This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 001204 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
PARIS AND LONDON PASS AFRICA WATCHERS 
DIA/J2 PASS GHAYES 
ENERGY PASS CGUY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: X1 
TAGS: PGOV PINS EPET KDEM PHUM EINV ASEC CASC PTER XY NI
SUBJECT: NIGER DELTA: GUNS AND THUGS RULE THE LAND 
 
REF: A. LAGOS 902 
     ¶B. ABUJA NI 760 
     ¶C. ABUJA NI 913 
     ¶D. ABUJA NI 1003 
     ¶E. LAGOS 1163 
     ¶F. 2003 LAGOS 2434 
     ¶G. ABUJA NI 906 
     ¶H. ABUJA NI 420 
 
Classified By: Robyn Hinson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and (e) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This is the first in a series of four cables 
addressing the security, political, and humanitarian 
situation in the Niger Delta based on a field visit by POLOFF 
and ECONOFF to Warri June 7 and 8. This cable addresses the 
overall security situation, Joint Task Force (JTF) Operation 
Restore Hope's response to the April 23 killings of two 
AMCITS, the proliferation of small arms, and the 
consolidation of power and purpose by the militant youths in 
the area.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------ 
GETTING THE BALL ROLLING 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) The killings of two AMCIT oil services contract 
workers along the Benin River (refs A,B,C) have precipitated 
a course of events in the Niger Delta. JTF Commander BG Elias 
Zamani (strictly protect) told Consulate Officers that after 
the killings the JTF arrested over 60 militant youths from 
both ethnic groups in a dragnet to obtain intelligence (ref 
A) and warned them that whichever village was responsible for 
the attack would "pay." Zamani told us he expressed his 
"disappointment" with the youth leaders for their poor 
leadership and for creating an atmosphere of chaos and 
violence.  He advised them to cooperate with the JTF and 
provide information on the killings.  Having been held in 
custody together, the youths were able to discuss the attack, 
as well as other issues.  Ironically, this forced 
togetherness in the wake of a JTF investigation helped create 
an atmosphere that laid the foundation for a cease-fire 
agreement (septel). 
 
-------------------------------- 
IJAW YOUTHS, CONSOLIDATING POWER 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Sam Ken (strictly protect), a senior militant Ijaw 
youth leader and one of the key architects of the cease-fire, 
told Consulate Officers that he has been cooperating with 
Zamani and the JTF.  He explained that the April 23 attack 
was a planned kidnapping gone awry and carried out by a 
criminal Ijaw militant youth group, which he said are 
self-styled "commandos."  He explained that the commandos are 
broken into groups of operation throughout the riverine area, 
largely along Ijaw clan lines. Commando groups in general are 
also responsible for bank robberies in Warri and other 
violent crimes. Commandos located near the Benin River, Ken 
claims, were responsible for the AMCIT killings and the 
November 2003 kidnappings for ransom of expatriate employees 
from the Scottish oil services firm Bredero Shaw (ref F). 
 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Motivated by a fear of JTF reprisals for the AMCIT 
killings and a desire to find a peaceful and political 
solution to the crisis, Ken told CONOFFS that the Ijaw youth 
leadership is cleaning house.  The youth leadership has 
targeted the commando groups, specifically its overall leader 
John Ikpoko.  Ken bluntly stated that the Ijaw youth 
leadership had killed 17 commando leaders and members who had 
refused to abide by the cease-fire or curb their criminal 
operations and delivered them to the JTF headquarters. 
Ikpoko escaped the assassination teams and is in hiding. 
(Note: "Criminal operations" does not likely refer to 
facilitating illegal oil bunkering, which Ken was reluctant 
to discuss in detail.  End note.)  On June 5, the JTF held a 
press conference and broadcast pictures of the slain commando 
leaders on national television, claiming that the "sea 
pirates" were killed by JTF forces.  Zamani, in his 
conversation with Consulate Officers, claimed that JTF forces 
killed the 17 men.  (Note: In our conversation with Zamani he 
was warm and relatively open, willing to discuss even 
sensitive issues in further detail.  However, when asked 
about the deaths of the 17 "commandos", his demeanor changed 
and he became very closed-lipped. His change in behavior may 
lend credence to Ken's version of events.  End note.) 
 
------------------- 
THE ORIGINS OF GUNS 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) Illegal oil bunkering runs rampant in the region. 
Mission reporting has linked shady oil deals to First Lady 
Stella Obasanjo (Ref G).  Ijaw and Itsekiri youths and elders 
accuse unnamed high-ranking politicians in Abuja, while 
unconfirmed reports claim that Lebanese nationals possibly 
funding the terrorist groups Hamas and Hizbollah, the Russian 
Mafia, and drug cartels are involved (Refs B and H). 
Militant youths have been used to protect and facilitate the 
bunkering of crude oil and, to do so, have acquired small 
arms, namely AK-47s.  Ken told Consulate Officers that most 
of the youth's weaponry and ammunition comes from the 
Nigerian Army, who sells them in large quantities packaged in 
crates.  Other arms originate from conflict areas in West 
Africa and some are locally made in Warri.  However, Ken also 
implicated Lebanon and North Korea as sources of arms. 
(Comment: In his discussions, Ken was very frank about the 
African origins of arms, including the Nigerian Army.  He 
showed signs of nervousness when implicating the Lebanese and 
was very nervous, agitated, and possibly deceitful when 
implicating the North Koreans.  When pressed to clarify 
further, Ken initially referred to the North Koreans as 
"small white people," then "Asians," then "Koreans," then 
"North Koreans." End Comment.) 
 
-------------- 
JTF Operations 
-------------- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) Although the JTF's ability to exercise its power 
in the riverine areas around Warri is limited, its actions 
have improved security along the Benin River.  Zamani 
confirmed he has set up a forward deployment base at the 
mouth of the Benin River near the village of Ogheye Dunigun 
(ref A).  He has also set up a deployment area in another 
village further down the Benin River and is slowly ratcheting 
up his presence there.  JTF forces already secure Chevron 
Nigeria Limited (CNL) flow stations and facilities along the 
river, but they are trying to provide longer-term security in 
the area to ensure the safety of CNL operations and enable 
over 10,000 Itsekiri internally displaced persons (IDPs) to 
return (septel).  A handful of Itsekiri youth returned to 
their villages in April, hoping that others will follow, but 
Zamani has told the Itsekiri to wait until he has finalized 
his deployments before they begin returning home in large 
numbers. 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) Zamani has also declared war on the commando 
groups.  Ken told Consulate Officers that with Ijaw youth 
leadership cooperation, Zamani raided Ogbe-Ijoh (located 
across the Warri River from Warri) and surrounding Ijaw 
villages.  These villages served as one of the major 
operating areas from which criminal raids upon the city of 
Warri and surrounding Itsekiri villages originated.  Several 
sources say that they are now abandoned and the people are 
homeless, likely doubling the previous known figure of Ijaw 
IDPs to 2,000. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) As if ethnic conflict in Warri was not enough to 
occupy the JTF, Zamani told Consulate Officers he has 
recently deployed some of his troops to areas around Port 
Harcourt, where there has been widespread gangland warfare 
within the past two months (refs D and E).  Zamani said that 
part of his mandate was to protect oil installations 
throughout the larger Niger Delta area and that his forces 
were now protecting facilities there.  He declined to state 
how many have been sent.  Recent press reports claim that 
military forces had clashed with the gangs, leaving 50 dead 
near Buguma.  Zamani said he was unaware of such reports, 
emphasizing his mandate to protect oil facilities only and 
pointed out that two brigades outside of the JTF were 
stationed in Port Harcourt. 
HINSON-JONES