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Viewing cable 04ANKARA3088, PM ERDOGAN'S TRIP TO SEA ISLAND: DELIVERABLES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA3088 2004-06-04 11:00 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 003088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR FRIED, BRYZA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2014 
TAGS: CASC CY ECON IZ PHUM PREL PTER TU
SUBJECT: PM ERDOGAN'S TRIP TO SEA ISLAND:  DELIVERABLES 
SCENESETTER:  CORRECTED COPY (PARA 13) 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (S) Summary:  With the invitation for PM Erdogan to 
attend the Sea Island G-8, we have three opportunities for 
POTUS/PM interaction in the next month:  Sea Island, the 
POTUS Ankara visit and the NATO Summit.  This intense 
U.S./Turkish contact comes amid domestic pressure about the 
role of Islam in Turkey and Turkey's close relationship with 
Israel.  Turkey's economy has improved since 2002 but is 
still vulnerable.  We need to look at several key elements. 
There are several areas in which this series of events needs 
to produce tangible results to advance productive cooperation 
  Turkey has agreed to co-sponsor the Democracy Assistance 
Group (DAG) of the Broader Middle East and North Africa 
Initiative (BMENAI), but is extraordinarily sensitive about 
how its BMENAI role is perceived. 
 
 
2.  (S) Erdogan will be seeking U.S. steps against the PKK in 
Iraq and significant Turkmen representation in the new 
political structures in Iraq; we would like to renew GOT 
permission for and eventually expand use of Incirlik Air Base 
to support Iraq operations.  On Cyprus, we are both focusing 
on measures to help Turkish Cypriots overcome isolation in 
the wake of Turkish Cypriot support for the Annan Plan. 
Erdogan will continue to seek ways to highlight Turkey's 
reform process and usefully deploy U.S. support for Turkey's 
EU candidacy.  On the economic side, Erdogan wants U.S. 
legislation to establish a qualified industrial zone (QIZ) in 
Turkey; we hope Turkey will resolve at least one of the 
disputes involving U.S. companies in Turkey and we should 
urge Turkish Airlines to purchase Boeing aircraft.  We should 
encourage Erdogan to come up with a concrete plan for opening 
the Halki Seminary and do what he can to speed up the 
resolution of cases involving abducted American children. 
End Summary. 
 
 
Political and Economic Context 
 
 
3.  (C) Erdogan arrives at Sea Island under conflicting 
domestic pressure between some pious members of his AK Party, 
who want to create more space for religion in Turkish 
society, and the secular establishment and military, who are 
deeply suspicious that Erdogan and AK want to impose an 
Islamist agenda on Turkey.  Turkey's EU candidacy, supported 
across the political spectrum, is a major constraining force 
in this tension.  Turkey's close relationship with Israel 
continues.  However, some AK politicians and Islamist media 
have harshly criticized the relationship in light of recent 
events in Gaza and killings of Hamas leaders, prompting a 
spate of rumors about Turkey's diplomatic relations with 
Israel and the Palestinians.  Turkey will co-sponsor the 
BMENAI's Democracy Assistance Group, but is extraordinarily 
sensitive about not being lumped together with "target" 
countries and not being considered a "model" country -- 
particularly not a "model" of a "moderate Islamic" country. 
 
 
4.  (C) Turkey's economy has recovered from its 2000-2001 
economic crisis but remains vulnerable; its high debt load 
makes it especially vulnerable to interest rate changes. 
Over the next several weeks, Turkey will decide whether and 
how to proceed with the IMF and the U.S. bilateral financial 
agreement.  The markets have been unsettled in the last few 
weeks as domestic political tension, global withdrawals from 
emerging markets and uncertainty about Turkey's future 
economic policy coincided. 
 
 
Iraq and the PKK 
 
 
5.  (S) Since the Iraq War, Turkey has generally been helpful 
on Iraq, but Ankara has a number of concerns about Iraq's 
future, e.g., Kurdish autonomy, the Turkmen minority's 
status, PKK presence.  We have reassured the GOT that IGC 
member (and self-proclaimed PKK sympathizer) Mahmoud Othman 
will not be part of the IIG and that the quality of Iraqi 
Turkmen representation will be higher in the IIG than it was 
in the IGC.  Erdogan will certainly press the President, on 
each occasion, on steps to promote stability and unity in 
Iraq. 
 
