This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T  ROME 002123 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR FRIED AND VOLKER 
STATE FOR EUR A/S JONES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2023 
TAGS: IT IZ PREL ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: WHAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT MEANS FOR BERLUSCONI 
 
REF: ROME 1915 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Mel Sembler for Reasons 1.5 (B) 
and (D). 
 
¶1.  (S) The President's visit to Rome takes place one 
week before Italians vote for their 78 representatives 
to the European parliament and some local officials 
on June 12-13.  The results of the vote will be 
interpreted as an early test of how Berlusconi is 
likely to fare in national elections to be held no 
later than 2006, and as a referendum on Italy's 
involvement in Iraq.  This is because the 
Europarliament vote has become a head-to-head contest 
between Prime Minister Berlusconi and European 
Commission President Romano Prodi, the odds-on 
favorite to run against Berlusconi for the 
Prime Ministership in the next national election, 
thanks to the decision by each man to lead his 
party's ticket.  Prodi's campaign has tried to 
capitalize on widespread public displeasure with the 
presence of Italian forces in Iraq by calling for 
immediate troop withdrawal; this goes well beyond the 
opposition's earlier position that those troops should 
be recalled only if the United Nations was not given 
a "leading role." 
 
¶2.  (S) Prodi's anti-war stance had been gaining him 
momentum before Berlusconi's recent meetings with Kofi 
Annan in New York and President Bush in Washington. 
The Prime Minister blunted that momentum by spinning 
the Annan and Bush meetings as discussions about how 
best to achieve a "turning point" in Iraq after 
June 30 via a political process guided by the United 
Nations.  This allowed him to portray opposition 
calls for immediate withdrawal as feckless 
electioneering by politicians who previously 
championed a UN role but now can't seem to take 
"yes" for an answer.  Berlusconi also gained 
traction by hinting that his opponents might have 
motivations less palatable to the electorate, such as 
closet anti-Americanism.  (That explains the spate of 
requests to the Embassy from opposition leaders wishing 
to lay wreaths at the U.S. WWII cemetery, something they 
had not asked for on previous Memorial Days and probably 
would not have done now were it not for a desire to show 
they are not anti-American.) 
 
¶3.  (S) Notwithstanding Berlusconi's efforts, the 
percentage of votes garnered by his coalition on 
June 12-13 will probably decrease from its 
victorious showing in the 2001 national elections. 
A reduction of five percentage points or less can 
be written off as normal for an incumbent 
government in what amounts to a mid-term election. 
Any loss much greater than that, however, will be 
portrayed as public rejection of Berlusconi and his 
Iraq policy, and will make it politically harder 
for him to remain steadfast in his support for the 
U.S.  We therefore have an interest in helping the 
Prime Minister do as well as possible.  We can 
do so by ensuring that the media messages coming out 
of President Bush's visit portray Berlusconi as a 
respected world leader who is working effectively 
on a strategy for a UN-led political solution in Iraq 
that overcomes Italian fears of being caught in 
a quagmire. 
 
¶4.  (S)  The key words are "political solution" and 
"United Nations."  Italy's electorate wants its 
country to play an active role on the international 
stage, but is nervous about the use of military 
force.  Hence it will be important to stress that an 
internationally-supported political process is underway 
in Iraq.   The maintenance of security via a 
multinational force can then be justified as a 
necessary precondition for that process to succeed. 
Regarding the role of the UN, the Italian public 
has become convinced that the only road out of Iraq 
is through New York. The analysis may be fuzzy and 
a set-up for inevitable disappointment when a 
UN-endorsed interim government does not turn out 
to be a panacea for all of Iraq's problems. 
But it is what the majority of Italians want 
to believe, and what Berlusconi -- ever the 
masterful politician -- will no doubt provide them. 
 
¶5.  (S) From Berlusconi's point of view, the best 
scenario would be for a new resolution endorsing 
the forthcoming Iraqi transition to be approved 
by the UN Security Council immediately before 
President Bush's arrival.  That would allow him 
 
to trumpet the progress being made in Iraq by 
responsible members of the international community -- 
including, of course, himself -- and contrast that 
with the carping by Italy's opposition.  Even if 
a UNSCR has not been passed, however, the 
President's expression of continued U.S. 
commitment to a new resolution will be important. 
That, coupled with thanks to the Prime Minister 
for his personal role in advancing a UN-led political 
solution and recognition of Italy's positive 
contributions to Iraq, will bolster one of our 
strongest continental European allies and help 
Berlusconi avoid censure from the Italian public 
on June 12-13. 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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	2004ROME02123 - Classification: SECRET