This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ACCRA 001234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR -- PATRICK COLEMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2009 
TAGS: ETRD PREL ECON GH WTO AGOA
SUBJECT: GHANA; RESPONSE TO UPDATE ON AGOA III 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 120038 
 
     ¶B. 2003 ACCRA 2287 
     ¶C. ACCRA 440 
     ¶D. ACCRA 771 
 
Classified By: EconChief Chris Landberg for Reasons 1.5 (B and D) 
 
Summary 
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¶1. (C) Post expects that the economic impact of ending the 
AGOA third country fabric provision (Ref A) would be limited, 
given Ghana's (and the region's) minor apparel exports under 
AGOA, However, the textile and apparel sector in Ghana (and 
the region) would be devastated, so individual companies and 
workers would suffer.  It would also have a political impact, 
with the U.S. losing some leverage on bilateral and 
multilateral trade issues.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Econ, Commercial, USAID-Ghana and USAID-West Africa 
Regional Program (WARP) officers consulted internally and 
with the GoG and private sector to gauge the economic and 
political impact that failure to extend the AGOA third 
country fabric provision could have on Ghana and the region. 
The consensus is that in both Ghana and other countries in 
the region AGOA is as much a political phenomenon as it is an 
economic program.  Therefore, while there would not be a 
significant economic impact, there would be negative 
political repercussions. 
 
Economic Impact in Ghana 
------------------------ 
¶3. (C) The Trade Ministry argues that failure to extend the 
third country textile provision would destroy the GoG's 
efforts to encourage investment in the sector.  Existing 
companies are also worried.  An Indian firm in Ghana told 
USAID that without access to third country fabric it would 
shut down and lay off 300 workers.  This would probably 
repeat throughout the sector, and the GoG would not welcome 
such job losses so close to the December election. 
 
¶4. (C) GoG officials' public comments have led the Ghanaian 
public to believe that AGOA itself, not the third country 
textile provisions, will end September 30.  Post has 
clarified this point to the GoG and press.  Apparel make up 
about ten percent of total exports under AGOA/GSP, but the 
GoG sees it the area with the most possibilities for export 
growth.  Therefore, eliminating opportunities in the sector 
would create the perception in both government and the 
general public that the main benefits under AGOA had ceased. 
 
Bilateral and Multilateral Impact -- Ghana 
------------------------------------------ 
¶5. (C) The GoG has enacted a Presidential Special Initiative 
(PSI) on textiles and apparel.  Post has previously reported 
on the lack of focus of PSIs and our concerns about the GoG's 
ability to "pick winners" (Refs B and C). By not extending 
the third country textile provision, the GoG would be able to 
blame the U.S. for both the failure of the Textile/Apparel 
PSI and its inability to deliver on promises of over 100,000 
jobs and increased investment. 
 
¶6. (C) Reducing Ghana's benefits under AGOA would also 
undermine the USG's efforts to influence the GoG to maintain 
open-market oriented policies.   The GoG is developing a 
"National Trade Policy," with USAID and other donor help, and 
GoG officials are facing increasing pressure to protect local 
industry.  For example, the Trade Ministry acquiesced to 
demands from Ghanaian poultry companies and limited licenses 
for large scale poultry imports from the U.S. (Ref D).  The 
GoG will be even less disposed to resist protectionist 
demands and ensure the National Trade Policy has a free 
market focus if it loses preferential access into the U.S. 
market. 
 
¶7. (C) As USTR has highlighted, Ghana was one of the few 
developing countries to play a positive role during the 
Cancun meetings.  Reducing or even eliminating Ghana's 
limited gains on increased investment and exports to the U.S. 
would make the GoG less inclined to cooperate on WTO issues 
and would leave it more focused on agriculture as the main 
sector with export growth potential. 
 
Regional Impact 
--------------- 
¶8. (C) USAID-WARP officers note that approximately 75 percent 
of sub-Saharan African apparel exports under AGOA use third 
country fabric.  There are few viable alternatives:  U.S. 
fabric is 20 to 40 percent more expensive, primary textiles 
produced in sub-Saharan Africa are generally low quality and 
produced in insufficient quantities.  Even textiles from the 
predominant African producer, South Africa, are cost 
prohibitive because of the strong Rand.  Without a prolonged 
phase-out period, apparel firms in West Africa would not have 
the opportunity to build linkages with other AGOA countries 
and invest in local textile production to lower dependence on 
mostly Asian fabric.  Again, while Post believes the regional 
economic impact would be limited because total sales are 
relatively low, the change would effectively cut regional 
apparel firms out of the U.S. market.  Whatever limited 
success AGOA has had in West Africa -- mainly in the apparel 
sector -- will end. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶9. (C) The U.S. uses AGOA to prove to African governments 
that we are interested in their economic development.  The 
GoG and other governments in the region have two central 
areas of interest with regards to trade:  apparel and 
agriculture.  Aside from the GoG and other countries' 
negative reaction to eliminating the third country fabric 
provision, it would encourage them to focus even more on 
agricultural issues in bilateral and multilateral discussions. 
 
¶10. (C) This sector may disappear anyway, with or without 
AGOA III.  The fierce global competition that will ensue 
following the expiration of the Multi-Fiber Agreement will 
likely put an end to most of the inefficient, local textile 
and apparel producers, with the possible exception of turnkey 
operations (using U.S. cloth).  In this case, however, 
company failures and job losses would not be blamed on a 
change in U.S. Government policies.  End Comment 
Yates