This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 002464 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR HR/CDA AND NEA/I - RSCHLICHER 
SECDEF FOR OSD - AJTORRES 
CPA BAGHDAD FOR EXECSEC - BREMER, JONES AND PMO - NASH, 
KELLEY, GIBB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2009 
TAGS: AMGT ECON EAID IT IZ PREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ POST-HANDOVER: GOI SUPPORT STRONG AND 
UNWAVERING 
 
REF: SECSTATE 134750 
 
Classified By: Economic Minister-Counselor Scott F. Kilner for reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. This message contains an action request in paragraph 7. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Citing the parallel goals of strengthening 
Iraqi security services and forging an overarching Iraqi 
national identity from a highly regionalized reality, the GOI 
has described a comprehensive plan to provide assistance to 
the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) after the transfer of 
sovereignty on June 30.  The GOI assistance package includes 
25 to 30 advisors placed in Iraqi ministries and in IRMO and 
PCO, the successor entities to the CPA Program Management 
Office.  Some thirteen of these advisors will work with the 
Iraqi Ministry of Defense alone, to coordinate analysis and 
planning as well as a comprehensive program of military and 
logistics training in both Iraq and Italy.  The GOI also 
expects to have a fully staffed Embassy in Baghdad and, for 
the first time, a consulate in Basra, by the end of the year. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
SECURITY, COORDINATION AMONG MISSIONS "CRUCIAL" 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (C) MFA Iraq Task Force Deputy Director Luigi Maccotta 
told Ecmin on June 24, in response to reftel demarche, that 
the GOI considered coordination and information sharing among 
the foreign missions in Iraq after June 30 to be "crucial," 
as the missions must band together to replace the CPA as a 
coordinating body.  Maccotta explained that this was 
especially important regarding security, and asked for 
clarification on whether security would really be left 
entirely up to each individual mission.  According to 
Maccotta, the GOI had understood that there would also be 
some limited shared support coming from the Multi-National 
Force (MNF) or from another international body such as the 
United Nations. 
 
GOI MINISTRY LIAISON OFFICERS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Aside from the roughly thirteen advisors who will work 
with the Ministry of Defense (see para 5), the GOI is also 
planning to provide nine others, most of whom will be 
existing staff asked to remain through transition.  Two of 
these Ministry Liaison Officers would work with the Ministry 
of Culture, and one each would work with the Ministries of 
Human Resources, Finance, Development and Planning, Health, 
Youth and Sports, Education and Justice.  Another one or two 
would work directly with the office of Prime Minster Iyad 
Allawi. 
 
¶5. (C) Maccotta emphasized the importance the GOI placed on 
strengthening the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi 
security services, including the Army.  Towards this end, the 
GOI is planning to have thirteen or more advisors work with 
the Ministry, a plan which has already been approved by 
Italy's Council of Ministers, according to Maccotta.  These 
advisors would also offer training, in Italy and in Iraq, 
covering a range of disciplines from the logistical to the 
tactical.  The GOI also plans to have two of its military 
officers placed within the structures of the MNF Central 
Command in Iraq, one in the office of security transition and 
another at the command level.  Specific names of military 
generals have already been identified for these two roles. 
 
CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM WITHIN IRMO AND PCO 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Building on the existing Italian presence within the 
CPA Program Management Office, the GOI plans to embed four to 
six advisors within the two PMO successor organs, the Iraq 
Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) and the Project 
Contracting Office (PCO).  One of these would be placed in 
Basra to focus on oil issues; the others would likely remain 
in Baghdad to focus on several areas, including logistics and 
water resources, Maccotta explained. 
 
GOI QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS 
-------------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) Maccotta asked for clarification in two areas, and 
requested answers to these concerns from Washington.  First, 
as mentioned in paragraph 2, the GOI had imagined there would 
be some degree of common or shared protection, such as that 
offered by the MNF around Baghdad's Green Zone.  Maccotta 
asked where this will end and where individual foreign 
mission responsibility for security will begin.  The second 
question sought confirmation that non-Americans will be 
allowed to work within IRMO and PCO, as they currently do in 
PMO.  He explained that the GOI believed that there are three 
areas in which it can provide assistance to post-handover 
Iraq - through its embassy, through the Iraqi ministries and 
through IRMO and PCO.  Washington guidance is requested on 
the above two questions. 
 
BUILDING THE ITALIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO IRAQ 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (C) The staff of the Italian Embassy in Baghdad will 
ultimately consist of four diplomats plus an ambassador, 
along with some twelve administrative staff.  The Consulate 
in Basra is scheduled to have a staff of two, plus 
administrative staff.  In addition, the GOI plans to have a 
political advisor embedded in the military camp in Nasiriyah, 
as well as two or three civilians working in the Italian 
equivalent of USAID. 
 
¶9. (C) Due to the fact that these Iraq staffing imperatives 
emerged after the current fiscal year budget had already been 
set, additional requests for funding had to be made outside 
of the normal budget cycle.  This has slowed funding 
somewhat, and will result in a gradual GOI ramp-up to full 
staffing levels.  Initial staff at the Italian Embassy in 
Baghdad is expected to consist of two diplomats plus the 
ambassador, with full staff in Baghdad and Basra in place by 
the end of 2004. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) The amount of thought the GOI has already given to 
its assistance package, including complex negotiations among 
the MFA, the Prime Minister's Office and the Council of 
Ministers, reflects how serious the GOI is about helping 
rebuild and secure post-handover Iraq.  Security for foreign 
missions in Iraq after June 30 remains a major concern and an 
area on which the GOI seeks further clarification.  The clear 
goals and specific areas for assistance outlined by Maccotta 
further indicate the pride this government feels at being 
"the third largest member of the Coalition" and a major 
stakeholder in the future security of Iraq.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶11. (U) Minimize Considered for Baghdad. 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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	2004ROME02464 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL