This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

021435Z Jun 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GUATEMALA 001361 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SHANNON, DOD FOR OGC ALLEN. 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, PM/B, L, T, P, D, IO, S/WCI, 
S/P/PM/AT, OSD/ISP/NP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2014 
TAGS: MOPS PREL GT
SUBJECT: (C) DIFFICULT POLITICS OF ARTICLE 98 PASSAGE 
 
REF: GUATEMALA 1055 
 
Classified By: Acting PolChief Erik Hall for reasons 1.5 (b&d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  As reported reftel, the GOG signed an 
Article 98 agreement on April 28 but requested that we keep 
the agreement confidential while it devises a strategy to 
gain Congressional approval.  MFA Vice Minister Skinner-Klee 
told DCM on May 25 that the GOG remains absolutely committed 
to Article 98 ratification, but does not want to submit it to 
Congress for ratification during the current special session 
for a variety of reasons, including: 
 
-- the political imperative of getting fiscal reforms 
approved demands the GOG's full attention; 
 
-- Article 98 is too sensitive/controversial to be 
spotlighted in an extraordinary session of Congress; 
 
-- shifting political alliances within Congress make 
vote-counting difficult right now, and the GOG needs to see 
how the alliances settle out before they will be able to 
count the votes needed for this issue; 
 
-- FM Briz needs to shore up his own political bases before 
pushing Article 98 in Congress; 
 
-- events at Abu Ghraib have given powerful ammunition to 
Article 98 critics, making this a particularly inopportune 
time to present the agreement for congressional and public 
debate. 
 
The Berger Administration therefore prefers to submit Article 
98 to Congress for ratification during the regular session 
starting August 1, and to avoid as much as possible a 
politicization of the issue.  While the latter may be wishful 
thinking, we concur that submitting Article 98 during the 
current special session of Congress could be fatal.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) In a meeting with DCM on May 25, MFA Vice Minister 
Jorge Skinner-Klee said the current special session of 
Congress is focused on the political imperative of getting 
fiscal reforms approved before July 30.  This is the Berger 
Administration's highest political priority, and demands the 
GOG's full attention.  Introducing Article 98 during the 
current extraordinary session of Congress would distract from 
fiscal reform passage and attract unwanted controversy to the 
agreement.  Shifting political alliances within Congress make 
vote-counting difficult right now.  (Note: the ruling GANA 
coalition, the FRG and the Unionista Party appear to be in 
agreement to pass the fiscal reforms, and the PAN may also 
join in support, according to Presidential Chief of Staff 
Eduardo Gonzalez.  End Note.)  The GANA coalition suffered 
the loss of the Patriot Party over its dialogue with the FRG. 
 It is unclear whether the fiscal pact alliance could be 
replicated on other issues, including Article 98. 
Skinner-Klee said FM Jorge Briz needs to shore up his own 
political bases before pushing Article 98 in Congress. 
(Note:  We have heard unconfirmed rumors that Briz might be 
considering resigning.  End Note.) 
 
¶3.  (C) Skinner-Klee also said recent revelations from Abu 
Ghraib have given powerful ammunition to Article 98 critics. 
He argued that effective US action against the culprits will 
help counter that criticism. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  News of the signing of the Article 98 agreement has 
not yet become public here.  When it does, it will provoke 
strong criticism from human rights groups, which have formed 
an ad-hoc Commission in Support of the International Criminal 
Court and are actively lobbying the GOG against any Article 
98 agreement.  Opposition to Article 98 is likely to be 
concentrated in civil society and the smaller leftist parties 
including the UNE, ANN, and URNG. 
 
¶5.  (C) We concur with the GOG's caution over how to deal 
with Congress.  Any move to ratify the agreement during the 
extraordinary session, which is focused almost exclusively on 
the issue of fiscal reforms, would likely cause another 
political firestorm like the one the GANA faced after it 
became clear that Berger was in dialogue with FRG leader Rios 
Montt. 
 
¶6.  (C) Prospects for passage of the fiscal reforms are good, 
as a result of Berger's willingness to work with the FRG and 
to consider marginal changes and incentives demanded by other 
opposition parties.  By deferring the Article 98 debate until 
after the fiscal reforms are approved, the prospects also 
improve for the emergence of a working coalition which could 
also support Article 98 ratification.  We will continue to 
discuss how the USG can best assist the GOG's efforts to 
approve the agreement. 
HAMILTON