This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 002168 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ IR SR AF EUN NATO IAEA IRAQI FREEDOM AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS TELL A/S JONES ITALY WILL HELP PUSH 
FOR QUICK IRAQ UNSCR RESOLUTION; RESOURCE CONSIDERATIONS 
HOLDING UP DECISION ON AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENT 
 
REF: STATE 122673 
 
Classified By: DCM EMIL SKODON.  REASON:1.5 (B)(D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  During a June 4 meeting over lunch on the 
margins of President Bush's Rome visit, MFA Political 
Director Giampiero Massolo told EUR A/S Jones that the draft 
UNSC Iraq resolution was "heading for a good result in a 
relatively short time," and Italy was doing all it could to 
help.  He said that PM Berlusconi was personally engaged with 
President Putin to help smooth the way with Russia on the 
UNSCR.  Massolo suggested that an event in New York to signal 
international recognition of the interim government, followed 
by a pledging conference sometime in the future, might 
satisfy Russian calls for an international conference on 
Iraq. 
 
¶2. (C)  Massolo confided that the Ministries of Defense and 
Foreign Affairs agree that Italy should deploy a PRT to 
Afghanistan, but added that Italy's resource constraints 
would make it difficult to stand up an FSB alone.  Further, 
Italy is in the process of implementing a tax reduction 
program and is already stretched thin given its current 
world-wide deployments.  He added that Italy was thinking of 
taking the ISAF lead after Turkey.  Massolo underlined that 
Italy, like the US, will be looking for a strong statement on 
Iran from the June 14 IAEA Board of Governors, but added that 
Italy supports engaging the Iranians on other issues such as 
regional stabilization. Jones insisted that we must act now 
to re-establish UNMIK leadership, and not wait for elections 
as some have suggested.  She said that the US view would be 
to support its European colleagues in developing a list of 
qualified candidates from which SYG Annan could choose the 
next UNMIK head, and promised that Amb. Rossin would be ready 
to take up his post as UNMIK deputy head in mid-August. 
Massolo asked for US assistance in halting momentum towards 
establishing additional permanent UNSC seats.  An enlargement 
that did not include Italy would be a &national 
catastrophe.8  END SUMMARY 
 
¶3. (SBU) With Massolo were Deputy POLDIR Claudio Bisognero, 
Director for EU Security Affairs Luigi Mattiolo and NATO 
Affairs Director Giovanni Brauzzi.  The DCM, SA Deborah 
Mennuti and Poloff Jim Donegan (notetaker) accompanied A/S 
Jones. 
 
----------------------------- 
Iraq UNSC Resolution Strategy 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Massolo began by noting that recent meetings indicated 
an excellent "chemistry" and working relationship between 
President Bush and PM Berlusconi, symbolic of Italian-US 
cooperation on a broad range of issues.  For instance, 
Massolo felt that the draft UNSC Iraq resolution was "heading 
for a good result in a relatively short time," and Italy was 
doing all it could to help.  He acknowledged some foot 
dragging by the Russians, centering on Moscow's concerns over 
moving too quickly and the need for true legitimacy for the 
interim government but, Massolo continued, these issues did 
not represent significant stumbling blocks to the ultimate 
approval of the resolution.  Massolo said that PM Berlusconi 
was personally engaged with President Putin to help smooth 
the way with Russia on the UNSCR. 
 
¶5. (C) A/S Jones expressed USG appreciation for Italy's role 
throughout the UNSCR deliberation process, and underlined 
that Secretary Powell has told Russian FM Lavrov that the US 
has no objection to Russia's proposal for an international 
conference on Iraq, but that it could not be a precondition 
to a UNSCR.  Jones also underscored that the USG could not 
accept excluding some non-permanent Security Council members 
from the conference.  The participant formula should either 
include all Security Council members or just the Permanent 
members.  The USG would also not want to see Italy excluded. 
Massolo said that Russia realizes that a conference could not 
be a condition for the UNSCR, and pointed out that in any 
case it was unlikely that Iraqi authorities would want a 
conference at this time.  He suggested that an event in New 
York to signal international recognition of the interim 
government, followed by a pledging conference sometime in the 
future, might be a compromise that addressed Russian 
concerns. 
 
¶6. (C) A/S Jones noted that UNSG Annan was sponsoring a 
"Friends of Iraq" meeting of some 40 countries in New York 
 
during the week of June 7, and that President Bush was 
hopeful that the resolution could be voted on within the next 
week.  Massolo and Jones agreed that this timing was 
critical, and that the resolution should not be the subject 
of negotiation at the G-8 Summit.  Massolo reported that the 
UK was optimistic that the side letters to the resolution 
could be completed as early as June 4. 
 
¶7. (C) In order to gain wider acceptance for the resolution, 
Massolo proposed that the current draft be modified slightly 
to include "cosmetic, eye-catching phrases," such as 
references to "international humanitarian law" and the 
"sovereignty of the Iraqi people."  He said it would also 
help if the resolution referenced specific dates for 
elections and force withdrawal.  Massolo was pleased to learn 
from Jones that the draft to be tabled in New York later that 
day contained language along those lines. 
 
¶8. (C) Massolo suggested that the resolution address the 
possibility of an international conference, in general terms, 
as a negotiating tool to use with the Russians.  He also 
proposed that it include formation of an &Iraq security 
council8 composed of the MNF, Iraqi military and government, 
as a forum for coordination during the interim period.  A/S 
Jones indicated that Secretary Powell would explore these 
ideas with FM Frattini later that day (septel). 
 
¶9. (C) Massolo further predicted that a resolution 
&package8 that contained the above elements would help the 
Italian government when it came time for Parliament to 
authorize extension of the Italian military presence in Iraq 
at the end of June.  The more multilateral the presence, the 
better for public relations, he added.  The main internal 
Italian concern was not the Left per se, but the &pacifist 
and Catholic8 elements that transcend party lines. 
President Bush,s meeting with the Pope would help in that 
regard. 
 
-------------------------- 
Afghanistan PRT Deployment 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Massolo said that the 
Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs agree that Italy 
should deploy a provincial reconstruction team (PRT), but 
added that Italy's resource constraints would make it 
difficult to stand up a forward support base (FSB) alone. 
Further, Italy faces mounting budget constraints.  &Tax 
reduction is a costly business,8 he emphasized, and 
therefore the Ministry of Finance had an increasingly strong 
say in decisions relating to foreign military deployments. 
Italy is also ending conscription at the end of 2004, Massolo 
added, and MOD officials are beginning to worry about how 
Italy will be able to maintain its 9000 troops currently 
deployed abroad under the constraints of an all-volunteer 
military.  Italy would always need to keep troops available 
to deploy to the Balkans should the situation there 
deteriorate, as it did in Kosovo in March.  Still, averred 
Massolo, it will help the US position if President Bush 
continues to emphasize to PM Berlusconi the importance of the 
PRT and FSB to US strategic interests. 
 
¶11. (C) Massolo added that Italy was thinking, &in parallel, 
not as a substitute8 for PRT deployment, of taking the ISAF 
lead after Turkey.  He was optimistic that Italy would reach 
decisions on all these issues prior to the NATO summit.  A/S 
Jones expressed appreciation for Italy,s outstanding 
contribution to peacekeeping efforts worldwide, and said she 
understands the resource constraints under which many of 
these political decisions must be made.  She also underlined 
USG gratitude for Italy,s role in the Global Peacekeeping 
Operations Initiative to be highlighted at the Sea Island G-8 
Summit. 
 
---------------------------------- 
US-EU/Istanbul Summit Preparations 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) A/S Jones had hoped for a more operational EU-US 
statement on the Middle East than the draft from Brussels. 
Mattiolo emphasized that the document was indeed just that, a 
working draft that had not been formally circulated to all 
Member States, and that Italy agreed with the US view that 
the Dublin statement should be more action oriented. 
Mattiolo predicted that a more acceptable draft incorporating 
US comments would be ready for review by June 9.  Brauzzi 
 
added that work was proceeding on the Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative, which would offer a menu of options on a 
self-selection basis to countries in the region wanting to 
participate in stabilization efforts.  A/S Jones said that at 
the Istanbul Summit, the US would see how far we could get 
on the question of a possible NATO presence in Iraq.  One 
problem is that the timing was wrong, coming as it did just 
prior to the transfer of sovereignty to the interim 
government.  Both agreed that the door must remain open for a 
NATO or other multilateral role in the Security Council 
Resolution. 
 
--------- 
Iran/IAEA 
--------- 
 
¶13. (C) Reiterating the need for a &balanced8 approach 
towards Iran, Massolo told Jones that Italy, like the US, 
will be looking for a strong statement from the June 14 IAEA 
Board of Governors meeting that  makes clear and 
unconditional the need for Iran to cooperate fully with the 
IAEA and to comply with its nonproliferation commitments.  In 
fact, when he visited Tehran he told Iranian officials that 
&any other country would already have been called before the 
UNSC.8  That said, continued Massolo, &we must not lose 
Iran.8  We can engage the Iranians on other issues, he 
suggested, such as regional stabilization, so as to make them 
feel part of the international community.  While he did not 
criticize directly the results of the EU-3 initiative, he 
said that he was not enthusiastic, from an EU-institutional 
standpoint, about such &pioneer groups8 acting outside EU 
negotiating structures.  Note: Poloff delivered reftel 
non-paper to MFA Office Director for Arms Control Giovanni 
Ianuzzi on June 3.  End Note. 
 
---------- 
UNMIK HEAD 
---------- 
 
¶14. (C) Massolo was looking forward to continued close 
cooperation with the US and in the Contact Group on Balkans 
stabilization, especially in Kosovo.  Quint Ambassadors would 
discuss that day in New York nominations for head of UNMIK 
A/S Jones said that the US role would be to support its 
European colleagues in developing a list of qualified 
candidates from which SYG Annan could choose.  The US was 
proposing Amb. Rossin as UNMIK deputy; he would be ready to 
take up his post in mid-August.  Jones insisted that we must 
act now to re-establish UNMIK leadership, and not wait for 
elections as some have suggested. 
 
----------- 
UNSC Reform 
----------- 
 
¶15. (C) Massolo concluded the meeting with a plea for US 
assistance in halting what Italy sees as momentum towards 
establishing additional permanent UNSC seats.  He cited 
increased coordinated &activism8 by Germany, Brazil and 
Japan, among others, to use efforts to reform and streamline 
the UN as a means of increasing the number of permanent seats 
in the UNSC, which would have exactly the opposite effect 
desired by those members, including the US, who wish to see a 
more efficient UN.  Under any Rome government, an enlargement 
that did not include Italy would be a &national 
catastrophe.8  A/S Jones promised to speak with A/S Holmes 
and Amb. Cunningham to plan a course of action. 
 
¶16. (SBU) A/S Jones has cleared this message. 
 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m 
 
SKODON 
 
 
NNNN 
 2004ROME02168 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL