Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04ANKARA3257, UPDATE ON THE (STALLED) PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04ANKARA3257.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA3257 2004-06-10 17:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
STATE FOR E, EUR/SE, AND EUR/IFD 
TREASURY FOR OASIA - MMILLS, RADKINS 
NSC FOR BRYZA AND MCKIBBEN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN EIND ECON TU
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON THE (STALLED) PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM 
 
1.(Sbu) Summary. The travails of the Tupras privatization and 
recent meetings with Privatization Authority (PA) officials 
and other contacts confirm that Turkey,s privatization 
program continues to be plagued by PA mistakes, which opens 
the way for vested interests to use the courts to block 
privatizations and an excessive focus on the proceeds of the 
sale rather than the efficiency gains to the economy. The 
bottom line is that only one significant privatization has 
taken place since the current government came to power, and 
all the major privatizations seem to be moving at a snail's 
pace. On June 10, Finance Minister Unakitan optimistically 
claimed the GOT would realize deals worth $2.3 billion in 
2004, of which $468 million would be in cash. End Summary. 
 
 
---------- 
Overview 
---------- 
2. (Sbu) Although the current Government is widely considered 
to support privatization more than previous governments, its 
track record continues to underwhelm.  In 2003 (AKP,s first 
full year in power), the GOT projected privatization proceeds 
for the year of USD four billion, and for the period 2003-06 
of 12.4 billion. 2003 was marked, however, by high-profile 
debacles--the failures of Tekel tobacco and Petkim--and slow 
motion on the other large privatizations.  Finalized deals 
totaled only some USD 900 million, most of which were small 
transactions. For 2004, GOT reduced its target for total 
sales to only USD 1.2 billion.  Trying to put the best 
possible face on the situation, at a press conference June 
10, just after the courts blocked the $1.3 billion Tupras 
privatization, Finance Minister Unakitan claimed the GOT 
would realize sales in 2004 worth $2.3 billion of which only 
$468 million would be in cash.  These estimates seem highly 
optimistic, even if the Tupras deal goes through. Just in the 
past year, the GOT 's inability to conclude three large 
privatizations has cost it $3 billion in revenues and, more 
importantly, an opportunity to accelerate the reform process 
and enhance market confidence. 
3. (Sbu) In separate meetings with econoffs, Privatization 
Authority President Metin Kilci and Vice President Osman 
Ilter claimed they were proceeding as quickly as possible, 
but the subtext of the discussions was that any particular 
privatization will occur only if the sale price is 
politically palatable. 
4.(Sbu) Post has previously reported the PA,s problems with 
excessively high internal valuations, and officials, fears 
of being criticized or even prosecuted for selling below the 
internal valuation.  Moreover, senior GOT officials tend to 
focus only on the fiscal benefit to the state from the 
proceeds of the privatization, rather than on the efficiency 
gains to the economy.  PA President Kilci told us that senior 
GOT officials measure the PA's success purely in terms of 
revenue raised. 
5.(Sbu) In recent weeks, as the Tupras privatization has 
become ensnarled in the courts (see below), two post contacts 
from outside the government have privately accused the PA of 
technical and legal incompetence that leaves it open to court 
challenges from the many vested interests opposed to 
privatization.  Faik Oztrak, the former Treasury 
Undersecretary, told econcouns that the PA is required to 
accept only unconditional bids, but accepted a conditional 
bid on the Tupras deal.  Likewise, Ergun Okur, EVP of Oyak 
Group, said the PA had made mistakes in conducting the Tupras 
privatization process. 
6.(Sbu) If the privatization process seems slow now, it may 
get worse: Kilci acknowledged that the PA has about a year to 
finalize its most contentious divestitures, before political 
considerations render tough choices impossible. As set forth 
below, the PA faces a huge challenge in meeting this deadline. 
---------------- 
Tupras (Refinery) 
---------------- 
7. (Sbu) Tupras has been in the PA portfolio since 1990. A 
tender last fall produced a high bid of USD 1.3 billion to a 
consortium of the Russian oil company Tatneft and the Turkish 
conglomerate, Zorlu group. The sale was originally expected 
to be concluded by the end of 2003, but the sale has been 
delayed by difficult contract negotiations and by lawsuits 
brought by Tatneft,s minority shareholders and by Tupras 
unions. Shortly after Kilci opined to us that the sale would 
