This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 001512 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR JOECK 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL LY CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) - STATUS OF 
DISCUSSIONS ON LIBYAN EXTENSION REQUEST AND RABTA 
CONVERSION 
 
REF: SECSTATE 132224 (NOTAL) 
 
 This is CWC-73-04. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU)  As noted in the scene setter for the 37th 
Executive Council session (septel), one important set of 
decisions under consideration at the EC involve the requests 
from Libya and Albania for extension of their destruction 
deadlines.  At this point, the prospects for the adoption of 
both sets of extension requests is questionable.  The 
Albanian extension request is addressed in the scene setter 
cable.  Delegation has indications there may be a problems 
from some countries, notably France and Germany, with 
providing "in principle" extensions for Libya and Albania. 
In the recent past, they have expressed 
displeasure/disapproval over the use of this mechanism and 
seem to regret that its use was adopted with regard to U.S. 
and Russian extensions.  Delegation expects those concerns to 
be expressed in the run-up to the EC, and probably raised 
during the EC, though it remains unclear whether the strength 
of France and Germany's disagreement is sufficient for them 
to refuse to join consensus. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Delegation also notes that the subject of the 
Albanian and Libyan extension requests has become the 
catalyst for reviving another controversial issue thought to 
have been put behind us; site visits.  Germany and France 
have intonated, with the apparent support of other WEOG 
members, for including site visits as an element of the 
Libyan and Albanian extension request decision documents.  In 
the course of various conversations, Germany, France, and 
Netherlands have indicated they believe it is also necessary 
to revive site visits in Russia.  WEOG delegations generally 
appear to be dissatisfied and restless over what they see as 
a pervasive and continuing failure on the part of Russia to 
meet its Convention obligations. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) With regard to the Libyan conversion request for 
Rabta, the U.S./U.K./Italy/Libya proposal has been previewed 
with the Western Group.  The discussion indicates that the 
U.S. and others will need to do a substantial amount of 
spade-work with other delegations in the run-up to the EC and 
at the EC itself in order to assuage various concerns.  While 
the conversion request will probably not be adopted in June, 
it will be important to do the work necessary to ensure its 
adoption in October.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
LIBYAN EXTENSION REQUEST 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  There is no indication that any delegation holds 
principled opposition to the Libyan request for new 
destruction deadlines.  In fact, there is a strong general 
feeling that it is important to show that the OPCW is willing 
to find a practical solution to the problems facing new 
States Parties.  The only problem that has arisen is the 
concern some delegations (particularly Germany and France) 
have with "in principle" deadline extensions.  Similar 
concerns have been noted regarding the Albanian extension 
request, and were expressed last year with regard to U.S. and 
Russian deadline extensions. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  We fully anticipate that France, Germany and 
others may continue to harp on this issue up to and at the 
EC.  During this period, it will be important for the U.S. to 
work with other delegations and emphasize that "in principle" 
extensions are nothing new to the organization.  What was 
acceptable for the U.S. and Russia should certainly be 
acceptable for Libya.  Ultimately, we have our doubts that 
France, Germany or others would be willing to break consensus 
on the Libyan request.  In the absence of a good alternative, 
which has not been presented to us by France or Germany, they 
will be hard-pressed to bear the onus of having denied the 
Libyan extension request. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
LIBYA - RABTA CONVERSION - FRENCH VIEWS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) With regard to creating a mechanism by which to 
permit the conversion of Libya's chemical weapons production 
facility at Rabta for purposes not inconsistent with the 
Convention, it is apparent that France and Germany have 
difficulties with the current U.S./UK/Italian/Libyan 
approach.  The French delegation has stated that while it has 
no principled objection either to the concept of converting 
Rabta, or the use of a technical change as a means for 
enabling such a conversion, it does not favor the 
case-by-case approach laid out in our proposal.  France 
specifically has expressed concern this approach will lead to 
the arbitrary, unequal application of standards for future 
conversion, along with the attendant legal difficulties. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The French delegation, allegedly under instructions 
from Paris, has presented an alternative proposal for a 
technical change (text faxed back to AC/CB, AC/VC) that has 
the practical effect of re-starting the conversion clock for 
latecomers by extending the conversion period to twelve years 
from EIF of the Convention.  This text would have the effect, 
France asserts, of keeping pressure on newcomers to complete 
their conversions quickly, while at the same time preserving 
the equal treatment of all SPs under the convention. 
 
Begin Proposed French Text: 
 
"For those countries having ratified or adhered to the 
Convention after the 29th April 2003 (sixth anniversary of 
EIF), conversion of a chemical weapons production facility 
shall be completed not later than twelve years after entry 
into force of this Convention". 
 
End Proposed French Text. 
 
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FRG VIEWS 
--------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Germany has stated that since the conversion 
request has not yet been submitted it does not envision any 
real action being taken on the request until the October EC, 
vice this June.  Nevertheless, Germany has emphasized that it 
is not expressing a lack of urgency, simply that there is 
some time to work it.  Moreover Germany has indicated that in 
their view the timeframe for conversion as set out in the 
Convention is not "technical or administrative" and thus 
cannot be changed by a technical change, as is currently 
proposed.  Rather, such a change is substantive.  Germany 
will not make this argument publicly, but noted that others, 
like Iran and perhaps other NAM countries, may in fact make 
such an argument. 
¶9.  (SBU) Germany has also expressed concern that Russia may 
take advantage of the proposed technical change mechanism to 
attempt to do likewise with destruction deadline extension 
requests.  Russia could claim that a technical change for 
extending the conversion deadline is no different than for 
changing destruction deadlines and that destruction deadlines 
should be treated the same way in the future. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) As a bureaucratic matter, any technical change to 
the Convention would require processing through sixteen state 
parliaments, as well as Germany's national parliament. 
Germany does not rule this out as a possibility, but noted 
that if this is the course of action chosen, this is what 
they would be up against domestically.  The saxitoxin case of 
a few years ago presented a model or example for what they 
would have to do.  Thus, rather than pursuing a technical 
change to permit the Rabta conversion, Germany would prefer 
to have the change brought about through report language or 
an EC decision document.  Germany has no objection to the 
actual text of the technical change we have proposed, only 
the use of a technical change itself. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) To this extent, the French and German positions 
are precisely the opposite of one another; the French do not 
mind the mechanism of a technical change, but do not like the 
text we have proposed while the Germans do not mind the text, 
but want a different mechanism.  We would emphasize that 
apart from contradicting each other, the French and German 
positions are, at different times and in different ways, not 
only contradictory, but also vacuous. 
 
-------------- 
U.S. RESPONSES 
-------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  During meetings with France and Germany, as well 
as UK and Italy, our respective delegations provided the 
following responses to rebut the French and German positions. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  First, re-setting the clock for another six 
years, starting April 29, 2003, as France proposes, actually 
has the opposite effect from pressuring new SPs to complete 
conversion quickly.  Using Rabta as an example, it does not 
seem reasonable to assume it will require six years to 
complete the conversion.  But under the French proposal the 
Libyans would actually have until April 29, 2009, to complete 
their conversion.  Thus, far from pressuring them to complete 
their conversion, the lack of flexibility by the CSP to set 
an earlier date would actually serve to grant more time than 
is needed or reasonable. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Second, the equal treatment argument does not 
wash since, under France's proposal, an SP joining the 
convention in 2008, for example, would only have one year to 
complete a conversion.  If we were faced, as is the case with 
Libya, with a compelling case for permitting the conversion, 
the SP in question would only have one year to complete it. 
This did not seem like "equal" treatment, or a reasonable 
approach.  More important, with its lack of flexibility to 
set a date, the practical effect of France's position would 
be to either deny the conversion or to require further action 
by the EC and CSP to enable the SP to go beyond the year 
remaining to it. 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  Third, equal treatment was not the law of the 
land.  There were other provisions in the Convention that 
allowed for dissimilar treatment of SPs, depending upon 
circumstances. 
¶16.  (SBU)  Fourth, Germany's argument for a decision 
document or report language also seems untenable.  While 
changing the deadline for conversion does not require an 
actual Convention amendment, recording it in the manner 
Germany was proposing would completely trivialize the action 
and invite exactly the kind of effort by Russia to adopt a 
similar strategy with regard to destruction deadlines that 
Germany was wants to avoid.  We understood Germany's desire 
to avoid parliamentary involvement, but a decision document 
or report language is not appropriate for a decision or 
action of this significance. 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  Generally, we emphasized that our proposal is the 
best of several admittedly imperfect options; it definitely 
had its warts but, overall, was defensible and represented 
the quickest way to move forward.  Germany allowed that the 
parliamentary process could probably be engaged in the 
timelines laid out in the Convention anyway -- that is they 
could do their domestic piece of the process in the same or 
less time than it will take for the request to wend its way 
through the OPCW process -- so they would probably not have 
to delay anything. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) In analyzing France's behavior, several things 
suggest that its proposal is being driven locally, rather 
than originating in Paris.  First, in basic respects it is 
not well thought out, was not well defended when it was 
presented, and the text itself is "kind of pathetic", as UK 
put it.  It does not seem like a "real" proposal that has 
been carefully vetted.  Moreover, the French delegation 
indicated that the only place their counterproposal was going 
to be proffered was here in The Hague.  There is to be no 
notification by the GOF via capitals. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Delegation believes Germany's parliamentary claim 
is serious.  But even the Germans admit that engaging their 
parliament on this could be readily done and need not delay 
the process.  Delegation believes that on further reflection 
they will agree that, intellectually, they cannot argue that 
report language or a decision document would be more 
appropriate than the technical change.  Especially given 
their concerns over Russia using this as a precedent. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) Given the unconstructive approach taken so far by 
France and Germany, delegation believes that the best chance 
for success is, in the near term, to essentially ignore the 
French proposal and to proceed with building support among EC 
members, especially African and Arab countries.  As noted 
above, their arguments to support their position are very 
weak and we do not believe they will gain traction with other 
Council members.  However, as a later concession to France 
and to gain its support, delegation sees no serious harm to 
our proposal by adding a provision along the lines France has 
proposed.  We have in mind text along the lines of "In no 
case shall an extension exceed six years after entry into 
force of the Convention for such a State Party".  The 
practical effect would be to preserve our current proposal, 
while at the same time assuring that newly-acceding States 
Parties are not granted a longer period of time for 
completing conversions than original members were given. 
 
¶21.  (SBU) After consulting with UK and Italy, delegation 
agreed to a UK briefing to WEOG on 15 June on the proposal. 
UK had drafted a set of talking points/non-paper which 
Delegation made inputs to ahead of time.  Several WEOG 
members responded to the presentation by echoing France's 
"equal treatment" mantra, most notably Canada and Spain. 
Based on the number and similarity of these interventions, 
delegation speculates that France and/or Germany had been 
busy in the day or two prior to the WEOG meeting.  Whatever 
the origin, however, skepticism of the case-by-case approach 
was widespread, as was support for the notion of equal 
treatment. 
 
---------- 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
¶22.  (SBU) UK delegation has taken the step of requesting 
London's support for a high-level demarche to Paris, Berlin, 
and Ottawa, requesting their delegations be directed to 
assume a more accommodating and constructive approach.  UK 
indicated 10 Downing Street had been slugged in its cable. 
The UK delegation has been given to understand that London 
supports such a demarche.  Delegation believes it is worth 
considering whether Washington may not wish to do likewise. 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Delegation believes that arguing effectively 
against the equal treatment position of France and others 
will be important to gaining support for our proposal.  We 
also believe that the two best arguments against the equal 
treatment principle are that it contradicts the "maintaining 
pressure" principle, as described in paragraph 13 above, and 
that "unequal treatment" has already been clearly established 
as a precedent in the context of establishing new deadlines 
for the destruction of Category 1 CW.  Indeed, also before 
the Council this session are requests for extensions of 
deadlines for Albania and Libya.  As with similar deadline 
extension requests for the US and Russia, the approach being 
proposed is for the Council to gather as much information as 
possible and, based on that information, make a decision for 
a new deadline date that is realistic and reflects the 
information available.  It is not a "one size fits all" 
approach but a case-by-case approach that preserves for the 
States Parties their ability to exercise judiciousness and 
the practical effect of which is to establish different dates 
for different States Parties.  While these dates are 
different, they would nonetheless appropriate to the 
particular set of circumstances at hand. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) After the appropriate African and Arab states have 
been demarched in Capitals concerning the proposal, we 
believe it is important to follow up here with a meeting or 
series of meetings, presenting the same material and urging 
their unrestrained support for this initiative.  Delegation 
understands this is consistent with the plans contemplated in 
Washington and agreed generally among U.S., UK, and Italy. 
Upon receipt of the relevant guidance, delegation intends to 
host a meeting of African and Arab delegations along the 
lines described.  We intend to suggest that the Libyan 
representative personally appeal to others to request 
guidance from their capitals to offer support during the 
upcoming Council session. 
 
¶25.  (U)  Javits sends. 
SOBEL