This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  VATICAN 001968 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR T U/S BOLTON AND EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2014 
TAGS: PARM PREL IR LY IN PK IS VT
SUBJECT: U/S BOLTON PREVIEWS SEA ISLAND NON-PROLIFERATION 
INITIATIVES FOR HOLY SEE FM 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James Nicholson. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Under Secretary Bolton previewed Sea Island G-8 
Summit non-proliferation initiatives for Holy See Foreign 
Minister Giovanni Lajolo May 17, emphasizing the 
President's desire to ensure that efforts to address WMD 
threats were a priority for G-8 nations.  Bolton 
highlighted progress in implementing the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), including its success in 
interdicting nuclear equipment destined for Libya.  He 
reviewed the status of the Global Partnership initiative to 
address the legacy of the Soviet-era WMD programs, and 
outlined the U.S. desire to close loopholes in the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that created the potential 
for easy transfer from civilian to military applications. 
FM Lajolo asked about the status of Libyan disarmament, as 
well as North Korean, Indian, Pakistani, and Israeli 
nuclear programs.  Lajolo also reviewed his recent meeting 
with 
the Iranian vice-Foreign Minister, who promised the Vatican 
that Iran would completely meet its IAEA commitments by the 
time of the next meeting in Vienna.  End Summary. 
 
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WMD Proliferation in Focus for G-8 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Continuing a regular dialogue with the Holy See on 
international non-proliferation and arms control efforts, 
U/S John Bolton told the Holy See's Foreign Minister 
equivalent, Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo, that the United 
States believes the proliferation of biological, chemical 
and nuclear weapons continues to pose a serious threat to 
global security despite some recent successes.  Given U.S. 
concerns, President Bush had asked that WMD be a primary 
focus of the June 8 Sea Island G-8 Summit.  Bolton outlined 
the G-8 non-proliferation agenda, which would include a 
review of the PSI, an effort to expand the Global 
Partnership (GP), and an initiative to close loopholes in 
the NPT that allow states to pursue fissile material and 
develop expertise for nuclear weapons under peaceful cover. 
 
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Proliferation Security Initiative 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In its first year, Bolton told Lajolo, the PSI had 
resulted in expanded international cooperation to interdict 
shipments of WMD materials and prevent them from moving 
from states of concern to other states or non-state 
actors.  The initiative had scored a major success last 
October when the U.S., working with Germany, Italy, and the 
UK stopped and seized a shipment of centrifuge equipment 
destined for Libya that could have facilitated uranium 
enrichment.  This interdiction, Bolton suggested, may have 
played a role in Libya's decision to abandon its nuclear 
weapons programs. 
 
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The Global Partnership 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) A second objective of the Sea Island Summit, Bolton 
said, would be to expand the Global Partnership against the 
spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, which 
had been launched at the Kananaskis G-8 Summit in June 
2002, and which had contributed to the destruction of 
missile silos and chemical weapons, as well as to the 
conversion of reactors from highly to low enriched 
uranium.  The U.S. has committed 10 billion dollars to the 
Partnership over ten years, and was looking to its G-8 and 
other partners to come up with an additional 10 billion 
dollars to reach the 20 billion target established at 
Kananaskis.  While preventing dangerous materials from 
falling into the wrong hands, the program would also help 
bring Russia in line with its START and other treaty 
commitments, while allowing for the expansion of programs 
to ensure legitimate employment for weapons scientists. 
Lajolo welcomed this initiative and expressed hope it could 
be expanded to address this threat. 
 
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Closing NPT Loopholes 
--------------------- 
 
 
¶5. (C) A third priority for the U.S. at Sea Island, Bolton 
explained, would be to build support for an initiative to 
close loopholes in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that allow 
countries to be in full compliance with the NPT while 
acquiring the skills and materials to bring them very close 
to nuclear weapons capability.  The U.S. has tabled a 
number of reforms that we believe would prevent the spread 
of uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.  The 
Under Secretary observed that this has been a controversial 
initiative, and has required the U.S. to explore ways to 
ensure that low enriched fuel can be made available at low 
cost as highly enriched plants are converted.  If the G-8 
can agree on this, it would set an international standard 
that would form a useful foundation for future 
international discussions on closing loopholes. 
 
