This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 001431 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR JOECK 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WEEKLY WRAP-UP 
FOR JUNE 4, 2004 
 
 
This is CWC-69-04. 
 
---------------------------- 
OPTIMIZATION OF VERIFICATION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  In a June 1 meeting, Sophie Moal (France) and 
Peter Beerwerth (FRG) informed the U.S. Del that they believe 
anything which the U.S. does on optimization, including the 
trial run in the fall, will require Executive Council 
approval.  They want some kind of paper to be proffered by 
the Technical Secretariat (TS) setting out what will happen 
during the trial and afterward, and for the EC to consider it 
at EC-37 or EC-38, before going ahead with the trial.  France 
and Germany stated that they want the TS document presented 
to the EC and approved, perhaps by silence procedures, before 
going ahead with the trial run of optimization at Anniston. 
They are not, apparently, going to be satisfied with an 
explanatory paper as they had asked for previously. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  We emphasized that what the French and Germans 
were proposing was far beyond what had been required of any 
other possessor.  As reflected on p. 24 - 25 of the 
Verification Implementation Report, optimization already has 
been implemented in Korea, India, and Russia.  Beerwerth 
tried to assert that France and Germany are totally sanguine 
about the U.S. demil program, but have to watch the Russians 
very closely.  It is worth noting that in the view of the UK 
delegation, Germany's assertion that it is only the Russians 
they are concerned about is misleading; they (Germany) also 
harbor misgivings about the U.S. program.  We pointed out 
that Russia had already implemented optimization.  Reduction 
of inspectors at Gorniy was a fait accompli, and the event 
came and went without so much as a whimper from Germany, 
France, or anyone other than the U.S. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  It was hard to accept statements of concern about 
the Russians, we argued, if the French and Germans are trying 
to hold the U.S. to a standard that was not required of 
Russia or any other possessor.  This was not what the U.S. 
expected as a response to transparency, which was in direct 
response to calls from, most vociferously, France and 
Germany.  We will continue discussing this with the French 
and Germans, and coordinate with the TS. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In subsequent conversations, both France and 
Germany appeared to soften their positions and backed away 
from an outright call for EC approval.  Indeed, France 
repeated that they simply were looking for information and a 
better understanding of the optimization effort at Anniston, 
and in particular the material changes optimization would 
bring about in the verification regime.  At delegation's 
request, the TS has produced a lengthy non-paper setting out 
the information France asked for, on a strictly informal 
basis.  The French and German response to this paper, when it 
is circulated, will provide a more positive indication of 
whether they will be satisfied with this approach, or press 
for EC action.  Delegation is not convinced that the 
provision of this paper will not be followed by a request 
from France and Germany that it be assigned an "EC number" 
and put before the Council, if only for its information. 
 
----------------------------------- 
ABERDEEN - END POINT OF DESTRUCTION 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Mark Matthews (U.K.) asked whether the U.S. was 
changing its view on the issue of Aberdeen, and specifically 
on the end point of destruction issue.  He requested that the 
Del convey to Washington the message that everyone, including 
the U.K., would strenuously oppose any change in policy on 
that matter.  He observed, without any further elaboration, 
that for France it would be "the last straw."  We suspect 
that Matthews was being somewhat over-dramatic in order to 
make his point.  However, we provide the U.K. view simply to 
note the need for a substantial amount of spade-work with 
other delegations should Washington wish to put forth a new 
policy regarding EPOD.  It would be critical to emphasize 
that key provisions of the Convention (regarding verification 
in particular) would not be weakened and that the U.S. has no 
intention of undermining the Convention. 
 
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SITE VISITS 
----------- 
 
¶6.  (U)  At the June 1 WEOG, Dutch Amb. Mark Vogelaar raised 
the question of conducting site visits to Russian facilities, 
and stated his belief that the report from the last such 
visit to Gorniy and Kambarka pointed to the possibility of 
future such visits.  The Del noted that the provision in the 
Russian deadline extension that had called for such visits 
had been excised during our negotiations with Russia.  We 
further reminded everyone that this had been the subject of a 
fairly big row between the U.S., Russia, and others, 
particularly Germany, who were incensed that we agreed to 
omit the visit text from the Russian document. 
 
¶7.  (U)  We also emphasized that the U.S. position was at 
that time, and remains, that we were not then and are not now 
going to accept site visits as a quid pro quo for Russian 
visits.  Finally, we observed that, to the extent the "hook" 
that had hitherto obliged Russia to accept visits had been 
deliberately done away with, Russia was very unlikely to 
accept them without a specific commitment that the U.S. would 
do likewise.  The issue had been for them, at the time we 
debated it, "equal treatment".  That had not changed, and a 
sentence in a visit report was not likely to persuade Russia 
it was still under an obligation to accept visits. 
 
¶8.  (U)  During the debate, France stated, supported by 
Germany and apparently the Netherlands, that site visits must 
be an element of extension requests.  The publication of the 
Libyan and Albanian extension request documents was the event 
that gave rise to this line of discussion, and it was 
explicitly stated that these documents would need to be 
changed to include visits.  All of which indicates a renewed 
debate over the issue of site visits, including in the U.S. 
Vogelaar spoke to us after the meeting to say that perhaps 
the idea could be made more palatable by not making visits 
contingent upon making or not making deadlines, but could be 
cast as a transparency measure for all possessors, including 
the Indians who have met all treaty deadlines for 
destruction.  We were non-committal and said we would pass 
the idea back to Washington.  We will need guidance for the 
upcoming EC on how to deal with the question of site visits 
generally, and vis a vis Albania and Libya in particular. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Delegation notes also that Germany, supported 
apparently by France, has expressed disaffection with the 
idea of extensions "in principle".  Though it is obviously a 
tool that has been used by the U.S. and Russia for past 
deadline extensions, they remain uncomfortable with the idea. 
 Though no specific reason was given, delegation surmises 
that the basis of their misgivings is that, once an "in 
principle" extension is in place, the possessor in question 
is, in their view at least, relieved of the pressure to 
expedite destruction.  Delegation recalls that during our 
last round of discussion with the Russians regarding their 20 
and 45 percent deadline extension requests, the Russian 
delegation did in fact state that they were relatively 
unconcerned about setting a date for the 20 percent deadline 
because it had been extended in principle already, and they 
were therefore legally in compliance with the Convention. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Delegation received and is in the process of 
acting on guidance for this subject and anticipates that in 
the course of that process we will gain a clearer 
understanding of the depth of Germany and France's misgivings. 
 
----------------- 
DELEGATION SPACES 
----------------- 
 
¶11.  (U)  The Del was informed by Rob Simpson, head of the 
Office of Confidentiality and Security, that the physical 
area in which the Del office is located is in the process of 
being incorporated into a grand vision by the Dutch for a 
"World Forum".  The concept is apparently already approved 
and planning well under way to combine OPCW, ICTY, and to 
move in other organizations (Europol was mentioned) into a 
single compound not accessible to traffic, but linked by open 
areas and walkways.  It will occupy basically all the real 
estate now occupied by OPCW, Congress Centrum, the building 
in which the Del is located, the ICTY building, and perhaps 
more.  They apparently are planning to start moving dirt 
around sometime in 2006.  Simpson said he thought there was 
actually a model of this new forum on display in city hall. 
Simpson provided some information that has been sent back to 
AC/CB. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
FINANCIAL REGULATIONS - ARTICLE IV/V PAYMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U)  On June 3, facilitator Peter van Brakel (Canada) 
held the latest consultation on amendments to Financial 
Regulations.  The focus of discussion was on FR 5.4 and 
payment of Article IV/V invoices, and delegations had the 
following three concerns: 
 
-- agreement for partial payment of invoices (despite the 
fact that the Russian delegation had indicated Moscow could 
not accept partial payment); 
-- a designated period to bring to an end discussion over 
disputed parts of an invoice; 
-- some mechanism so that possessor states could not use a 
question about an invoice to delay payment for an unlimited 
period of time. 
 
¶13.  (U)  The FRG delegation tabled the following proposal on 
which participants suggested modifications.  The text has 
been distributed electronically by van Brakel, and has been 
sent electronically to AC/CB.  The broad outlines are: 
 
-- creation of financial rule 5A which will contain all of 
the following items; 
-- contributions subject to Article IV/V shall be due and 
payable within 90 days after receipt of the invoice; 
-- payment of the undisputed amounts of an invoice will be 
within 90 days; 
-- if there is a dispute over the invoice, the possessor 
state must notify the TS within 30 days of receipt of the 
invoice specifying the basis for the dispute; 
-- the TS must respond to the possessor state within 60 days 
of receipt of the invoice by the possessor state; 
-- the TS and possessor state should settle the dispute 
within 90 days after the invoice is received by the possessor 
state; 
-- the possessor state should pay the resolved amount within 
120 days after receipt of the invoice; 
-- should there be no resolution between the TS and possessor 
state after this total period of 90 days following receipt of 
invoice, the DG will note the dispute in the next monthly 
report on expenditures. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  The U.K., FRG and other delegations indicated to 
the U.S. Del in side-bar conversations that their concern was 
not with the U.S., but in not giving the Russians an 
opportunity to abuse flexible dispute resolution provisions. 
The resulting "penalty" noted above would be the notation in 
the DG's report, which ostensibly makes it more difficult for 
Moscow to simply notify the TS about a dispute and 
perpetually avoid paying the invoice.  Finally, it was 
noteworthy that the lengthy discussion about the text cited 
above ensued after Director of Administration Schulz reported 
that, depending on the possessor state involved, only some 
8-13% of the total amount of Article IV/V invoices are 
disputed. 
 
