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Viewing cable 04ROME2245, ITALIAN ELECTIONS: PRODI AND BERLUSCONI IN THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ROME2245 2004-06-10 17:08 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

101708Z Jun 04
UNCLAS  ROME 002245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV IT ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: ITALIAN ELECTIONS:  PRODI AND BERLUSCONI IN THE 
FIRST ROUND OF THE 2006 NATIONAL ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN 
 
REF:  A) FLORENCE 75, B) ROME 1911, C) ROME 1567, D) ROME 
 
1278, E) ROME 624, F) ROME 22 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.  (U)  Italy's June 12-13 European Parliament and local 
elections are the latest contest, albeit indirect, between 
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and his once and likely 
future challenger, European Commission President Romano 
Prodi.  Italy's next national elections will almost certainly 
not occur before 2006, making Berlusconi the first Prime 
Minister in Italy's post-war history to serve a full 
five-year term, but observers and politicians alike 
acknowledge that this is the first round of a long campaign. 
The sparring occurs not only between left and right, but also 
within the coalitions, and it will continue -) at varying 
intensity -- until national elections are held.  Although 
recent events may off-set downward trends, governing 
coalition parties are likely to suffer setbacks in this 
round, but we do not foresee this leading to a breakdown in 
the coalition, nor to new unity and peace on the center-left. 
 END SUMMARY 
 
--------------- 
WHAT ELECTIONS? 
--------------- 
2.  (U)  On June 12-13, Italians nationwide will vote for the 
European Parliament (EP).  These elections are viewed with 
great interest at the national level as a barometer of 
electoral mood.  As a result of losses in 1999 European 
elections, several minor party leaders were forced to resign 
their positions, National Alliance (AN) leader Fini was 
challenged for (but kept) his party's leadership, and 
Democrats of the Left (DS) leader, then-Prime Minister, 
D'Alema was forced into minor government re-shuffling.  Only 
Berlusconi and his Forza Italia (FI) )- not then in power -- 
emerged relatively unscathed, earning the most votes.  (FI is 
unlikely to repeat that performance this year.) 
 
3.  (SBU)  At the same time, some 4500 cities will hold local 
elections.  The focus is on 30 capital cities, with the most 
politically significant race in Bologna (Ref A).  In the last 
elections, center-right candidate Giorgio Guazzaloca won 
Bologna after fifty years of leftist administrations.  To 
strengthen its profile going into national elections, the 
center-left must re-take Bologna.  Thus, it selected as its 
candidate former CGIL labor confederation leader Sergio 
Cofferati.  Cofferati brings strong name recognition and a 
built-in organizational structure from his time at the head 
of CGIL, Italy's largest (and most left-leaning) union 
federation.  Nevertheless, he is an outsider while Guazzaloca 
has strong local roots. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Sardegna is the only region to vote for a new 
local (regional level) government.  Elections for most of 
Italy's twenty regions will be held in 2005, the next battle 
in the national electoral war.  Italy's five autonomous 
regions (Sardegna, Sicily, Valle D,Aosta, Trentino 
Alto-Adige, and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia), however, vote at 
different times, according to local statutes.  The Sardegna 
elections are of interest to the United States as they could 
affect local support for construction plans to refurbish 
Italian-owned facilities used by U.S. Navy personnel.  A 
strong center-left showing could make our plans there harder 
to accomplish. 
 
------------------------------- 
TO COALESCE, OR NOT TO COALESCE 
------------------------------- 
5.  (U)  These elections are a test of strength among 
individual parties.  Because European Parliamentary elections 
are the only ones in Italy where voting occurs on a strictly 
proportional basis, they are an easy measure of each party's 
(and each leader's) popularity.  This is the chance for 
parties to see where they stand, and what their chances are 
likely to be in a national race.  At a February Olive Tree 
(the name used by the center-left coalition in national 
elections) convention, Prodi acknowledged directly that the 
real objective was 2006 national elections (an implicit 
assessment of the current Government's staying power), and 
that the European elections were only a lap of the race. 
 
6.  (U)  The center-left thus defied conventional wisdom when 
four more moderate parties united to run as a coalition for 
EP elections, the "Prodi List" (somewhat misnamed as the 
"Tricycle," given that it consists of DS, Daisy, Italian 
Social Democrats (SDI), and the tiny European Republicans). 
The coalition seals Prodi's return to the national political 
 
 
scene.  The center-left has been on a losing streak in 
Italy-wide elections since the Prodi government fell in 1998. 
 In 1999 EP elections, the DS refused a joint ticket with 
Prodi, who created his &Democrats8 party -- and took 7.7 
percent from the hide of the center-left.  In 2000 regional 
elections, the center-right won more presidencies than the 
center-left, forcing D,Alema,s resignation.  The 
center-left then lost the 2001 national elections, again 
without Prodi, and also without far-left Communist Renewal 
(RC), which was refused entrance to the coalition by the DS. 
The center-left has ultimately recognized Prodi as its best 
bet for electoral victory.  Not all are pleased with the 
choice; DS for one tried hard to find a different option.  No 
one on the center-left scene, however, can match Prodi's 
pulling power or ability to join elements of the moderate and 
further left. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Center-right parties, on the other hand, will 
stick with tradition and run separately, if under a similar 
symbol.  Although the clear victor in 1999, Berlusconi was 
willing to run on a united center-right coalition in these 
2004 elections.  Coalition partner Union of Christian 
Democrats of the Center (UDC), however, decided it wanted to 
test its strength and the coalition idea was abandoned )- 
leading to considerable internecine squabbling as electoral 
pressures built.  We expect the squabbles to continue at 
varying rhythm until the next national elections, but we do 
not expect them to bring down the coalition.  An 
exceptionally poor showing by governing coalition parties 
across the board would likely bring strong turbulence.  If 
the Tricycle scores far ahead of FI, the center-left will 
attempt to engineer the fall of the Berlusconi Government, 
but it lacks the means to accomplish this.  (The Government 
will still have its solid majority in Parliament.)  Our 
analysis remains, therefore, that the four governing partners 
will continue to see more value to working together, seeking 
further practical achievements to present the voters before 
2006. 
 
----------------- 
THE REAL FACE-OFF 
----------------- 
8.  (U)  Even more than a test of party strength, these 
elections foreshadow the expected face-off between Prodi and 
Berlusconi in 2006.  Prodi will not appear on any ballot 
(although his face appears prominently on Tricyle campaign 
posters.)  At the February Olive Tree convention, he 
declared, &I will not run as a candidate for these elections 
because I want to honor my commitments (as EC President) and 
I hope that other national executive leaders will behave in 
the same way.8  (Refs C, D, and F are our analysis of how 
well Prodi has succeeded in staying out of the campaign.) 
Berlusconi, in contrast, will lead the FI list in all five 
Italian EP electoral districts, putting his personal standing 
squarely on the line.  He made clear he would not resign as 
Prime Minister, saying his was a "symbolic candidacy." 
(Italian law prohibits him from serving concurrently as Prime 
Minister and in the EP; Ref C.)  Thus, not more than thirty 
days after he is elected (as he is certain to be, given his 
place at the head of FI's list), he will relinquish his seats 
(plural) to the next candidates on the FI list.  The 
center-left has criticized Berlusconi's move unceasingly, as 
the center-right has continuously demanded that Prodi give up 
his EC presidency in view of his overt campaigning in Italian 
elections. 
 
---------- 
THE ISSUES 
---------- 
9.  (SBU)  Details of local races aside, the issues in the 
elections are the Iraq war and Italy's Iraq policy, followed 
by the economy and the governing coalition's ability to keep 
its 2001 electoral pledges, Berlusconi's famed "Contract for 
Italy."  With its May about face to call for the withdrawal 
of Italian troops from Iraq (Ref B), the center-left made the 
political calculation that if Italian voters were asked to 
choose between war and peace, they would choose peace.  The 
left therefore disingenuously made "peace" its campaign 
platform.  The governing coalition is not running away from 
its Iraq record, however.  Berlusconi and his ministers 
maintain this Government has shown that Italy can play in the 
international big leagues.  Recent events, primarily jubilant 
scenes of the hostage release, may show the center-left to 
have put too many of its eggs in one basket. 
 
