This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001191 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EB/ESP; U.S. CUSTOMS HG FOR STRATEGIC 
INVESTIGATIONS; ROME FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC YE
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK REPORT: PRE-LICENSE CHECK FADEL 
AL-HUSSEINI 
 
REF: A. USDOC 01535 
     ¶B. SANAA 00823 
     ¶C. USDOC 00982 
 
¶1. (u) Summary.  Reftel c requested a pre-license check (PLC) 
of the cargo trucks and spare parts of the Republican Guard 
of Yemen.  Despite repeated attempts, Post did not get the 
full cooperation of the Republican Guard and was not able to 
access facilities to conduct the PLC as requested by 
Department of Commerce (DOC).  Over a period of 60 days, with 
the help of a four-week extension (ref a) on the original 
deadline (ref c), Post explained the PLC process and 
consequences of noncompliance to the Republican Guard of 
Yemen through both diplomatic and military liaison channels. 
After having consulted with DOC officials, Post will send a 
diplomatic note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and 
the Republican Guard outlining the possible repercussions, 
including loss of the license to receive these export 
commodities.  End Summary. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2. (u) Post received original PLC request in reftel c on 
March 8.   The purchaser is the Fadel Al-Husseini Trading 
Group.  The enduser is the Republican Guard of Yemen.  The 
enduser site is the training and storage facilities of the 
Yemeni Republican Guard camps. 
 
¶3. (sbu) In reftel b, Post requested an extension of four 
weeks to pursue investigating the extrancheck request.  USDOC 
granted a four-week extension until May 10 (ref a). 
 
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ATTEMPTS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (u) Starting March 13, Emboffs made repeated attempts 
through emails, telephone calls, and faxes (per Republican 
Guard request) to arrange a pre-license check visit (ref b). 
On March 31, Post submitted a diplomatic note to the 
Republican Guard through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) requesting cooperation on the extrancheck.  Post 
repeatedly notified all parties that the extrancheck is a 
requirement of the agreement to purchase these commodities. 
Emboffs contacted many parties at the MFA and the Republican 
Guard including the following: Major Walid al-Eryani, Deputy 
Office Manager of the Commander Ali's office; Zaid 
al-Wareeth, MFA Protocol; and, Hadi Haidarah Qassem, MFA 
Protocol.  In their comments, the parties demonstrated 
understanding but did not allow Emboffs to inspect any cargo 
trucks or the maintenance shop for the trucks. 
 
¶5. (u) Based on consultations with DOC officials, Post will 
send a diplomatic note to the MFA and the Republican Guard 
informing them of the consequences of noncompliance, which 
include placement on the interagency list of "unverified 
parties" and potential non-issuance of this or future 
licenses. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
ATTEMPTS THROUGH MILITARY LIASON CHANNELS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (sbu) Post recruited the assistance of the Operational 
Control Element in Sanaa (OCE-S) from the United States 
Special Operations Force.  Jeffrey Cuiper, Officer in Charge 
of  OCE-S, and James Holmes, OCE-S Chief of Operations, train 
and supply military equipment to the Special Operations Force 
of Republic of Yemen (Y-SOF).  The head of the Yemeni Special 
Operations Force is also the head of the Republican Guard, 
Ahmed Ali, son of President Saleh.  Since April 13, OCE-S has 
made repeated requests to Ahmed Ali's office through Captain 
Rajeh, liason officer of Y-SOF and the Republican Guard. 
With our assistance, OCE-S provided all vehicle 
identification numbers (VINs) of the cargo trucks the 
Republican Guard has already received from American companies 
through the Al-Husseini Company.  Post requested to see any 
five cargo trucks of 17 VINs provided.  OCE-S's requests for 
inspection of parts and cargo trucks has so far gone 
unanswered despite notification that if the Republican Guard 
blocks this inspection, this order may not be shipped and 
that all future military equipment from the U.S. Department 
of Defense may also be jeopardized. 
 
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CONTACTS WITH DOC 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (u) In a April 3 teleconference, Emboff consulted Mary 
O'Brien, Department of Commerce employee in Abu Dhabi, 
regarding the extrancheck.  Post faxed her the bills of 
lading and other documents provided by Fadel Al-Husseini. 
She indicated that inspection of cargo trucks and spare parts 
in the maintenance shop are essential to this pre-license 
check. 
 
¶8. (sbu) Per a May 11 teleconference with Tom Andrukonis, DOC 
Office of Enforcement, Post obtained an outline of possible 
consequences of noncompliance with the pre-license check. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (sbu) Despite being notified of the potential consequences 
of non-compliance, the Republican Guard has been 
uncooperative with Post's requests to allow the pre-license 
check.  Post utilized multiple channels of inquiry to assist 
the Republican Guard with this purchase.  Nevertheless, the 
Republican Guard failed to allow access to the facilities and 
equipment as requested.  Post has limited confidence that 
this most recent diplomatic note will improve the situation. 
End Comment. 
HULL