 
6.  (S) However, Turkey believes that the US is not 
fulfilling its commitment to end the PKK's safe-haven in 
northern Iraq.  In the past few months, Turkey has seen an 
up-tick in PKK violence in southeast Turkey by infiltrators 
the GOT believes came from northern Iraq.  In response, the 
Turks this month deployed troops to high ground in Iraq 
overlooking the Turkey-Iraq border.  The widely-shared 
Turkish perception of U.S. inactivity against the PKK 
terrorists in Iraq is hurting our ability to generate Turkish 
public support for our broader efforts in Iraq and hampers PM 
Erdogan's ability to stake out pro-U.S. positions.  Unless we 
take some visible steps against the PKK in Iraq before the 
President's late June visit to Ankara and Istanbul, Erdogan 
will be unable to avoid making U.S. inaction against the PKK 
a lead point on his agenda with the President.  More intense 
PKK actions in Turkey around the Summit would be dangerous 
and politically embarrassing.  We again strongly recommend 
deciding on some of the steps described in Ankara 2902 and 
2236 as deliverables for the President in his meetings with 
Erdogan. 
 
 
7.  (S) The steps we recommend include: 
 
 
-- Committing to aggressive patrols around Iraq's Makhmour 
Camp to prevent PKK intimidation while the UN screens Turkish 
refugees there; 
 
 
-- Closing the PKK's front Kurdistan Democratic Solution 
Party offices in Iraq; 
 
 
-- Initiating with Turkey a joint information operations 
campaign to further weaken the PKK in Iraq; 
 
 
-- Conducting small scale military actions vs. the PKK in 
Iraq; 
 
 
-- Issuing arrest warrants and trying to arrest high value 
PKK targets in Iraq; 
 
 
-- Shutting off PKK lines of supply in Iraq and securing 
border areas where the PKK is present; 
 
 
-- Getting the KDP, PUK, IGC and IIG to state their support 
for coalition action against the PKK terrorist organization. 
 
 
8.  (S) In June 2003, the Turkish cabinet approved a decree 
(duration one year) allowing the use of Turkish bases and 
ports for humanitarian and reconstruction operations covered 
under UNSCR 1483.   It does not allow use of Turkish 
facilities for the stationing of assets to be used in 
combat-related operations (i.e. stationing of fighters).  The 
decree -- which did not require parliamentary approval and 
expires at the end of June 2004 -- provided Turkish 
authorities sufficient legal basis to approve two important 
Iraq-related requests from the US:  stationing of aerial 
refueling tankers at Incirlik Air Base (IAB) and the use of 
IAB to rotate US troops out of Iraq.  EUCOM intends to ask 
the Turks to extend the authorization for the tankers and for 
permission to establish a multi-directional cargo hub at IAB 
to support OIF and OEF operations.  A future troop rotation 
hub may also be useful.  The Cabinet must extend the decree 
before the GOT can consider these requests.  We have asked 
the GOT to renew the decree; our contacts tell us that the 
GOT is "mid-way" through the process and they do not foresee 
any difficulties. 
 
 
Measures to Overcome North Cyprus' Isolation 
 
 
9.  (C) We are beginning to implement a number of measures 
intended to respond positively to the constructive approach 
the Turks and Turkish Cypriots demonstrated toward the 
UNSYG's Good Offices Mission, to reduce the economic 
disparity between the northern and southern parts of Cyprus, 
and to help lay the foundation for eventual reunification. 
We understand Erdogan expects this to be a major topic for 
his discussion with the President. 
 
 
10.  (U) We have already taken some symbolic steps: 
 
 
-- Secretary Powell met with "TRNC PM" Talat in New York on 
May 4. 
 
 
-- Although Ambassador Klosson has met with "TRNC PM" Talat 
privately many times before, he met with Talat in his office 
for the first time on May 21. 
 
 
-- Ambassador Edelman invited the "TRNC Ambassador" to Turkey 
in his personal capacity to an Embassy function for the first 
time on May 26. 
 
 
-- We have begun issuing expanded-validity visas to holders 
of "TRNC" passports 
 
 
11.  (C) The Turks want more steps taken to reduce Turkish 
Cypriot isolation.  We could move ahead on additional steps 
under consideration: 
 
 
-- Limited expansion of North Cyprus Missions in Washington 
and New York. 
 
 
-- On the economic and commercial side, we are proceeding 
deliberately, coordinating with the EU and navigating a 
thicket of national and international legal considerations as 
we consider how to expand trade and give economic assistance. 
 
 
-- Erdogan will likely press hardest for direct flights to 
the "TRNC"  (Turkish Transportation Minister Yilidirim raised 
this with Secretary Mineta on May 24).  We are actively 
considering this and coordinating with the EU and ICAO.  This 
and other steps will not come as quickly as Erdogan would 
prefer, but he will appreciate assurances that our intention 
to help the TCs is unshakable. 
 
 
12.  (U) On May 26, the "TRNC" lifted its requirement that 
Greek Cypriots show passports to enter the North, a goodwill 
measure we had long advocated.  We should thank Erdogan for 
the GOT's constructive input into this decision. 
 
 
Economic Steps 
 
 
13.  (C) In addition to promoting further economic reform and 
strengthening of Turkey's regime for combating terrorist 
finance, there are three specific deliverables we are pushing 
ahead of the President's end-June visit.  All three relate to 
our bilateral effort to enhance economic-commercial relations 
through increased trade and investment. 
 
 
-- The Turks want us to introduce legislation providing for 
Qualifying Industrial Zones in Turkey.  Prime Minister 
Erdogan raised this with the President in January, and is 
likely to do so again in June.  We need to resolve the 
discussion of QIZ scope with the Turks and identify our 
legislative vehicle. 
 
 
-- Turkey needs to resolve one or more investment disputes 
involving U.S. companies, such as by introducing in 
Parliament industrial zones legislation to resolve Cargill's 
zoning problem. 
 
 
-- We should urge Turkey to agree to a purchase by Turkish 
Airlines of Boeing aircraft (the GOT and Turkish Airlines are 
now talking with both Boeing and Airbus, with an eye to 
making a decision shortly). 
 
 
EU Candidacy 
 
 
14.  (C) Turkey's EU candidacy remains Erdogan's top 
political priority and the aim for a date to begin accession 
negotiations si the governor that so far has kept domestic 
political tensions from getting out of hand.  We will want to 
reiterate our plan to be helpful with EU members, but Turkish 
implementation remains key.  Some areas where Turkey could 
help itself include religious freedom, minority rights (e.g., 
Kurdish broadcasting) and rule of law. 
 
 
Reopening Halki 
 
 
15.  (U) The continued closure of Halki Seminary is an 
irritant to Turkey's relations with the EU, Greece and us. 
We should urge Erdogan to come up with a concrete proposal to 
re-open Halki.  Under Turkish law, all schools, public or 
private, must be under Education Ministry authority.  A 
recent Education Ministry study suggested three different 
alternatives for opening it consistent with Turkish law. 
However, the GOT and the Patriarchiate have not reached an 
agreement on how to reopen the seminary in a manner 
acceptable to both sides. 
 
 
Child Abduction Cases 
 
 
16.  (U) We are working with the Turkish police and courts on 
several cases of U.S. children abducted to Turkey.  There has 
been some progress, but the court system does not work 
effectively.  Due to delays in the court system Turkey is not 
in compliance with the Hague Convention regarding abducted 
children. 
 
 
-- We should ask for Erdogan's help to speed up these cases. 
In particular, we hope the family court decision in the 
Corapcioglu (cho-rap-chee-oh-loo) case will be issued before 
the end of June.  (PM Blair's visit in May resulted in the 
first-ever return of a British child.)  We are hoping for a 
decision returning the child to the mother and granting 
permission for them to leave Turkey while the remaining 
appeals are pending. 
 
 
Armenia 
 
 
17.  (C) Since Armenian President Kocharian will not attend 
the NATO Summit, we see little chance of moving ahead on 
Turkish-Armenian relations in the short run. 
EDELMAN