10.  (SBU)  The economy is more challenging, with the public 
overwhelmingly convinced of an increased cost of living and 
decreased purchasing power as a result of the introduction of 
the Euro.  Sluggish growth and the government,s perceived 
 
 
inability to help &get the economy moving again8 increase 
the problem for the center-right, which many supported 
expecting concrete improvement in their everyday lives. 
Interestingly, the opposition has not hammered the 
center-right excessively on this theme, perhaps because 
voters also identify the Euro with Prodi.  Berlusconi sensed 
it could be a potent political issue and tried to defuse it 
by offering tax cuts (sometimes before coordinating his 
message with fellow coalition members), one of the unrealized 
planks in his Contract with which voters readily identify. 
Governing coalition partners are also seeking to portray what 
this Government has done; as Berlusconi told coalition 
partners at a February convention, the majority must 
illustrate to the electors its accomplishments. 
 
--------- 
WHO WINS? 
--------- 
11.  (SBU)  In these "mid-term" elections, most observers 
predict setbacks for the governing coalition.  A late May 
poll shows the center-left and left attracting 47-52% of the 
voters, and the governing coalition 41-45%.  The advantage of 
the peace/war question for the opposition may have been 
undercut (some suggest significantly) by President Bush's 
June 4-5 visit, the unanimously-adopted UN resolution, the 
Government's spinning of Italy's role in getting acceptable 
language into the resolution's text, the left's new flip-flop 
hinting maybe Italian troops needn't come back after all, and 
the June 8 release of the Italian hostages.  A significant 
percentage of Italian voters remains steadfastly opposed to 
Italy's involvement in Iraq, however, and they are highly 
motivated to vote. 
 
12.  (SBU)  The lackluster performance of the economy, and -- 
in some part of the public,s eye -- of the governing 
coalition itself, contributes to a sense of malaise among 
center-right voters, including in the North, an FI 
stronghold.  Many feel disillusioned by Berlusconi and his 
coalition.  They expected something new and different, and 
many perceive they have gotten more of the same.  Avowed 
center-right voters are unlikely to vote for the left, but 
they may stay home.  Disillusioned FI voters may throw some 
weight to AN.  A question mark is the effect of Northern 
League leader Bossi's prolonged illness and his consequent 
absence from the political stage )- will Lega voters support 
their suffering leader more strongly, stay home, or place 
their votes elsewhere? 
 
13.  (U)  Given the proportional system employed, EP 
elections in Italy are more a popularity contest among 
parties than a battle between competing programs.  The 
results are fundamental for creating the coalitions that will 
compete in 2006 national elections.  The Prodi List is out to 
prove that a reformist coalition led by Romano Prodi is the 
best bet for center-left success in national elections.  The 
more radical leftist parties want to discredit efforts to 
moderate the DS, showing this to be unacceptable to the 
electorate. 
 
14.  (SBU)  On the center-right, the contest is among 
individual parties.  Berlusconi hopes for a good victory to 
show his allies their hopes must be pinned on him )- and to 
validate what he has made to some degree a referendum on his 
Government.  Second coalition partner AN, and especially DPM 
Fini, is concentrating on a modern American (or Berlusconi) 
style electoral campaign, intensely hoping for substantial 
gains in order to push for a more significant slice of the 
coalition pie.  Likewise, UDC hopes for a good enough victory 
to force Berlusconi to give this smaller ally more visibility 
in the government.  Given Umberto Bossi's unfortunate 
illness, the Northern League is probably hoping primarily 
just to stay in the game. 
 
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 2004ROME02245 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED