This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001731 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, S/CT, INR/NESA 
RIYADH FOR TUELLER 
TEL AVIV FOR DCM LEBARON 
TUNIS FOR NATALIE BROWN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2014 
TAGS: PTER KISL PGOV PREL KJUS PINR KU
SUBJECT: (S) JALAHMA TRIES TO SHOW HE'S NOT SUCH AN 
EXTREMIST 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 1661 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 1500 
 
Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON 1.4 (D). 
 
¶1.  (S) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY:  In a two-and-a-half-hour 
conversation with PolChief June 01, Kuwaiti Islamist 
extremist Jaber Al-Jalahma (ref A) denied ever having been a 
member of Al-Qaeda and ever having funded men of violence. 
He expressed ambivalence about 9/11 and similar attacks: 
good in principle but wrong to the extent they victimized 
innocents.  He allowed that Americans in Iraq are far better 
than the former Baathist regime, declared that there is no 
legitimate jihad today in Iraq or Afghanistan (because jihad 
requires a degree of popular support that is lacking), and 
said he advises young hotheads not to go to Iraq.  He claimed 
to have saved the lives of Westerners during the Iraqi 
occupation, and to have extracted a promise from Usama Bin 
Laden (UBL) before 9/11/01 to leave Kuwait alone.  He 
admitted that he had been wrong to call the Failaka killers 
"martyrs" without explanation; he had subsequently explained 
in court that he meant their intention was sincere even 
though their action was wrong.  He repeatedly accused the USG 
of choosing violence as its first resort and of rejecting 
dialogue with Islamists -- "even with Bin Laden it could have 
worked."  He accused Kuwait State Security (KSS) of torturing 
and raping young Islamists, thus driving them to do terrible 
things such as the Failaka attack. 
 
¶2.  (S) The meeting, organized through the Foreign Ministry, 
was held at the home of Jassim Boodai, editor-in-chief of 
Al-Ra'i Al-Aam newspaper, a distant relative of Jalahma's. 
Boodai indicated that Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed 
was the driving force behind the meeting:  he said the PM had 
approached him after hearing DNSA Townsend single out Jalahma 
by name as an extremist who needed to be stopped (in reply, 
the PM had sought to reassure her that the GOK had Jalahma 
under control -- ref B).  The Prime Minister's Media Advisor 
Madi Al-Khamees sat in on the meeting ("as a friend," 
according to Boodai).  Jalahma came and went accompanied by 
Majed Al-Ali of Al-Ra'i Al-Aam.  All parties agreed to keep 
the meeting strictly confidential.  The possibility of future 
meetings was held open, not necessarily in the same format. 
END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  (S) Boodai welcomed PolChief into his home at noon. 
Khamees was already there; Jalahma and Al-Ali had gone to the 
mosque to pray.  Boodai explained that he had long known 
Jalahma, a distant relative.  His deputy at Al-Ra'i Al-Aam, 
Yusuf al-Jalahma, was "a direct cousin" of Jaber's.  Prime 
Minister Shaykh Sabah had personally approached Boodai after 
his May 4 meeting with DNSA Townsend, "annoyed" at her 
mention of Jalahma:  was Jaber up to no good, or were the 
Americans misinformed?  After some persuading, Jaber had 
agreed to speak directly with someone from the US Embassy to 
clarify his position. 
 
¶4.  (S) Jalahma arrived shortly, accompanied by Majed Al-Ali 
(no relation to Islamist extremist Hamed Al-Ali).  He shook 
hands with Khamees and embraced Boodai, but exchanged only a 
brief nod with the American, never coming within arm's 
length.  Throughout the meeting, Jalahma spoke in Arabic, 
PolChief spoke in English, and Boodai interpreted as needed. 
Jalahma appeared to understand only a little English.  Both 
PolChief and Khamees openly tape-recorded the meeting, 
Jalahma having no objection.  The discussion began with an 
exchange clarifying that Jalahma was willing to talk but did 
not have any specific "information for the US Embassy," as 
MFA had put it.  He wanted to be able to travel. 
(Afterwards, Boodai stressed this point to PolChief: 
Jalahma had recently been detained in Yemen, Syria and Dubai; 
in all cases, the authorities had told him they were acting 
at the behest of the USG.  The Syrians had shown him a file 
on him, which they said had been provided by Kuwait State 
Security (KSS) at the request of the Americans.) 
 
¶5.  (S) In reply to questions, Jalahma (whom Boodai addressed 
as "Bou Mohammed") said he had never been a member of 
Al-Qaeda, had never given allegiance to it nor been asked to. 
 He knew UBL ("Shaykh Usama") from Afghanistan, where he had 
gone several times during the Soviet occupation to deliver 
aid collected from mosques and "popular committees" (lajan 
sha'abiya).  At that time, the Kuwaiti and Saudi Red Crescent 
Societies had an official presence in Afghanistan.  The aid 
he had provided was purely humanitarian, never to armed 
groups or individuals.  He had stopped going to Afghanistan 
and broken contact when, after the Soviet withdrawal, trouble 
erupted among various tribes and groups.  His last trip was 
before 9/11/01; Al-Qaeda was threatening Kuwait as a 
potential target, so he met with UBL in Kandahar and 
extracted a promise to leave Kuwait alone.  Jalahma assessed 
UBL as a fallible human who had made mistakes, "not a 
prophet." 
 
