This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 001911 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON IT ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: ITALY'S BERLUSCONI UNDER POLITICAL PRESSURE; 
EXPECTS BOOST FROM MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH 
 
REF: A. A) ROME 1734 
     ¶B. B) ROME 1661 
     ¶C. C) ROME 1567 
     ¶D. D) 03 ROME 5121 
 
Classified By: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C)  The Berlusconi Government is under increasing 
political pressure in the build-up to June 12-13 European 
Parliament and local elections.  A combination of global and 
domestic events -- Iraqi prisoner abuse and Italy's purported 
knowledge thereof, heavy fighting in Italy's sector of Iraq, 
the lingering hostage crisis, vocal pressure from Italy's 
large pacifist block to remove troops from Iraq, various 
economic crises and a near-miss on an EU deficit warning -- 
has put the governing coalition on the defensive.  The 
pressure is not of the type to bring down the Government, nor 
to weaken the Prime Minister's intention of staying the 
course in Iraq.  The coalition's prospects in the elections, 
however, are less than rosy, and a poor outcome will increase 
tensions between member parties.  PM Berlusconi sees his 
upcoming meetings with the President as a way to boost his 
electoral chances.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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EXTERNAL PRESSURES 
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¶2.  (C)  The onslaught of negative international political 
news, combined with some poor domestic performances, is 
putting increasing political pressure on the Berlusconi 
governing coalition in the run-up to June 12-13 European 
Parliament and local elections.  The opposition, sensing 
weakness, seeks to exploit every advantage -- and to create 
some from scratch.  The flood of images of tortured and 
humiliated Iraqi prisoners at the hands of some U.S. 
soldiers, occurring in the Iraqi campaign which Berlusconi 
devoutly supports, does little to help America's 
self-proclaimed "closest ally in continental Europe."  The 
opposition-induced "what the Government knew and when it knew 
it" scandal alleging Italy's complicity in torture cover-up 
makes matters worse.  (The widow of one of the Carbinieri 
killed in the November 12 bombing in Nasiriya (Ref D) either 
did or did not suggest her murdered husband told her he had 
seen prisoner torture and reported it to his superiors.  The 
widow claims her remarks to a journalist were manipulated.) 
 
¶3.  (C)  Meanwhile, Italy's hostage crisis drags on, with the 
three hostages seemingly still alive, but no sign that they 
will be freed soon -- contributing to an image of an 
ineffectual government.  Intensified fighting throughout 
Iraq, including in Italy's sector, resulted in one Italian 
killed and 16 wounded in recent days.  These exceptional 
events overlay the already vocal controversy over the Italian 
troop presence there.  The majority of the Italian public 
does not support Italian involvement in Iraq (about 70 
percent, when asked about the war itself, although only 52 
percent supported immediate withdrawal of Italian troops). 
The far-left political spectrum has taken its cue, endlessly 
protesting the U.S. presence in Iraq and calling for an 
immediate withdrawal of Italian troops. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Until recently, moderates in the center-left 
opposition had taken the high ground, acknowledging the 
humanitarian nature of the mission, supporting Italian troops 
under pressure, but demanding an increased UN role.  That 
changed under the weight of the prison torture reports.  In a 
May 13 meeting led by European Commission President (and 
opposition leader and expected candidate against Berlusconi 
in the next national elections) Romano Prodi, the moderate 
opposition switched tacks to call for the withdrawal of 
troops, absent "a radical change" before May 20.  (PM 
Berlusconi is slated to appear before Parliament to defend 
the Government's position on Iraq on May 20, the day after 
his meeting in Washington with President Bush.) 
 
¶5.  (C)  The center-left justified its about-face by saying 
revelations of torture in Iraq erase any concept of a 
humanitarian mission in Iraq.  The opposition plans to craft 
a resolution to gain the united support of all the left, from 
the radicals to the moderates.  If the resolution calls 
forthrightly for troop withdrawal, that will be easy going. 
If the moderates seek to parse what they mean by "radical 
change," they risk losing those further to the left.  This 
has made the Berlusconi Government's balancing act more 
delicate, as it seeks to maintain its commitment to building 
 
 
Iraqi democracy while needing a credible showing in upcoming 
elections. 
 