be finalized by the end of June, an appeals court reinstated 
a lower court restraining order blocking the sale. While the 
PA may well be successful in its appeal to the Council of 
State, this sell-off is already being compared to the 2003 
Petkim and Tekel debacles. As Tupras is the only possible 
near-term &win8 for the PA, if the appeal is lost the PA,s 
credibility, such as it is, will be badly damaged. 
---------------------- 
Petkim (Petrochemicals) 
---------------------- 
8. (Sbu) Petkim also has been in the PA portfolio since 1990. 
Though the PA had accepted the bid by the Uzan group,s 
Standart Kimya in 2003, once the Uzan group companies were 
seized over the Imar Bank collapse, Standart Kimya was unable 
to come up with the funds to make the initial payment, and 
the PA had to cancel the tender.  It then re-tendered the 
company, only to cancel the tender in January for lack of 
interest. Kilci said he hopes to announce a tender this year 
or early next year, but first he &wants to see some good 
financial statements.8 (For 2004 Q1, Petkim reported a USD 
40 million loss.) At his press conference, Unakitan said the 
PA would re-tender by the end of the year.  Comment: The 
problem with waiting for &good financial statements8 is 
two-fold: First, the wait could be long. Second, in its 
valuations PA seems to apply to earnings a much higher 
multiple than do investors. As such, as a company,s 
performance improves, it perversely becomes more difficult to 
sell, because the discrepancy between the PA,s valuation and 
those of potential purchasers is magnified. End Comment. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Erdemir (Iron and Steel) 
------------------------ 
9.  (Sbu)   Erdemir has been in the PA portfolio since 1987. 
Ilter explained that the PA wants to delay the block sale of 
the state,s 50% interest in Erdemir until (a) its 
publicly-traded stock recovers the value it recently lost 
(because of what Ilter considers an overreaction by the 
market to a fall in Chinese steel purchases), (b) the Tupras 
sale is concluded (thus demonstrating the &credibility8 of 
Turkey,s privatization program), and (c) additional 
investors show interest (two have shown interest so far, but 
Ilter very much wants to see other investor interest). 
Comment:  The PA will be waiting a very long time for all 
three of Ilter,s conditions to come into alignment. 
Ilter,s caution is unfortunate: Erdemir has been profitable 
in 2003 and likely in 2004, benefiting from surging local 
demand from the booming Turkish auto and white goods sectors, 
and probably could be sold relatively quickly.  Econoff 
recently visited Erdemir,s headquarters in the Black Sea 
town of Eregli and will report septel. End Comment. 
--------------------- 
Turkish Airlines (THY) 
--------------------- 
10. (Sbu) THY has been in the PA portfolio since 1990. Ilter 
explained that the PA is considering a limited public 
offering of 20-30 percent with a subsequent block sale. 
Kilci thought the IPO could be concluded before the year end. 
 Ilter revealed that the Transport Minister has held up 
approval to prepare for the IPO.  According to Ilter, this is 
probably because of the Transport Minister,s irritation that 
the PA, under the authority of Finance Minister Unakitan, has 
the lead on the THY privatization. 
---------- 
Tekel (Tobacco) 
---------- 
11.   (Sbu) Tekel has been in the PA portfolio since 2001. 
The GOT,s rejection last fall of the high ($1.3 billion) bid 
for Tekel,s tobacco operations has left the PA frantically 
-- and to date unsuccessfully -- searching for options. Kilci 
said that the PA is trying to develop a &more attractive 
model.8 However, the only meaningful alternative that has 
been suggested ) separate sales of individual brands -- is 
not under consideration. The privatization of Tekel,s 
smaller alcohol operations was successfully completed earlier 
in 2004, the only significant company privatized by the GOT 
in the past year. 
---------- 
Turk Telekom 
---------- 
12.(Sbu) Turk Telekom (TT) has been slated for sale since 
1998, though consideration of TT,s privatization began in 
the 1980s. TT is perhaps the most politically controversial 
of the potential privatizations, and the TT privatization 
process comes under its own special legislative framework. 
Although technically not part of the PA,s portfolio, the PA 
is involved in the TT sell-off. The GOT seems to be 
proceeding diligently to address the many problems that must 
be resolved before this sale can proceed, such as amending 
the public procurement law to allow the PA to retain a 
financial advisor for the sale. Kilci agreed that labor is 
TT,s biggest problem, and said that a bill has been 
submitted to Parliament that will aid TT,s downsizing. Kilci 
also stated, however, that the PA can best handle the labor 
problem by finding a &good customer8 for TT. 
 
 
13. (Sbu) The U.S. Trade and Development agency has financed 
a U.S. consultant doing a study of TT,s information 
technology upgrade needs.  Econoffs recently met with the 
consultant, who described a company with serious systems 
problems. The consultant said TT desperately needed 
investment in new systems, and he wondered about the 
company,s ability to manage IT projects.  The consultant 
said TT had clearly underinvested for years, lacked a 
customer service mindset, and badly needs strengthened 
management, marketing and systems. 
------------------------ 
Electricity Distribution 
------------------------ 
14.(Sbu) Under the GOT,s recently-agreed energy sector 
strategy, elaborated with the help of the World Bank, the GOT 
plans to privatize some government-owned generation 
facilities and divide the country's distribution network into 
21 regions, creating a joint stock company for each region, 
and establishing regional tariffs. The difficulty is that, in 
the Eastern part of Turkey, up to 80 percent of all 
electricity is stolen.  The total loss nationwide is 
estimated at $1.75 billion annually. Thus, at present, with a 
national tariff system, the Western part of Turkey, in which 
leakage is much smaller, is subsidizing the Eastern part of 
Turkey. Kilci advised that the World Bank has now agreed with 
GOT to maintain national tariffs for five years, during which 
time the GOT expects private distribution companies to 
significantly reduce losses. 
 
 
----------------------- 
State Bank Privatization: 
------------------------ 
15. (Sbu) The privatizations of state-owned Ziraat and Halk 
Banks, and of state-controlled Vakif Bank are central 
elements in IMF and World Bank programs in Turkey.  In the 
course of the negotiations over the IMF,s Seventh Review, in 
March and April, the GOT agreed with the IFI,s on a state 
bank privatization strategy for Halk and Ziraat, and 
continues to try to resolve ownership structure issues that 
prevent the privatization of Vakif.  As reported earlier, the 
strategy is to shrink Ziraat and Halk*especially their 
outsized government securities portfolios*to prepare for 
eventual privatization.  Though Halk and Ziraat management 
initially behaved contrary to the strategy, by aggressively 
competing for consumer lending business, several contacts 
have confirmed that these banks have finally been reined in 
by Treasury, and are no longer undercutting private banks, 
lending rates.  Rodrigo Chavez, the World Bank economist who 
has the lead on the state bank issue, told econoff the plan 
is for the GOT to pull $5 billion in capital out of Ziraat 
and Halk in the coming months. He said the GOT moved rather 
quickly to select an advisor, McKinsey, who is already 
working on the process.  Comment: Despite the progress, and 
Chavez, optimism, the privatization of these banks, with 
their gigantic branch networks and payrolls, is likely to be 
a very long process. End Comment. 
------- 
Comment: 
------- 
16. (Sbu) Though the privatization program is seriously 
undermined by widespread anti-privatization attitudes, 
litigious labor unions, and unsympathetic and capricious 
courts, the GOT itself has yet to demonstrate that it 
understands the efficiency gains that could be obtained from 
faster privatization, or has the will and competence to speed 
up the process.  The GOT has proven adept at convincing the 
IFI,s that it is working towards privatization, while, by 
and large, only the small companies are actually transferred 
to the private sector. 
 
 
EDELMAN