¶6.  (S) Jalahma stated openly that he had been happy when the 
9/11 attacks occurred, because the US "needed a lesson:"  it 
relies on violence as its first resort, and rejects dialogue 
with Islamists -- "even with Bin Laden, dialogue could have 
worked."  At the same time, his joy had been perturbed by the 
killing of innocents.  Human beings have feelings, he 
remarked:  they feel sorry even when they accidentally run 
over a cat.  Jalahma emphasized at length that Islam 
prescribes limits to violence:  it is forbidden to target 
civilians, and even to target soldiers outside a battle zone. 
 He cited the recent Madrid terrorist attacks:  getting Spain 
to withdraw troops from Iraq had been a good idea, but 
killing all those civilians was wrong. 
 
¶7.  (S) He would only consider himself at war against the US 
if it were an invader/occupier, which is not the case in 
Kuwait.  He had helped save Westerners' lives as a member of 
the resistance during the Iraqi occupation.  When reminded 
that he had praised as "martyrs" the two young Kuwaitis who 
killed a US Marine and wounded another on Failaka island in 
October 2002, Jalahma admitted that he had been wrong to say 
that without explanation:  some impetuous youth could have 
interpreted it as a license to go out and kill more 
Americans.  He had subsequently clarified his position in 
court, and Al-Ra'i Al-Aam had published it:  the violent 
action had been wrong, but the intention righteous; the young 
zealots' feelings had been aroused by television images of 
Israeli brutality towards Palestinians, overwhelming their 
reason; they had failed to seek guidance from mature 
spiritual authority. 
 
¶8.  (S) Jalahma complained that KSS routinely subjects young 
Islamists to unspeakable tortures including sodomizing them 
with a stick; this leaves them severely damaged and can drive 
them to do terrible things, as was the case of Anas 
Al-Kandari who led the Failaka attack.  The US Embassy should 
tell the GOK to end such practices.  Near the end of the 
meeting, Jalahma said he wanted to hear PolChief condemn the 
Abu Ghrayb abuses.  In reply, PolChief said those abuses 
violated American values and specific military regulations; 
the President and the Secretary of Defense had both 
apologized publicly; investigations were continuing to 
determine the full extent of the problem; even before the 
story made headlines, an internal Army investigation had 
resulted in a scathing report, not a cover-up. 
 
¶9.  (S) On Iraq, Jalahma said the US is "better by far" than 
the former Baath regime.  He insisted that he has provided no 
aid to anyone in Iraq to oppose the US, and when young 
hotheads seek his advice, he tells them not to go to Iraq. 
That country is "a mess," but there is no proper jihad there 
now:  jihad requires the support of the people, which is 
lacking.  Iraqis should rule themselves, and it is acceptable 
for Sunnis to share power with Shiites and Kurds.  In 
Afghanistan, he had supported the Taleban regime, seeing it 
as the choice of the people, but after its fall, there was no 
more proper jihad there either.  In his view, the 
transitional government of Afghanistan possesses provisional 
legitimacy, and the prospective elections could lead to a 
satisfactory result. 
 
¶10.  (S) Jalahma said he derived his understanding of Islamic 
principles from reading ancient sources, which he respected 
far more than modern ones.  He bemoaned Sunni Islam's current 
lack of eminent spiritual authorities.  While Shiites can 
turn to recognized "marajea" ("references," i.e. spiritual 
guides), "we Sunnis are all marajea, and that's our problem." 
 He recalled that during the Iraqi occupation, the late Saudi 
Shaykh Abdul-Aziz Bin Baz had ruled that Saddam was not a 
Muslim and it was permissible to fight against him alongside 
the infidel Americans.  Shaykh Al-Albani, on the other hand, 
had ruled that because the Iraqis were Muslims, if the US 
bombed Iraq all Muslims had the duty to fight against the 
Americans.  Today, he said, the situation is even worse:  the 
Saudi and Egyptian muftis just approve whatever their 
respective governments want. 
 
¶11.  (S) At the end of the session, Jalahma hoped the USG 
would now have a more accurate understanding of his position. 
 PolChief replied that he had come to listen; he disagreed 
with much that Jalahma had said, but had refrained from 
responding in order to hear Jalahma out.  He did have 
responses, however, and would be willing to meet again to 
have more of a dialogue rather than today's monologue. It was 
his job to be familiar with all currents of thought; he had 
met with everyone from whisky-drinking liberals to Scientific 
Salafis.  The format of a follow-up meeting need not be the 
same.  Jalahma indicated a vague willingness to meet again, 
but did not provide any direct contact information or make 
any commitment. 
 
¶12.  (S) COMMENT:  From his own words, it is clear that 
Jalahma is deeply anti-American and, under some 
circumstances, would be perfectly happy to support violence 
against Americans, and even carry it out personally.  The 
minimum point he seemed to be trying to convey -- both to the 
USG and the GOK -- was that he is not advocating violence in 
Kuwait or against Americans anywhere at the moment. 
URBANCIC