This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS AND PRM/ANE 
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY 
NEW DELHI PLEASE PASS TO DAS DCAMP 
CAIRO FOR CHEYNE 
GENEVA FOR PLYNCH 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2014 
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM PGOV BT IN NP
SUBJECT: BHUTANESE REFUGEES: HISTORY STARTS TODAY 
 
REF: A. A. KATHMANDU 758 
     ¶B. B. NEW DELHI 3117 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Janet Bogue for reasons 1.5 (B,D). 
 
Support for the End Goal 
------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  We appreciate the perspective, based on personal 
experience as well as scholarship, brought to the history of 
the Nepalese Bhutanese refugee problem by Embassy New Delhi 
(REF B).  The roots of the present imbroglio are deep and 
complex.  What the Government of Bhutan describes as 
legitimate steps to safeguard a vulnerable culture against 
illegal immigrants and pro-democracy agitators appear to many 
foreign observers (including this mission) as unjustifiable 
ethnic persecution and expulsion of nearly a sixth of the 
kingdom's population.  The history of the Bhutanese refugees 
is subject to varying interpretations, but is less important 
than what the U.S. Government, the Governments of Nepal and 
India, and the international community can do to solve it. 
We agree with Delhi that "we are working towards the same 
goal: a durable solution" and support Delhi's multifaceted 
and forward-looking strategy.  The following are our comments 
on New Delhi's prescriptions. 
 
Begin Equitable 
Repatriation Without Delay 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  We agree that the USG should press the RGOB to begin 
repatriation of Category 1 "Genuine Bhutanese" refugees as a 
first step.  In addition, the verification process in other 
camps should be accelerated in a transparent manner and the 
appeal process should be reinstated.  The Joint Verification 
Team (JVT) took eighteen months to "verify" the approximately 
12,200 refugees within Khudunabari Camp and determined that 
only 2.4 percent of the population met the JVT's criteria for 
Category 1.  Such a small proportion of involuntary emigres 
is belied by all independent assessments, and can be 
justified only in the context of reported assurances by the 
RGOB to the Nepalese Government that Bhutan plans to accept 
both Category 1 and 2 refugees, which together constitute 
over 72 percent of the Khudunabari Camp's inhabitants.  The 
USG should urge the RGOB to clarify its intentions regarding 
Category 2 refugees and state them publicly.  The USG should 
also garner international support for the re-opening of the 
appeals process to correct flawed JVT determinations that 
often separate minor children from their parents and render 
others "stateless." 
 
Need for Specific, Written 
Terms of Repatriation 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C)  The USG should engage with the RGOB on the need to 
provide detailed, written information on the terms and 
conditions for repatriation.  Such specific issues as 
citizenship, land ownership, shelter, employment, language, 
education, and security must be addressed. 
Confidence-building mechanisms could include public radio 
broadcasts and/or internet dissemination of terms of return 
and the RGOB's authorization of a small group refugees to 
conduct a "pre-repatriation" visit to examine conditions of 
return first-hand. This approach has been very successful in 
other refugee situations. The USG should continue to 
highlight the role that international organizations already 
active in Bhutan (such as ICRC, UNDP, WFP and UNICEF) can 
play in facilitating re-integration into Bhutan society and 
economy.  We believe, however, that the UNHCR's unique 
mandate and capabilities would be invaluable in implementing 
and legitimizing the repatriation process. 
 
Direct Dialogue 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  The USG should encourage direct dialogue between the 
RGOB and refugees.  However, recent events suggest that there 
should be a neutral party present to facilitate the dialogue, 
keep the discussion constructive and on track, and ensure the 
credibility and sustainability of the process. 
 
Strengthen USG Diplomatic Efforts 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  The USG should strengthen our diplomatic efforts on 
two fronts: 
 
-- As New Delhi suggests, we should "take the lead in 
organizing a coordinated effort" to make it clear to the RGOB 
that the international community, including Bhutan's major 
donors, expects RGOB to honor its responsibilities as a 
member of the UN in solving the refugee problem according to 
international standards, preferably with UNHCR's involvement. 
 The USG might be able to rejuvenate the coordination within 
the "Friends of Bhutan" group, urging its members to use 
their collective influence and offer their collective 
resources to persuade the RGOB to repatriate a substantial 
portion of the camps' residents, and thus prevent the camps 
from becoming the breeding grounds of political radicalism. 
 
-- We hope that New Delhi will agree that the USG should 
encourage the new Government of India, given its unique 
influence in Bhutan, to take a more proactive role to resolve 
a problem that threatens to become a source of political 
unrest, and possibly terrorism, in India, Nepal and Bhutan. 
We agree fully with a UNHCR official from Geneva, who 
recently visited Kathmandu, that India holds the key to any 
satisfactory settlement of the refugee problem.  Fortunately, 
the signals that Natwar Singh's MEA has been sending to 
Kathmandu suggest that issues of security in the Himalayas 
are being accorded high priority in New Delhi.  We will look 
for further signals during Singh's visit to Kathmandu this 
week. 
 
BOGUE