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MEANWHILE, ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT 
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¶6.  (C)  If external events were not enough, Berlusconi has 
also faced a series of internal challenges, not sufficient to 
threaten the stability of his coalition, but enough to 
increase tensions and add to the political perception of a 
government "on the run."  Wildcat strikes at Alitalia, 
Italy's national flag airline, disrupted domestic and some 
international flights for over a week.  The Government's 
response -- select a new CEO and offer a government-backed 
bridge loan -- is under criticism, even from some within the 
coalition.  At the same time, strikes at a FIAT plant 
resulted in lost production of tens of thousands of 
automobiles (although the wage agreement part of the package 
called for only modest wage increases over eighteen months.) 
Italy barely escaped a pre-election "early warning" for 
potentially violating the EU's three percent budget 
deficit/GDP ceiling.  (COMMENT:  Prodi must not have been 
asked for his views on that decision.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶7.  (C)  The Government pushed back, declaring its intent to 
implement spending cuts, balanced by tax cuts, soon.  In one 
positive economic development, the Senate passed a 
long-awaited, if modest, pension reform measure that will 
raise the retirement age -- but this will also require 
careful explanation to the electorate.  The continued bleak 
economic picture has contributed to an image of a coalition 
lacking a program, unity and resolve. 
 
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IT'S ABOUT VOTES, 
AND THE PRESIDENT CAN HELP 
-------------------------- 
¶8.  (C)  The unrelenting onslaught of negative news makes the 
Government look weak, and all indicators suggest the 
center-right coalition parties will see setbacks in June, 
both in local elections and in the European parliamentary 
elections.  This is normal for mid-term elections, but the 
trend is exacerbated by current events.  The opposition has 
been quick to seek advantage, with the about-face on keeping 
troops in Iraq the prime example.  The Government has the 
votes to defeat any resolution introduced by the opposition 
and will do so.  A motion calling for immediate troop 
withdrawal will not weaken Berlusconi's resolve to keep 
Italian troops in Iraq; DefMin Martino held the line in an 
intense "question time" before the Senate May 13.  Likewise, 
the motion is unlikely to cause a rupture in the governing 
coalition that would bring down the Government; this 
coalition will hold through and past the elections. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Such a motion, however, would be extremely popular 
with the Italian public and a highly effective campaign ploy. 
 The opposition has made little headway with counterproposals 
on economic issues and has essentially no platform to 
juxtapose against the governing coalition's.  So it sees the 
advantage in having June 12-13 European Parliament-local 
elections turn on events in Iraq, on the question of "peace 
or war."  Presented with such an ultimatum, the Italian 
public is solidly in favor of "peace."  A united opposition 
motion on Iraq will enhance prospects for a poor showing by 
the four governing coalition member parties, with 
Berlusconi's Forza Italia and DPM Fini's National Alliance 
likely to take the biggest hits. 
 
¶10.  (C)  His upcoming meetings with the President are an 
integral part of Berlusconi's strategy.  For the committed 
leftist electorate, the encounters are only negative -- but 
Berlusconi will not win votes from this sector, in any case. 
For committed rightist voters, the meetings will help, and 
might convince some to vote for Forza Italia, rather than one 
of the other coalition partners.  (Voting will be 
proportional, pitting each party against the others in a test 
of strength.)  But the test is Italy's centrist, uncommitted 
voters.  Left, right and center are closely balanced in the 
Italian electorate.  The winning coalition is the one that 
attracts the center.  Berlusconi is banking that the center 
will be attracted by a Prime Minister who can deal 
effectively on the international stage, even with the leader 
of the world's only superpower. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Some -- mostly those on the far left -- will see 
the test as being whether Berlusconi can convince the 
President to ask Secretary Rumsfeld to resign.  There are 
some calls for this, but we doubt the Prime Minister would 
 
 
think of making such a suggestion.  Most will look to see 
whether the President and the Prime Minister interact as 
equals, whether Italy is involved in the development of a new 
UN resolution on Iraq, and whether Berlusconi secures a 
renewed expression of America's determination to see justice 
done in the torture cases.  If so, Berlusconi is betting on a 
pre-election boost from his contacts with his good friend. 
 
¶12.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
 
Visit Rome's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m 
 
SKODON 
 
 
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 2004ROME01911 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL