowadays relate to efforts 
by "hostile forces" in the U.S. rather than to the USG 
itself, which demonstrates some progress in thinking. 
Overall, however, academic influence over GVN and CPV policy 
is likely limited at best.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Using September 11 to pursue unilateralism 
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¶2.  (U)  According to one researcher at the Communist Party 
of Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh Political Academy, the United 
States has in recent years been "taking advantage" of its 
superpower position gradually to establish a "uni-polar 
order," placing the world under its "hegemony."  U.S. 
national strategy and unilateralism have become 
"increasingly aggressive" as the USG "continues to 
interfere" in the internal affairs of many countries, the 
academic commented, while enhancing its relations with 
traditional military allies and trying to prevent potential 
competitors from Asia and Europe from playing important 
roles in international security issues.  September 11th was 
a turning point in world politics, after which the U.S. took 
advantage of its "victim status" to seek a speedier 
unipolarization process, he added. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Separately, a researcher from the Institute of 
American Studies (IAS) analyzed that, with its post- 
September 11 "alliance," the U.S. had strengthened its 
central position and created an "unprecedented change" in 
its relations with major powers such as Russia, China, 
India, and Pakistan.  He claimed that the U.S. had thereby 
conveniently added the "counterterrorism pretext" to earlier 
campaigns for globalization and human rights "protection" to 
safeguard its own interests throughout the world. 
 
¶4.  (U)  Another researcher from the Ministry of Defense's 
Military Strategy Institute argued separately that, after 
September 11, the U.S. had changed its focus from Europe to 
the Asia - Pacific region, and took advantage of the 
"counterterrorism pretext" to "lure, bargain, and build up" 
pressure on other countries to join the U.S.-led 
"Counterterrorism alliance."  The adjustments in U.S. global 
strategy towards the Asia - Pacific region had actually made 
the regional and international situation "more complicated 
and difficult," he concluded. 
 
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Closer to home 
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¶5.  (U)  The IAS researcher further noted that adjustments 
in U.S. security policy have had an "inevitable" impact on 
Vietnam, albeit "indirectly," as "Vietnam does not have 
terrorists."   A researcher at the MFA's Institute for 
International Relations (IIR) opined separately that, 
although Vietnam had cooperated well with the U.S. on this 
front, the two countries still do "not have much to do 
together" in this fight, apart from checking bank accounts, 
assets, and immigration records of suspected or known 
terrorists. 
 
¶6.  (U)  Recently, Vietnam and the U.S. have taken "big 
steps" in developing their economic, political, diplomatic, 
military, and cultural ties, according to the IAS 
researcher, but still encounter disputes and serious 
disagreements concerning the catfish/basa shrimp dumping 
cases, textiles, human rights, democracy, religion, and 
ethnicity.  His conclusion was that the U.S. is trying to 
"direct" Vietnam toward economic and political reforms that 
are in the U.S. interest. 
 
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Threat levels 
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¶7.  (U)  The MOD researcher claimed that USG campaigns on 
democracy and human rights in Vietnam reflected a desire to 
impose U.S. values and gradually to change Vietnam's 
political regime, a "real threat" to the CPV and GVN. 
According to the researcher, the U.S. will not give up the 
policy of "interference" in Vietnam's internal affairs even 
as the bilateral relationship continues to develop. 
Separately, the IIR researcher predicted that there would be 
no breakthroughs in U.S.-Vietnam relations in the immediate 
future, since they "have already developed to the 
temporarily desired extent," except for military-to-military 
contacts. 
 
¶8. (U)  In a March 2004 article in the CPV's "Communist 
Review," Dr. Nguyen Van Long, Deputy Director of the Dong 
Nai Provincial Propaganda Commission, claimed ongoing 
"attempts by the hostile forces to sabotage socialism," 
resorting to comprehensive, violent and anti-revolutionary 
measures to reduce the power of or even "kill" the CPV.  He 
described many recent anti-Vietnam campaigns in the West in 
which the "hostile forces" -- notably, overseas Vietnamese 
in the U.S. -- publicly "slandered, distorted, attacked, and 
smeared" the CPV.  He cited a recent letter to Vietnamese 
leaders, in which "anti-socialism individuals" objected to 
"the dictatorship by the CPV leaders" and called on CPV 
leaders "to accept necessary changes, eliminate regulations 
in the constitution and laws concerning their indispensable 
leadership rights and return to the Vietnamese the rights to 
decide their fate and that of their country."  He noted a 
separate request by "exiled" Pham Chinh Tam that the CPV 
"surrender" and be replaced with the so-called "national 
council or convention."  He explained the recent 
establishment by overseas "hostile forces" of the "so-called 
'Vietnam National Party'" as a "plot to launch massive 
campaigns to win over communism," and establish a multi- 
party society and pluralism. 
 
¶9.  (U)  In a May 2004 article also in the "Communist 
Review," Dr. Le Binh of the CPV's Ho Chi Minh Political 
Academy critiqued perceived "attempts to take advantage of 
religion and ethnicity against Vietnam's revolution cause." 
According to Dr. Binh, "hostile forces" pay "special 
attention" to these issues to "sabotage socialism."  He 
compared these efforts to the collapse of socialism in 
Poland and socialist countries in Eastern Europe, while 
insisting that "hostile forces" are now "taking advantage of 
religion and ethnicity" to conduct "peaceful evolution" and 
"create violence" to overthrow the GVN, with special 
attention to the Northwest and Central Highlands.  He 
claimed that these "hostile forces" have taken advantage of 
Vietnam's policy of open door and multilateralism to 
influence Protestants here in order to "create disorder" and 
damage "solidarity," including "illegal missionary work to 
instigate" ethnic people in the Central Highlands to stage 
"violent" unrest in February 2001 and April 2004.  In 
addition, the "hostile forces" have recently directed their 
attention to the military, he claimed, including urging that 
religious believers study in Vietnam's military academies. 
Dr. Binh specifically criticized the US-based Ksor Kok for 
seeking an "independent Dega state" as well as "one very 
wicked plot" by "hostile forces overseas" to lure ethnic 
people illegally to cross the border into Cambodia to cause 
instability.  Additionally, he claimed, several VIPs in the 
USG as well as Vietnamese "reactionary elements" had 
publicly criticized the GVN for violating religious freedom 
and human rights, which he concluded was proof that they 
were "taking advantage" of freedoms of belief and religion, 
as well as the ethnicity issue, to "sabotage" the revolution 
of Vietnam. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶10.  (U)  Despite Vietnam's long history of literacy and 
education, Vietnamese academics and think tankers do not 
have a notable role in shaping national policy under the 
CPV.  It is often hard to differentiate what is written and 
said for purely ideological reasons from what the academics 
personally believe or analyze to be true.  Nor is it clear 
that their expressed views are at all representative of the 
views of a broader public, although they must reflect the 
outlook of at least some important elements of the 
leadership -- or else they would not be published or uttered 
in this hyper-sensitive and self-censoring society.  In any 
event, clearly some elements of suspicion about U.S. global 
goals and intentions specifically toward Vietnam remain 
actively under discussion in academic and official circles. 
In perhaps a small show of progress, however, the domestic 
focus against "hostile forces" has become a more generalized 
threat from overseas "reactionary" or "anti-SRV" individuals 
and groups, and no longer specifically target the USG as the 
alleged agent of change -- unlike continued negative 
comments on what the USG is supposedly doing on the 
international stage. 
BURGHARDT