This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001067 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR LAROIAN, MRAYNOR 
NSC FOR AFRICA DIRECTOR D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2009 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: COSMETIC ELECTORAL REFORMS EMERGING 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1018 (B) HARARE 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Electoral law changes proposed by the 
ruling party last week appear to be attempts to project a 
more level political playing field without jeopardizing the 
party's absolute grip on power in the run-up to next March's 
scheduled parliamentary elections.  The proposals provide for 
a new electoral commission that would still be controlled by 
the President and changes to certain technical aspects of 
election administration.  They would do nothing to alter 
media controls, patterns of political violence, suppression 
of freedoms of association/assembly, or heavy restrictions of 
political campaigning by the MDC. 
 
¶2.  (U) The official "Herald" reported on June 26 that the 
politburo had approved on June 25 proposals submitted by 
Minister for Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Patrick 
Chinamasa for revision of the nation's electoral laws and 
processes.  The proposals included the composition of a new 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission that would be "publicly funded 
and accountable to Parliament but independent of Government." 
 However, its chief electoral officer and five commissioners 
would be appointed by the President -- the chairman in 
consultation with the Judicial Services Commission and the 
four other commissioners from a list of seven names submitted 
by Parliament.  The Commission would supervise voter 
registration; organize and conduct presidential, 
parliamentary, and council elections; and be reponsible for 
accrediting observers.  The article noted also that it would 
"monitor the organization and operation of all political 
parties, including their finances."  It would hire its own 
staff. 
 
¶3.  (U) It remains unclear the extent to which the proposal 
would affect the four agencies involved in election 
administration: the Registrar-General, The Electoral 
Supervisory Commission, the Delimitation Commission, and the 
Election Directorate.  The  official press reported that the 
Registrar-General's role would be significantly reduced but 
it would continue to conduct voter registration, and the the 
Delimitation Commission would continue its functions.  An "ad 
hoc court" would be established to address any disputes 
arising from an election within six months.  The proposal 
reportedly included a host of changes to technical aspects of 
election administration, many apparently designed to 
streamline the voting process at polling stations.  The 
number of polling centers would increase, the use of mobile 
polling stations would cease, translucent ballot boxes would 
be used, and elections would be conducted in one day. 
 
¶4.  (U) Nothing is suggested to abolish the Public Order and 
Security Act (POSA) or Access to Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which have been the principal means 
to prevent oppostiion political activity and to shut down 
independent press.  Repeal of these repressive laws was a key 
element of MDC demands for election reform. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  NGO contacts advise that that the ruling party 
consulted with some members of civil society in formulating 
its program.  However, it did not appear to consult formally 
with the MDC nor did it go back the UN to pick up on its 
standing offer to help in electoral reform and to prepare 
election conditions.  The opposition MDC has not responded 
officially to the proposals yet, although the independent 
"Standard" newspaper quoted MDC Secretary-General Welshman 
Ncube as claiming the proposed reforms represented the fruit 
of MDC pressure domestically and abroad.  He reportedly 
asserted that the reforms met many of the party's demands but 
that the opposition would resist appointment of the 
commission chairman by the President. 
 
¶6.  (C) MDC MP Silas Mangono told poloff June 28 that the MDC 
would take some time to put together a formal vetted response 
and cautioned that any individual member reactions should not 
be taken as a party response.  He forecast that the proposal 
would probably be introduced into parliament in July 
(confirming UNDP Resrep information; ref B) and passed within 
a month.  He expected that the MDC delegation would offer 
amendments in an effort to beef the proposals up but that 
ZANU-PF was unlikely to budge on anything more than 
non-substantive changes.  He concluded that the changes would 
do little to cut into ZANU-PF's decisive advantage in the 
run-up to the March elections but that the MDC would have 
little choice but to go along.  He conceded the possibility 
raised by some parliamentary observers that the election 
could be pushed back as late as June to permit passage and 
implementation of the proposals. 
 
¶7.  (C) COMMENT:  The ruling party is not complacent over 
recent by-election victories in Lupane and Zengeza, and the 
politburo's attention to minute details of election 
administration underscores the party's obsession with the 
March elections.  As politburo member and ZANU-PF "moderate" 
Simba Makoni confided to the Ambassador June 18 (ref A), the 
party will be careful not place their election "reforms" onto 
a slippery slope.  Factions squabble over power within 
ZANU-PF but there is no support anywhere in the ruling party 
for meaningful alteration of a rulebook that assures their 
collective electoral triumph.  This modest effort is geared 
to advance the party's modest charm offensive with a 
long-term view to rehabilitating its international image (ref 
B), but not at any expense of its overarching objective to 
remain in power. 
 
¶8.  (U) COMMENT (CONT'D): ZANU-PF further tipped its hand in 
early state media coverage by blasting the SADC-Parliamentary 
Forum, which had prepared electoral norms and standards and 
criticized Zimbabwe's 2002 elections, as donor-funded and 
directed.  Dismissing SADC-PF, the state media claimed that 
SADC member states were circulating their own draft election 
standards in advance of the August SADC Summit in Mauritius. 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMENT (CONT'D): The reforms present a tactical 
dilemma for the opposition.  The proposals borrow from some 
of the MDC's list of electoral demands (originally circulated 
as 15 but pared back to five).  As such, GOZ propagandists 
and diplomats can be expected to present them to domestic and 
international audiences as evidence of ruling party "good 
will" and "compromise."  The MDC leadership recognizes the 
reforms for what they are, but will be loath to reject them 
out of hand for fear of giving the official press and Mugabe 
apologists in the region a pretext to marginalize the 
opposition as "obstructionist."  The reforms and the party's 
posture toward them are unlikely to arrest the continued 
slide in the MDC's political fortunes. 
SULLIVAN