P 251509Z JUN 04
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3092
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BEIRUT 003300 
 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  THE "BEIRUT DECLARATION" -- BACKGROUND, 
FOLLOW-UP, AND REACTIONS 
 
REF: A. PARIS 4767 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 3169 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Vincent M. Battle for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Lebanese authorities inadvertently gave the "Beirut 
Declaration" -- a ringing denunciation of Lebanon's political 
status quo covered by the press in both Lebanon and France 
(Ref A) -- widespread publicity as a result of  their 
ham-handed attempt to block the document's public unveiling. 
Two Shi'a political figures we talked to -- one a government 
minister, the other an independent, anti-establishment 
politician -- provided nuanced reactions to the document. 
End summary. 
 
An inside view from one of the authors 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) One of the drafters of the "Beirut Declaration," 
Joseph Bahout, a professor at Beirut's University of St. 
Joseph, told us work began in March of this year, although 
the ideas behind it were "not new" but had come together over 
a long period of time.  His collaborators -- "the usual 
suspects," as he put it -- included: 
 
-- Samir Franjieh and Fares Souaid, two members of parliament 
from the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, a moderate, anti-Syrian 
Christian opposition group; both are Maronites; 
 
-- Saoud el Mawla, a professor at Beirut's Lebanese-American 
University who began as a pro-Palestinian radical leftist in 
the 1970s but is now close to liberal Iranian reformers and 
Bahout's collaborator in the Arab Muslim-Christian Dialogue; 
he is a Shi'a; 
 
-- Mohammad Hussein Shamseddine, a "classic" Shi'a cleric 
with close connections to Shi'a clerical circles in Najaf 
(and a former student of the late Grand Ayatollah Abdul Qasim 
al-Khoei, who was the highest Shi'a religious authority in 
Iraq). 
 
¶3.  (C) The May 2-29 series of municipal elections delayed 
the release of the "Beirut Declaration" until June -- its 
authors had originally hoped to release it sooner, according 
to Bahout.  He was puzzled but pleased with the way Lebanese 
authorities had prevented him and his colleagues from holding 
a conference over the June 19-20 weekend, one that 2,000 
participants were expected to attend, and during which the 
"Beirut Declaration" was to be unveiled.  In doing so, the 
authorities had inadvertently given the "Beirut Declaration" 
and its organizers tremendous "free publicity," far more than 
they would have received otherwise, according to Bahout. 
 
The organizers follow up 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Following up on the June 21 publication of the 
"Beirut Declaration" in the French daily "Le Monde", Bahout 
said he planned to work with contacts at the French daily 
"Liberation" to provide further favorable press coverage. 
Bahout also expected the "Beirut Declaration" to be on the 
agenda of an annual conference of opposition and like-minded 
figures organized by Souaid, scheduled this year to take 
place on June 27. 
 
¶5.  (C) Bahout said the French Embassy in Beirut -- which he 
described as "excited" about the declaration -- had been 
quick to initiate contact with him, Franjieh, and other 
organizers once news of its stillborn public release hit the 
local press. 
 
Two Shi'a reactions:  an establishment one... 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) In a June 24 conversation with the Ambassador, 
Agriculture Minister Ali Hassan Khalil, a leading figure of 
the Amal Movement led by parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, 
said he had "no problem" with the "Beirut Declaration" or its 
backers.  He said he did not consider its release to be a 
very important development, however, and suggested it 
probably was not worth the Ambassador's time in following up. 
 
¶7.  (C) While some "Beirut Declaration" backers might 
represent a Shi'a "third force" in Lebanese politics, those 
individuals did not have a "program" beyond opposing both 
Amal and Hizballah, Khalil said. 
 
 
... and an opposition one 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Riad al-Ass'ad, an independent Shi'a politician from 
the South and sworn enemy of Berri and the Amal Movement (Ref 
B), said he saw the "Beirut Declaration" as a matter of "good 
ideas but bad people," characterizing its organizers as 
"elitish" figures engaged in political "maneuvering."  While 
the main points in the declaration, including those about 
Syria, were "good," its timing was "problematic" and not 
helpful in the current situation, Ass'ad said. 
 
¶9.  (C) Had the conference been allowed to take place, Ass'ad 
said, its main results would have been to showcase MP and 
possible presidential contender Nassib Lahoud (a man of 
integrity who has needlessly diminished himself with an 
excessive focus on local politics in the Metn region, in 
Ass'ad's view) as the chief "defender of the constitution," 
and to serve as a platform for the Qornet Shehwan group. 
 
¶10.  (C) Ass'ad said he had little use for the declaration's 
emphasis on "Muslim-Christian understanding."  What Lebanon's 
Muslims and Christians really needed was a common sense of 
"Lebanese identity," he said. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) As Bahout told us, the main ideas behind the "Beirut 
Declaration" are not new.  However, the document crystallizes 
widespread and multi-confessional dissatisfaction with the 
political status quo at a time when more and more observers 
see a renewal or extension of President Lahoud's term in 
office as inevitable. 
 
 
BATTLE