This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000611 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/17/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM NLD
SUBJECT: RAZALI'S "MAN IN RANGOON" ON NATIONAL CONVENTION 
STATE OF PLAY 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 600 
     ¶B. 03 RANGOON 1431 
     ¶C. RANGOON 601 
     ¶D. RANGOON 544 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B/D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Leon de Reidmatten (LDR), UN Special Envoy 
Razali's "man in Rangoon" told COM that up until May 12, NLD 
leaders believed that an agreement had been reached to allow 
the party to participate in the National Convention.  Despite 
the NLD's May 14 announcement that they would not 
participate, LDR believes there is still a very faint 
possibility of a compromise.  LDR said that Prime Minister 
Khin Nyunt is now "very weak" and unable to deliver on his 
long-standing promises of a meeting between ASSK and the "Big 
Three" of the SPDC.  He said the current impasse demonstrates 
that Senior General Than Shwe has a firm grip on power and 
little or no intention to enter into a real dialog with the 
opposition.  On the subject of SE Razali, LDR believes Razali 
still wants to travel to Rangoon soon and knows that the SE 
will need to come prepared to overcome the NLD's perception 
that he is asking more from it than from the SPDC in the way 
of compromise.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) COM met with UN Special Envoy Razali's "man in 
Rangoon," Leon de Reidmatten, on the morning of Monday, April 
¶17.  De Reidmatten, a close confidante of Aung San Suu Kyi, 
said he was surprised on Friday, May 14, when the National 
League for Democracy announced (Ref A) it would not 
participate in the National Convention (NC).  According to 
LDR, up until Wednesday, May 12, ASSK and the other NLD 
leaders believed, based on their talks with SPDC 
interlocutors (the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister 
of Labor), that the following agreement had been reached 
which would have allowed the party to participate in the NC: 
the two remaining senior NLD party leaders, ASSK and U Tin 
Oo, would be released from house arrest before the opening of 
the NC; the NLD offices could reopen; and the NLD would be 
allowed to select 54 delegates to the NC. 
 
¶3. (C) However, LDR said he had not known before the May 14 
press conference that the compromise fell apart on Thursday 
night, May 13, when the SPDC interlocutors advised the NLD 
that Senior General Than Shwe refused to approve it.  The 
regime's best offer would be for ASSK and U Tin Oo to remain 
under house arrest and NLD branch party offices would remain 
closed, but the opportunity for the NLD to name delegates to 
the NC apparently remains on the table.  LDR said that the 
SPDC representatives tried to assuage ASSK by praising her 
past cooperative attitude (saying she was "so dutiful") and 
then tried to get her to instruct the NLD to participate 
under these obviously unacceptable conditions. 
 
¶4. (C) According to LDR, ASSK could not accept the terms 
offered the night of May 13, and the NLD announced its 
non-participation on the morning of May 14.  Shortly 
afterwards, LDR was approached by regime representatives and 
asked to try and get the NLD to compromise and participate in 
the NC.  LDR said he told the regime representatives he would 
not make an approach to the NLD unless he could propose the 
following:  the regime would set a date, preferably within a 
few weeks, for the release of ASSK and U Tin Oo; the regime 
would provide a firm timeline for the reopening of NLD branch 
offices; and the NLD would be allowed to freely name 54 
delegates to the NC.  Only under these conditions would he 
propose to the NLD the idea of participating in the NC while 
ASSK and U Tin Oo remain under house arrest and the NLD 
offices remain closed.  The regime envoys agreed and then he 
discussed the terms with NLD spokesman U Lwin on Saturday. 
By that same evening U Lwin advised him that ASSK and the NLD 
leadership were amenable to the compromise (terms of which 
had apparently been floated before). However, as of the 
morning of May 17, LDR says he has not been contacted further 
by the regime and does not believe the NLD has received a 
response to the compromise offer. 
 
¶5. (C) LDR feels that there is still a very faint glimmer of 
hope that the regime might see the light.  He praised the 
restraint shown in the Department's and the UNSYG's 
statements over the weekend regarding the state of the NC 
process.  He feels there are still face-saving ways the 
regime could accept the compromise offer and allow the NLD to 
participate, despite missing the NC opening ceremonies today. 
 The regime could claim that the first week, or even two, was 
being devoted to administrative and logistical matters, or 
that the start of monsoon season had delayed the arrival of 
other delegates, or could manufacture a host of other excuses 
for allowing the NLD's late entry into the NC. 
 
¶6. (C) LDR also said that ASSK was frustrated that the regime 
did not believe her assurances that she would not press too 
soon for an investigation of the May 30, 2003, Depeyin attack 
(Note: ASSK told UN Special Rapporteur Pinheiro on his last 
visit in November 2003 that there was a need for restraint on 
this matter, see Ref B.  End Note).  LDR said that ASSK knows 
there are those in her party that could be considered 
"hardliners" who want to use May 30 against the regime, but 
that she can control them and will take full responsibility 
for the party's actions if she is released. 
 
¶7. (C) In reference to the cease-fire groups that are 
participating in the NC, LDR said that he thought the SPDC 
would have a tough time handling them and keeping them in the 
process if they stick to their demands for amendment of the 
SPDC's six political objectives (Ref C).  He felt the 
cease-fire groups' demands were tougher than the three 
"suggestions" the NLD conveyed to the SPDC in late April (see 
Ref D). 
 
¶8. (C) LDR said he had not spoken to SE Razali today, but he 
felt that the SE still wants to come to Burma soon.  LDR said 
he was wrestling with developing recommendations for what 
approach the SE should take if another visit is allowed by 
the regime.  COM reminded LDR that she, the Australian, and 
the U.K. COM's had told LDR that the NLD felt like the 
international community and the SE were asking the NLD to 
make all the compromises and hoped that the SE understood 
that the NLD needed to be reassured that equal pressure was 
being placed on the SPDC.  LDR said he was also aware of the 
NLD's sentiments and would emphasize this to the SE. 
 
¶9. (C) The meeting concluded on a down beat note - LDR said 
that Prime Minister Khin Nyuent is "very weak" and unable to 
deliver on his long-standing promise of a meeting between 
ASSK and the "Big Three" - Senior General Than Shwe, General 
Maung Aye, and the Prime Minister himself.  In LDR's view, 
the current impasse demonstrates that the Senior General has 
a firm grip on power and little or no intention of entering 
into a real dialog with the opposition. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment:  Although the recent events are highly 
discouraging, we agree with LDR's assessment that there could 
still be a very faint possibility of a compromise that would 
allow NLD participation in the NC (FYI: COM was told by one 
of the COM's that attended the opening of the National 
Convention this morning that Deputy Foreign Minister Win Aung 
told a small group of COM's at the ceremony that procedurally 
it would be difficult for the NLD to participate at this late 
date, but that a political decision to allow their 
participation could be a possibility. End FYI).  On the 
subject of Razali, if he should be allowed back in by the 
regime, he will need to come prepared to overcome the NLD's 
perception that he is asking more than they can continue to 
give in the way of further compromise with the SPDC.  End 
Comment. 
Martinez