------------ 
ICA REQUESTS 
------------ 
 
¶15.  (U)  At the request of the Technical Secretariat (TS), 
Del met with International Cooperation and Assistance (ICA) 
representatives (Bauta, Dahvahle, Kisslev) on May 28.  The 
meeting was requested to discuss the U.S.-Romanian 
Implementation Assistance Program (IAP) introduced at the 
Romanian Regional Seminar for Eastern European Group National 
Authorities.  However, it became clear the TS motivation for 
the meeting was to ask for U.S. support for ICA in four 
specific areas: 
 
1) ICA asked for U.S. assistance in pressing States Parties 
(SP) who have requested implementation-related TS training to 
commit to dates.  The TS noted four African SP (Uganda, 
Nigeria, Gambia and Zimbabwe) have informed the TS of their 
need for assistance and interest in hosting a bilateral 
workshop or training activity to assist in implementation. 
However, none of these SP has committed to specific dates and 
the requests have been outstanding for some time.  The TS 
noted difficulties in contacting anyone within these 
governments to move forward on establishing a suitable date. 
The TS indicated it would be very helpful to have the U.S. 
weigh-in in capitals to urge these SP to finalize and host 
assistance visits. 
 
2) ICA requested the U.S. offer surplus computer equipment 
that the TS could distribute to SP lacking resources to 
assist them in meeting their Art. VII obligations.  Del 
indicated we would consider any information the TS provided 
to us regarding specific requests for assistance, but that 
without details, it could not make any decisions.  Del 
further noted that, to date, the TS has not made any specific 
request to the U.S.  The TS indicated it would work to 
"discretely" provide requests and also survey SP regarding 
implementation obstacles, including shortages of equipment. 
Del noted that we look forward to any information the TS 
might have regarding implementation-related requests for aid, 
and that the U.S. continues to evaluate the best ways to 
provide assistance. 
 
3) ICA requested the U.S. support an increase for ICA in 
upcoming budget negotiations, specifically, that the U.S. 
support the allocation of an additional P-2 position to 
handle internet-related program activities within ICA.  The 
TS reps commented that many of the agenda items designed to 
 
SIPDIS 
inform/assist SP in implementation are held up because ICA 
lacks the time, personnel and expertise needed to put such 
information online via a secure national authority 
coordination website.  Del noted the request and inquired 
whether, if the P-2 position did not materialize, the TS 
would consider allowing outsourcing of this work to a SP 
(like the U.S.) to accomplish the task?  The TS indicated it 
welcomed any programming or other web-based assistance SP 
could offer. 
 
4) ICA requested that the U.S. sponsor/support moves to 
expand ICA's reach and presence in Africa.  Specifically, ICA 
wants an OPCW official to reside in Africa and work with the 
African Union to support universality and implementation. 
Bauta indicated she had raised this with AC/CB once before 
but did not get a response. 
 
------------------------------------ 
TS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM 
 
SIPDIS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶16.  (U)  Del met with Leo Espinoza (TS/DEB) on June 4 
regarding a recap of activities during the recent Regional 
Seminar in Romania.  During the discussion, Espinoza raised a 
problem with TS assistance to Vietnam.  The TS has received a 
request from Vietnam to provide comments and input on a 
questionnaire they are assembling to identify, contact and 
request submissions from Art. VI facilities.  Espinoza 
indicated the TS simply lacks available manpower to provide 
such input.  However, he noted that the TS senses a political 
reluctance of the Vietnamese to directly contact the U.S. (or 
other SP) for assistance.  Del suggested that the TS consider 
alternatives to the U.S. playing a direct supporting role, if 
that was a problem for States Parties. 
 
¶17.  (U)  Del suggested the TS propose to the Vietnamese that 
the TS engage a third party (U.S.) to assist in review of the 
document.  In doing so, the TS would not need to reveal the 
origin of the document to the third party reviewer if that 
was sensitive, but would only note that it would solicit 
comments.  Of course, in this case the U.S. would 
unofficially know.  Espinoza said it sounded like a workable 
pretext for getting this and, maybe other, U.S. assistance to 
SP in reviewing documentation and other requests. 
 
¶18.  (U)  Javits sends. 
SOBEL