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Iranian Compliance with IAEA Commitments 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) FM Lajolo told the Under Secretary that he had 
recently received the Iranian Vice Foreign Minister, who 
assured him that Iran would be in full compliance with IAEA 
requirements by the time of the next commission review 
meeting in Vienna.  Lajolo also noted that the Iranian 
Minister had complained about what he considered the double 
standards vis-a-vis Iran's treatment compared to that of 
Israel and India.  Bolton responded that it is true that 
Iran wants to get off the IAEA's agenda and close its file, 
but that they have too much work to do to disclose recently 
uncovered programs to meet this timeline.  He pointed out 
that Iran had agreed with Germany, the UK, and France to 
suspend all uranium enrichment activities in exchange for 
expanded energy cooperation.  Unfortunately, Iran had not 
stopped production of centrifuge components or design work 
for an advanced centrifuge.  Iran is hoping to get off the 
IAEA's agenda, and then resume its enrichment work, Bolton 
explained, but he saw no prospect that the file would be 
closed anytime soon given the number of unanswered 
questions about Iranian programs.  Bolton stressed that the 
U.S. was working closely with EU countries on this issue, 
and would continue to work to make all of the Middle East 
free of nuclear weapons. 
 
¶7. (C) Lajolo also raised the Iranian Minister's claim that 
Iran needed the nuclear facility for economic purposes and 
long term energy security.  Bolton pointed out that Iran 
allows four times the amount of energy that would be 
produced at the Bushehr reactor to escape into the 
atmosphere.  Simply by scaling back this waste and loss, it 
would recoup far more than it would gain from nuclear 
power.  Bolton said that revelations of I.Q. Khan's nuclear 
dealings left no doubt that Iran is intent on building a 
nuclear weapons program, and will remain a serious 
proliferation problem for some time to come. 
 
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Libya 
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¶8. (C) In contrast to Iran and North Korea, Bolton told 
Lajolo, Libya had recently demonstrated how a country can 
give up its nuclear programs and reap benefits from greater 
international cooperation.  Libya had come to realize that 
its nuclear ambitions were not making it safer, but were 
increasing its risks from international sanction and 
potential military action.  Lajolo asked about the status 
of Libya's disarmament process and prospects for a 
resumption of full diplomatic relations with Libya.  Bolton 
indicated that Qadafi had been cooperating fully, allowing 
the U.S. and UK to move all of his nuclear equipment to Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee.  The U.S. and the international community 
had lifted major sanctions and, after resolving some 
remaining issues, it was likely that our relations could be 
upgraded by the end of the year. 
 
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North Korea 
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¶9. (C) Lajolo said it appeared to the Holy See that North 
Korea was trying to use its nuclear capability to leverage 
assistance from the West.  Bolton, commenting that this is 
also called blackmail, said it was hard to understand 
exactly what North Korea was after.  Even the Chinese were 
mystified, he noted.  To us, it appears the North Koreans 
want to keep their capability and get western assistance -- 
something the U.S. would not accept.  The U.S. was 
committed to resolving the North Korea threat 
 
 
diplomatically, and we were prepared to meet again in 
Beijing in June if this would be helpful. 
 
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India, Pakistan, and Israel 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Touching briefly on other nuclear countries, 
Lajolo asked what the U.S. was doing in regard to nuclear 
capabilities in India, Pakistan and Israel.  On India and 
Pakistan, the Under Secretary pointed out that the U.S. had 
been engaged intensively and successfully over the past two 
years to prevent the dispute over the Kashmir from spilling 
over to a nuclear showdown.  Pakistan remained a source of 
great concern in the face of continued assassination 
attempts on President Musharaf and the potential for a 
radical takeover.  On Israel, Bolton observed that the 
Israeli nuclear program offered an ultimate protection 
against being driven into the Mediterranean.  The U.S. did 
not regard the Israeli program as a threat to the region, 
as Israel would never use it unless attacked.  He noted 
that Libya had often cited Israel as an excuse for their 
nuclear program, but now insists that they know Israel 
would not attack unprovoked.  The U.S. goal remained to rid 
the Middle East of all nuclear weapons, but this had to be 
done one state at a time. 
 
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Comment 
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¶11.  (C) FM Lajolo expressed appreciation for Bolton's 
briefing on U.S. non-proliferation priorities and 
activities, and affirmed his interest in continuing such 
discussions in light of the Holy See's interest in arms 
control worldwide.  U/S Bolton noted that the Holy See had 
always been active in the NPT and an important voice on 
arms control, and he looked forward to staying in contact. 
 
¶12.  (U) This cable has been cleared by Under Secretary 
Bolton. 
 
Nicholson 
 
 
NNNN 
 

 2004VATICA01968 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL