This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 001160 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2013 
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL CG MONUC
SUBJECT: KEEPING PEACE NOT MAKING WAR: DRC WELCOMES QUAD 
MEETING, VERIFICATION MISSION 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1. (C)  Summary:  During June 22 meetings with President 
Kabila, VPs Bemba (MLC) and Ruberwa (RCD), visiting DAS Don 
Yamamoto and AF/C Director Al Eastham noted U.S. concern with 
the security situation in Eastern Congo, including the 
buildup of government troops; assured Congolese officials 
that, in the USG view, Rwandan support for rebel forces or 
Rwandan military intervention in the Congo are unacceptable; 
asked for - and received - Congolese endorsement of joint 
border patrols (with Monuc facilitation) in the Kivus, and 
urged the government to move swiftly on long-overdue military 
integration.  Bemba was most hawkish, openly stating that MLC 
forces are deploying to eastern Congo as part of the FARDC 
mobilization, and implying they are there to counter a 
possible Rwandan incursion.  Ruberwa laid much of the blame 
for developments in eastern Congo on shortcomings of the 
transition in Kinshasa and the government's failure to 
resolve the uncertain status of former RCD military 
commanders.  Nonetheless, he agreed the Nkunda and Mutebusi 
constituted 'insurrectional elements' and that the best 
solution would be for them to go into exile.  President 
Kabila said FARDC forces would defend Congolese territory and 
that he had not ruled out a military solution to the 
Nkunda/Mutebusi problem.  He said efforts to restore 
relations with Rwanda would take time.  He said he had agreed 
to meet Kagame in Abuja on June 25, and also welcomed 
Yamamoto's suggestion that the next quadripartite talks be 
held in Kinshasa o/a the week of July 19.  The Yamamoto 
delegation also met with SRSG Swing as well as French, 
Belgian and British Ambassadors (and visiting British junior 
minister) to ensure a coherent message among the principal 
players. Belgium signaled the EU's intention to hold a 
meeting in Belgium in early July to examine ways in which to 
help address the economic crisis in Congo, and said the EU 
will welcome U.S. participation. End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  During their June 22 flying visit, DAS Don Yamamoto 
and AF/C Director Al Eastham informed their Congolese 
interlocutors that Secretary Powell and NSC Rice had been in 
contact with Presidents Kabila and Kagame to urge both to 
deal with the serious security situation in the eastern Congo 
with restraint.  Yamamoto stressed that the success of the 
transition remains a priority U.S. objective; that we believe 
that joint border patrols in the Kivus would be a good first 
step to help defuse eastern tensions; and that Monuc is an 
essential partner to the transition and efforts to ensure 
elections, and suggested that the next round of quadripartite 
talks be held in Kinshasa on/about the week of July 19.  He 
also reminded Congolese officials of the importance of 
maintaining the solidarity of the transition government, 
maintaining good communications with Uganda and Rwanda, 
beginning military integration and pressing forward on 
elections preparations. 
 
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Bemba, The Practical Hawk 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C)  MLC VP Bemba said that when the transition government 
was formed last July, no one believed that there would be a 
new rebellion in the East, but the debate on the appointment 
of new provincial governors triggered the old Rwandan "game" 
of trying to keep control of the eastern provinces, 
particularly the Kivus.  One unintended result of their 
aggression, he confirmed, is an improved relationship between 
the MLC and President Kabila.  He said that the MLC (and 
particularly he, personally) is convinced that Rwanda is 
directly involved in the events in the East.  The MLC is 
completely committed to fighting this aggression, he said, 
and if necessary will commit its entire 20,000 troops to the 
effort.  (Note:  The MLC seems to have already dispatched 
about 5,000 MLC troops to the East, and Bemba's own private 
aircraft have been assisting in the airlift of these as well 
as FARDC forces.  End Note.)  Bemba insisted, repeatedly and 
forcefully, that Laurent Nkunda is a Rwandan, not Congolese; 
said that he has known Nkunda since the days when Nkunda was 
a Rwandan intelligence officer in Kisangani and Bemba was 
starting the MLC forces there.  As for the fate of Nkunda and 
Mutebusi, Bemba bluntly said that Rwanda should take back its 
officers or they would be killed.  Likewise, Bemba insisted 
that the FARDC is not capable of combating the Rwandans (we 
agree), that only the MLC is able to respond quickly and in 
concentrated numbers, i.e., use the Rwandan tactics against 
them.  He reminded his visitors that he "had trained" with 
Museveni, who knows Rwandan tactics, and said that he had 
personally advised President Kabila where the government 
troops should be deployed.  He said that to date, the 
government deployment has only cost $4 million, and has been 
funded without affecting the budget.  He dismissed Uganda as 
a possible security threat at this time, characterizing them 
as less interested than Rwanda in maintaining their presence 
in the Congo.  (Comment:  While we agree in principle, his 
statement is a bit disingenuous, given his training in and 
links to Uganda.  End Comment.)  Instead, he insisted that 
the government had obtained a copy of a Rwandan plan to 
attack the eastern Congo (note: Embassy also had heard this 
from Presidential National Security Advisor, end note) and 
that GDRC actions are preventive and defensive in nature, 
responding to elements of this plan. 
 
¶4. (C)  Bemba emphasized the importance of the international 
community's clearly and quickly telling President Kagame that 
"the game is over."  Referring to current Rwandan allegations 
that the government is again arming the FDLR to fight Rwanda, 
he questioned rhetorically how that would be possible, now 
that Monuc is in touch with the FDLR and has been working 
with them on voluntary repatriation.  Bemba repeatedly 
endorsed Yamamoto's call for joint Congolese-Rwandan border 
patrols (with Monuc supervision/facilitation), calling this a 
"perfect solution" to the Rwandan allegations of FDLR 
buildups - and, on the Congolese side, to allegations of 
penetration of DRC territory by Rwandan troops.  Likewise, he 
welcomed the second quadripartite meeting and urged that it 
be held as soon as possible.  He agreed that elections are 
essential, noting that the government had been surprised by 
the large mobilization of the Congolese public to protest 
Monuc and government inaction.  Meanwhile, current events in 
the East have set back by at least one year his efforts to 
attract investors to the Congo, he said, noting that even 
good economic variables (4% inflation, 6% growth and a stable 
exchange rate) are not enough to overcome a tenuous security 
climate. 
 
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Ruberwa, The Concerned Conciliator 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  RCD VP Ruberwa, whose response to the crisis in the 
East can best be characterized as confused dithering, tried 
to portray himself as conciliatory toward government and MLC 
exclusionary tactics.  He bemoaned the current climate of 
distrust, and noted that an alignment of some transition 
elements against others could ultimately ensure the demise of 
the transition.  Events in the East, while troubling, pose 
far less of a threat to the transition than does the current 
way in which the government is operating.  For instance, 
deploying troops to the East without full and frank 
consultations with all the government elements, and without 
the consent of all the government elements, is not only very 
troubling but does not send a good signal for the possibility 
of military integration.  He also noted that if foreign 
troops again enter the DRC, it would be the end of the 
transition.  As to the eastern situation itself, in many ways 
it was completely predictable -- officers (mostly RCD) like 
Nkunda and Mutebusi have become restless because their 
situation is too nebulous, their futures unclear, the absence 
of military integration/restructuring is a major factor in 
their decision to take the actions they have taken. Ruberwa 
did, however, concede that Nkunda (and Mutebusi) represented 
'insurrectional elements' and should probably go into exile 
for 3-5 years, that this would be the best solution - but not 
in Rwanda.  (Note:  Mutebusi had, earlier that day, crossed 
into Rwanda with about 300 of his troops and given up his 
arms (septel).  End Note.)  Their men, however, should not be 
punished but rather broken up and integrated into the new 
Congolese military.  (Comment:  This solution could 
perpetuate the problem of alleged penetration of the 
Congolese military by the Rwandan military.  End Comment.) 
 
¶6. (C)  Ruberwa said that if the situation is to be defused, 
both sides must recognize the other's concerns, i.e., Congo 
considers that Rwanda is fueling aggression in the east, but 
Rwanda views with concern recent alleged DRC re-arming of the 
FDLR, therefore both states are acting from justifiable 
motives of self-defense. (Note:  There is no evidence at this 
time of any large-scale FDLR involvement in the Kivus 
situation, although a few -- around 40-60 -- FDLR troops may 
be mixed into Mai Mai elements who are assisting FARDC troops 
in south S. Kivu.  End Note.)  The U.S. can play a key role 
in facilitating dialog and understanding, Ruberwa said.  He 
was less enthusiastic about the U.S. proposal for joint 
patrols, but did acknowledge its potential usefulness.  His 
lukewarm reaction may have been related to his subsequent 
criticism of Monuc for not having already utilized its 
Chapter VII authority to attack the FDLR and drive them out 
of the Congo, or, at the very least, to disarm them and 
thereby eliminate their threat to Rwanda. Ruberwa cautioned 
that although the RCD wants to stay in the transition 
government, the confidence and communication issues must be 
addressed to ensure the RCDs continued participation. 
 
--------------------- 
President, In Control 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  President Kabila began the meeting by saying that 
everyone involved in setting up the transition government 
seems to have underestimated the enormity and complexity of 
the tasks to be accomplished in two short years, particularly 
when the government would be encumbered with a bureaucratic, 
heavy structure.  However, he said, he had reassured both the 
Secretary and NSC Rice that all other problems can be 
 
SIPDIS 
overcome, as long as the situation in the East is quickly 
controlled.  Rwanda's allegations of ethnic genocide, or its 
current insistence on an FDLR plot, are pretexts.  The real 
problem lies in conflicting political, economic and social 
interests, and geography doesn't help.  Bukavu is only 100 
kilometers from Kigali, but is 2,000 kilometers from 
Kinshasa.  As he sees it, there are four key elements in 
dealing with the current situation: maintaining 
communications with Rwanda (he pointed to the upcoming June 
25 meeting in Nigeria between himself and Kagame); military 
integration; ethnic relations, in which, he said, the 
government will resolve the Banyamulenge situation, and 
certainly refugees should return to the Kivus, as their 
safety is assured; and, elections. 
 
¶8. (C)  The Congo doesn't want war, but a military solution 
against Nkunda cannot be ruled out.  The government has taken 
appropriate steps to contain the problem and limit the 
consequences for the transition, he said, and also will take 
advantage of the presence of a large number of government 
troops in the East to begin the process of military 
integration, thereby advancing a second key objective.  He 
endorsed the concept of joint border patrols as a 
verification and security measure (although Rwandan troops on 
Congolese soil is completely unacceptable), and indicated 
that if these are successful it could pave the way for a 
broader improvement in Congolese-Rwandan relations, including 
reopening of embassies and an exchange of ambassadors. 
Fundamentally important, however, is a climate of mutual 
respect.  Kabila welcomed the proposed second round of 
quadripartite talks in Kinshasa, and noted that these talks 
could help lay the foundation for a successful Great Lakes 
conference by helping to improve bilateral relations between 
the DRC-Rwanda and the DRC-Uganda. 
 
¶9. (C)  He welcomed the U.S. message that the presence of 
Rwandan troops in the Congo would be unacceptable, but 
(somewhat stiffly) seemed to object to the broader message 
than the presence of other foreign troops in the Congo, who 
could be hard to get rid of, could endanger the transition. 
He noted that Congo's friends in Belgium, S. Africa, Angola 
and Nigeria have committed themselves to help defend the 
Congo or train its security forces.  He mused that Ruberwa 
must choose what to do, since he finds himself in a situation 
in which his cousins are fighting the government to which he 
belongs.  Kabila concluded by saying that the current 
situation in the East is like turbulence during a long 
airflight -- something to be expected but which must be 
overcome so that the flight is not diverted. 
 
--------------- 
MONUC's Mandate 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (C) SRSG Swing admitted that MONUC cannot handle two 
crises at once. MONUC's June mandate renewal request will 
focus on MONUC's current strategic objectives and request 
more troops and civilian police. He understood that 
peacekeeping funding is very competitive and agreed that 
MONUC's mandate should be refined. Swing described MONUC's 
proposal for a joint MONUC-DRC-Rwanda border verification 
mechanism. He cautioned that Rwanda has so far opposed 
MONUC's draft TOR for the mechanism.  In the wake of recent 
anti-MONUC demonstrations, MONUC is upgrading its physical 
security, working to improve relations with Rwanda, and 
seeking to improve its public image by meeting with more 
Congolese groups and producing a flyer (in multiple 
languages) to explain MONUC's mandate and activities. 
 
¶11. (C)  Yamamoto also met with French, Belgian, and UK 
Ambassadors, and visiting British Junior Foreign Minister 
Chris Mullen (who will also travel to Kigali) to ensure a 
coordinated message to the GDRC and GOR. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶12. (C)  The Yamamoto visit underscored USG concern about the 
current political/security environment in Congo.  Along with 
other diplomatic initiatives (e.g., the British) this 
pressure may help to walk the Congolese and Rwandans back 
from a potential confrontation.  Although the situation 
remains dangerous -- with continued rebel troop movements, 
threatening statements by Rwanda, and a build-up of GDRC 
forces -- we are mildly encouraged by Kabila's commitment to 
meet with Kagame in Abuja and strong support for continuation 
of the quadripartite dialogue begun in Washington in May. 
HOOKS